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ABSTRACT 
The failure to consider the complexity of the regional telecommunication systems in 
planning has increased the telecom gap between other regions and the rural sectors in 
the developing countries. Earmarked funds generated by Universal Service Obligations 
and various types of other direct and cross-subsidies have not helped this situation.  
This research uses system dynamics modeling approach to understand the complexity of 
the system and to evaluate how different policies affect telephone densities. It is 
demonstrated that some of the prevalent policies may be counterproductive. Policy 
experiments with the model demonstrate that market-clearing pricing implemented with 
Universal Service Obligations, and a value-added service combination may significantly 
improve rural telecommunications. 
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PREFACE 
The poor people that live in rural areas of developing countries lack of the opportunities 
and benefits that people from cities and metropolis have. This dissertation is intended to 
improve the access of the rural population to telephone services, which are considered 
essential for economic development. This research was developed to shed light on the 
issue of external and cross subsidies in telecommunications in developing countries and 
to develop policies that have a synergic and positive impact on telephone dispersion.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Objective of this Dissertation  
This dissertation has studied the impact of Universal Service Obligations and 
International Cross-Subsidies on the growth of rural and urban telephone infrastructure 
in developing countries. This research has also analyzed the impact of wireless and 
value added services on the regional dispersion of telephone services in developing 
countries. Computer simulation through System Dynamics modeling is used to evaluate 
these impacts, and to design new policies. Therefore, as a result of this investigation, 
new policies and strategies that are able to outperform previous or existing ones have 
been proposed.  
1.2 Regional Telecommunications in Developing Countries 
Over the past several decades, telecommunications have often been seen as a 
luxury in developing countries while investments in basic needs and infrastructure have 
received much attention (Saunders et. al., 1994). For this reason, developing countries 
account for forty percent of the total number of telephone lines, although they contain 
about eighty percent of the world population. In addition, the low-income developing 
countries have only five percent of the total number of telephone lines worldwide and 
they contain forty percent of the world population. The situation for rural areas of these 
low-income countries is even worse. Although more than fifty percent of their 
population is rural, only 12% of the total number of telephone lines serves these regions 
(World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 2004). There is, however, a growing 
recognition that telecommunications is essential for economic development and 
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political and social integration of remote areas. Linking remote villages to the outside 
world with telecommunications has been observed to improve the quality of life of the 
local populations (Hudson, 1984; The ITU-D Focus Group 7, 2000). The realization 
that telecommunication networks are essential for rural development has called for a 
search for better policies and investment strategies that should increase telephone 
penetration in the rural areas. 
 The deployment of rural telecommunications involves the advancement of the 
universal service policy. Universal service can be defined as the provision of 
universal availability of connections to public telecommunication networks to 
individual households, with non-discriminatory and affordable prices (Hank and 
McCarthy, 2000). An alternative to universal service is universal access, which is 
defined by a situation where every person has a reasonable means of access to a 
publicly available telephone. In practice, progress toward universal service has been 
measured by the percentage of households with telephone service (Cain and Macdonald, 
1991) 
 
1.3 Policies for Improving Telephone Dispersion in Developing Countries 
Several policies have been used by governments and autonomous telecom 
service organizations in developing countries. These include Universal Service 
Obligations (USO), which uses resources generated in urban regions to subsidize the 
deployment of telecom infrastructure in rural regions. The increase of these investment 
obligations increases the percentage of telecom investment assigned to rural areas. 
 17 
However, USO decreases the proportion of telecom investment in urban areas. Another 
common policy is to internally cross-subsidize some services, such as local phone calls, 
with other services in order to increase the demand and the penetration of telephone 
lines. This policy has not only been applied to rural areas but also to urban areas, which 
have been subsidized by the revenue generated from international traffic. 
The cross-subsidies in telecommunications have been regarded as a useful 
mechanism for expanding networks in rural and poor areas of developing countries 
(Laffont and NGbo, 2000), even in the presence of competition (Gasmi et al, 2000). 
The application of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies is 
intended to create positive externalities for expansion of services. They translate into 
network, call, and social externalities, which should improve rural development and the 
social efficiency and benefit (Crandall and Waverman, 2000; Saunders et al., 1994). 
The question addressed in this investigation is whether the intended improvement will 
actually happen in the long term given that there are differences in income per capita, 
willingness to pay, telephone deployment and operating costs, and telephone 
deployment delays between urban and rural areas.   
There are other important policies in developing countries such as the 
privatization and liberalization of the telecom markets, which have been implemented in 
several countries in order to improve telecom services and penetration (Fink et. al., 
2002; Strover, 2003). The Universal Service Fund is applied in more liberalized markets 
and uses resources obtained from several network and service operators to finance 
capital expenditures on rural network deployment (Siochru, 1996). Finally, the use of 
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grant based funding is increasing, which subsidizes the deployment of telecom 
infrastructure using economic resources from the general budget of the country (Kayani 
and Dymond, 1997). 
The current policies for increasing telecommunications deployment in rural 
areas are considered to be insufficient or unsuccessful, and the plans for expansion of 
local telephone networks are considered to be imprecise considering the scope of the 
investment (Malecki, 2003; Melody 1999; Strover, 2003, Calhoun, 1992). For instance, 
telecom privatization has been related to telephone deployment growth but not to 
universal service. In addition, previous studies have suggested that privatization of 
infrastructure delivery would create several problems, since private sector organizations 
are often not designed to deliver public goods (Saeed and Honggang, 2004). In South 
Africa, more than 1.5 million new private telephone lines were disconnected, since the 
private operator did not have the obligation to provide affordable installation, rental, 
and usage nor to keep the overall number of connections at a specific target (Barendse, 
2004).  
1.4 Telecom Technologies and Services for Improving the Telephone Dispersion in 
Developing Countries 
The access plant of the traditional telephone network, as opposed to the switches 
and backhaul connections, is extremely unproductive and underutilized, and shows 
fewer economies of scales since it is largely dedicated. The access plant is considered 
the largest asset of the telephone network, since this can account for more than half of 
the total assets of the company. The traditional access plant is wired, and is largely a 
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function of the distance from the subscriber to central office or switching equipment. 
For this reason, the cost to provide a telephone line to a rural subscriber could be ten 
times the cost for an urban subscriber (Calhoun, 1992). 
Wireless technologies, such as cellular networks and Wireless Local Loop 
(WLL), are seen as a way to increase telephone density in developing countries, due to 
its rapid deployment and lower cost (Noerpel, 1997). It has been observed during 
previous years a rapid growth of cellular networks especially in cities and other urban 
areas. The wireless technologies are less sensitive to distance than traditional wired 
technologies, which make them more attractive for deployment in dispersed or scattered 
rural environments. However, there are still several questions regarding their viability in 
developing countries. For instance, the lack of electricity and of reliable power supply 
has been considered the biggest challenge on deploying wireless systems, mainly in the 
rural areas (Rycroft, 1998). This situation is clearly a problem for African countries, 
where the access to electricity in the urban areas reaches only fifty percent of their 
population, and the access in rural areas is just ten percent (Clarke and Wallsten, 2002).  
In some cases, the low level of telecom penetration in developing countries has 
been attributed to an outdated telecommunications system that prevents the 
implementation  of value added services, which are supposedly able to generate more 
revenue required for telecom investment (Fretes-Cibils et. al., 2003). In some cases, the 
resources invested in value added services, or intelligent network platform, have been 
considered to be worthwhile after the revenue of the telecom company is increased, and 
better service to the subscribers is provided (Hamersma, 1996). However, only few 
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studies have been developed in order to assess the impact that these innovative solutions 
have on increasing the connectivity of nations (Barandse, 2004). 
 
1.5 System Dynamics Modeling of Regional Telecommunications in Developing 
Countries. 
System Dynamics is a holistic methodology that deals with the limitation of 
bounded rationality or linear cause-and-effect relationship commonly applied in policy 
or strategy design, and considers the main interactions and feedback effects between the 
different elements of the system. For this reason, System Dynamics is an appropriate 
simulation methodology for designing and evaluating long-term policies and strategies 
needed for increasing telephone penetration in rural and urban areas of developing 
countries.  
The need for a systems framework to analyze the complexity of the regional 
telecommunication system and the importance of focusing more in economic and social 
aspects rather than the technological ones has been recognized to some degree (Andrew 
and Petkov, 2003). Telecom planning using a long-term and non-linear system 
dynamics approach as compared to tactical approaches, which are reactive, short-term, 
and linear, has been advocated (Lyneis, 1994). In addition, new modeling practices, like 
System Dynamics, has been suggested for the telecommunications industry, which can 
incorporate the trade-offs raised by the emergence of wireless access alternatives, 
especially when applied to rural environments (Calhoun, 1992). System Dynamics is 
used in this dissertation, specifically for investigating the impact of Universal Service 
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Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies on the growth of rural telecom 
infrastructure.  
This dissertation considers System Dynamics modeling as the best methodology 
that deals with the complexity and dynamics of the regional telecom system. This has 
already been successfully applied to design and evaluate long-term policies for 
telecommunications. It has been used to model the demand and supply of 
telecommunications (Jensen et. al., 2002), and as a vehicle for integrating different 
viewpoints of a multidisciplinary team involved in a study of the impact from telecom 
development in rural Canada (Beal, 1976).  
The model developed in this investigation has considered what earlier studies 
have pointed regarding the value of telephone lines perceived by the population. The 
value of telephone lines in rural areas is lower than it is in urban areas because of the 
low-income level, high percentage of primary industry, low level of education, and the 
way of life of the rural population. For example, the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) has shown that the willingness to pay or demand for telecommunications 
services is higher in urban areas than it is in rural areas for the same price (GAS 5, 
1984), while Saunders, Warford, and Wellenius suggest that income of the population 
and the level of education influences the demand of telephones as well as the level of 
telephone traffic. In the same manner, several studies have found that people employed 
in non-agrarian occupations have more demand for telephone services than people 
working in primary industries (Saunders et. al., 1994).  
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1.6 Summary Findings of the Research 
It was found that the International Cross-Subsidies addressed by the model, 
create below cost monthly rental fees by making the international tariffs high and above 
cost values, are counterproductive as they reduce the overall service penetration due to 
financial constraints. The International Cross-Subsidy reduces the monthly rental fee to 
a level lower than the willingness to pay for telephone access and below the operating 
costs in urban areas, which reduces the financial resources used for telephone supply in 
urban and rural areas. The initial increase and later decrease of the monthly rental fee 
applied to urban areas using market-clearing pricing, appears to raise the telephone 
density in urban and rural regions because it improves the financial resources of the 
telecom company and the long-term telephone demand in the urban  areas. 
A Universal Service Obligations policy has also a counterproductive  impact on 
the system. The implementation of Universal Service Obligations reduces the  urban 
and national telephone densities and the rural telecom infrastructure in the long run. 
This occurs due to the dynamic behavior generated when the Universal Service 
Obligation policy is combined with lower willingness to pay for telephone services, and 
higher operating costs and the  obstacles experienced when deploying telecom 
infrastructure in rural regions.  However, if market-clearing pricing is used and the 
Universal Service Obligation is applied after the urban telephone density reaches about 
thirty percent while the supply of urban telephone lines equals the demand, the USO 
policy is able to considerably increase the number of rural subscribers. 
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 It was found that a strategic combination of value added services are able to 
considerably improve the financial resources of the telecom company and the telephone 
densities of the country. On the other hand, the implementation of these services in 
isolation only moderately improved the number of telephone lines. It was also seen that 
prepaid phone, virtual telephony, and payphone services, which are innovative services 
over the telephone network, are able to significantly improve the financial resources of 
the telephone company and the dispersion of telephone lines in urban and rural areas of 
developing countries, only when implemented together.  
 Cellular systems are considered the technology currently in the market that is 
best able to accelerate the dispersion of telephone services in developing countries. This 
technology was found to considerably improve urban and rural telephone densities, 
when tested through the simulations. On the other hand, this investigation found that 
Wireless Local Loop (WLL) could be a viable alternative to improve telephone 
penetration in spite of its relative high cost, especially in low-density countries and rural 
areas, where the cost of wired systems considerably increases and the large coverage 
and low deployment delay of WLL systems become crucial factors on the dispersion of 
telephone services. 
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Chapter 2 Problem Background  
2.1 The Telephone Dispersion Problem in Developing Countries 
Over the past several decades, telecommunications have often been seen as a 
luxury after other investments, but this concept about telecommunications is changing 
as more people recognize its contribution to the development of a shared environment 
that reaches a countrys more remotes areas and can facilitate political, cultural, 
economic and social integration (International Cooperation Planning Department of 
ITU Association of Japan, Inc., 2003). More than fifty percent of the world population 
lives in rural areas of developing countries. These countries account for forty percent of 
the total number of telephone lines, although they are about eighty percent of the world 
population. The low-income developing countries have only five percent of the total 
number of telephone lines worldwide and they are forty percent of the world population 
(World Telecommunication Indicators Database, 2004). Their telephone densities are 
several times greater in the main cities than in provincial towns and rural areas 
(Saunders et. al. 1994).   
The low levels of telephone access, the gap between urban and rural telephone 
densities, and large waiting lists of telephone subscribers show the existence of a large 
volume of unmet telephone demand in developing countries, where the supply of 
telephone lines is lower than the demand (Saunders et. al., 1994; Ros and Banerjee, 
2000). The monthly rental fee, the usefulness of the telephone service, and the income 
per subscriber are considered to influence the demand (Warren, 2002). The usefulness 
of the telephone service is mainly related to the number of subscribers or telephone 
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density (Cain and Macdonald, 1991; Madden et al., 2004; Saunders et al., 1994). On the 
other hand, the supply of telephone lines is constrained by the financial resources 
available, which are a function of the revenues and operation costs of the telecom 
company (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). 
The problem of telephone dispersion in developing countries is observed in 
Figure 1, which shows the growth of telephones per 100 inhabitants from year 1993 to 
2002. It can be seen the very low numbers of telephones lines per 100 inhabitants for 
several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These telephone densities are low 
when compared with densities of developed countries, which are generally higher than 
50 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 
2004). The worst situation is found in Africa where the telephone densities for most 
countries are less than one telephone per 100 inhabitants. Figure 1 shows the telephone 
densities of 6 African countries: Zambia, Malawi, Chad, Uganda, Togo, and Botswana. 
The telephone densities in Asia and Latin America are similar and are a little bit better 
than Africa since they are higher than one. However, these are generally lower than ten 
telephones per 100 inhabitants. Figure 1 shows the telephone densities of 5 Asian 
countries: Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, India, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and 4 American 
countries: El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras. However, it can also be 
observed that in some cases the telephone densities have been reduced, such as the case 
of Zambia and Tajikistan. 
The historical behavior of demand and supply of telecommunications in 
developing countries is shown in Figure 2. This behavior represents the supply problem 
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of telephone lines in developing countries, where the waiting list of subscribers are 
higher than the new telephone lines available to connect (Pahlavan and Krishnamurthy, 
2002). The waiting list of subscribers is part of the unmet or unsatisfied demand, which 
is increased as more customers decide to subscribe to the telephone service. This 
decision is based on the value the telephone service represents to the potential customer, 
who considers the price and the usefulness of the service in order to make a decision. 
On the other hand, the size of the waiting lists is decreased as more new telephones are 
available. In developing countries, the number of new telephones deployed is a function 
of the financial resources available and not of the unmet demand. 
The problem of supply and demand of telephone lines in Nepal, Togo, Sudan, 
Syria, Botswana, and India is shown in Figure 2, which shows the growth of waiting 
lists and new telephones installed through time. It can be seen that the waiting lists are 
growing and are higher than the new telephones lines connected per year. The statistics 
do not consider the fact that unrecorded demand has beenwas found to be 
approximately three times the number of orders in the waiting list (Wellenius, 1969). It 
can also be observed that the gap between the waiting list and the new telephone lines is 
also growing in several countries, such as the case of Nepal, Togo, Sudan, and Syria. 
For instance, the waiting lists in Nepal grew from about 50,000 telephones in 1993 to 
350,000 in 2001. However, the new telephones installed remained below 50,000 lines. 
In the same manner, the waiting lists in Sudan grew from 50,000 telephones in 1992 to 
450,000 telephones in 2001, and the new telephones installed remained below 100,000 
lines.  Additional data from several developing countries also confirm this behavior, 
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where the unmet applications (waiting lists) are even higher than the total supply of 
telephone lines, which includes the total telephone lines installed and the new telephone 
lines available to connect (Saunders et. al., 1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      a) Africa                                                                                     b) Asia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            c) Latin America 
                                               Figure 1. Telephones per 100 inhabitants 
                                           Source: World Telecommunications Indicators Database (2004) 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Years
Zambia
Malaw i
Chad
Uganda
Togo
Botswana
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Years
Nepal
Kyrgyzstan
India
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Years
El Salvador
Bolivia
Ecuador
Honduras
 28 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
YEARS
Te
le
ph
o
n
e 
Li
n
es
Waiting List
New Lines
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
Te
le
ph
o
n
e 
Li
n
es
Waiting List
New Lines
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
YEARS
Te
le
ph
o
n
e 
Li
n
es
Waiting List
New Lines
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Years
Te
le
ph
o
n
e 
Li
n
es
Wating List
New Lines
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
YEARS
Te
le
ph
o
n
e 
Li
n
es
 
(M
ill
io
n
s)
Waiting List
New Lines
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Figure 2a. Nepal's Waiting List vs. New lines                                                             Figure 2b. Togo’s Waiting List vs. New Lines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 2c. Sudan’s Waiting List vs. New Lines                                                               Figure 2d. Syria’s Waiting List vs. New Lines  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2e. Botswana’s Waiting List vs. New Lines                                                  Figure 2f. India’s Waiting List vs. New Lines  
Figure 2. Waiting List vs. New Lines in selected Developing Countries 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics. Telecommunication Services (2001) and World 
Development Indicators Database (2004). 
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2.2 Regional Telephone Gap in Developing Countries 
The growth of telephone lines in developing nations has been historically higher 
in the urban areas, with respect to the rural areas (Saunders et. al., 1994). The data from 
several developing countries provided by the ITU and other regulatory and statistical 
entities of developing countries support this trend between urban and rural telephone 
lines (Yearbook of Statistics. Telecommunications Services, 2001; World 
Telecommunications Indicators Database, 2004; OSIPTEL of Peru; Superintendencia 
de Telecomunicaciones of Bolivia; Department of Telecommunications of India; and 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics).  
Figure 3 shows the telephone density gap between rural and urban areas in 
several developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This figure shows the 
ratio between rural and urban telephone densities. It can be seen that this ratio is less 
than 0.3 in all three continents, which indicates that the telephone densities in the urban 
areas are higher than three times the telephone densities in the rural areas. In most 
cases, this ratio is decreasing, which shows that the telephone densities in the urban 
areas are increasing faster than in the rural ones. This situation leads to an increase in 
the regional telephone gap in developing countries through time. 
The regional telephone density gap of Zambia, Malawi, Chad, Uganda, Togo, 
and Botswana, which are developing countries from Africa, are shown in Figure 3. The 
ratio between rural and urban telephone densities is less than 0.3 for all these countries, 
which means that telephone densities in urban areas are higher than three times the 
telephone densities in rural areas. In addition, it can also be seen that this ratio is 
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decreasing for Botswana, Chad, Malawi, and Uganda, which indicates the worsening of 
the rural-urban telephone gap through time for these countries. The rural-urban 
telephone density ratios for Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, India, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, 
which are Asian developing countries, are also observed in this figure. It can be seen 
that this ratio is less than 0.2 for all these countries, which indicates that telephone 
densities in urban areas are higher than five times the telephone densities in rural areas. 
In addition, it can also be seen that the rural-urban telephone gap is also getting worse 
for India, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, since their rural-urban telephone density ratios 
are also decreasing through time. The same behavior is also observed in Figure 3 for El 
Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, which are developing countries from Latin 
America. The rural-urban telephone density ratios are also less than 0.3 and are 
decreasing for El Salvador, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  
The higher dispersion of telephones in urban areas has been attributed to the 
higher income per capita of the urban population, and the lower implementation costs 
than the rural case, which restricts the telecom operator investment in more profitable 
urban areas (World Bank, 2002). Previous research has found that income is the most 
important variable that influences both demand of telephone lines and telephone traffic 
(Saunders et. al., 1994). The income per capita in urban regions is higher than the 
income per capita in rural areas. Therefore, the telephone traffic generated per 
subscriber in rural areas is lower than it is in urban areas (Hudson, 1984).  
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                                          Figure 3. The Rural-Urban Telephone Density Gap 
Source: Estimated from World Telecommunications Indicators Database (2004) and World 
Development Indicators (2002) 
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2.3 Unsuccessful Telecommunications Policies in Developing Countries 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement of 1997 established 
international commitments in the telecom sector for its country members. This implied 
the transformation of the telecom law and regulations in order to align the country 
objectives for the telecom sector with the international ones. Among the main policies 
suggested by this agreement are the implementation of universal service, the autonomy 
of the telecom regulator, free market for telecom services, and reduction of regulation 
(The Telecommunications Development Bureau of ITU and CITEL, 2000).  
The achievement of universal service indicated in the WTO agreement involves 
the development of telecom infrastructure in rural areas of developing countries. 
Universal service can be defined by the provision of universal availability of 
connections to individual households from public telecommunication networks, with 
non-discriminatory and affordable prices (Hank and McCarthy, 2000). An alternative to 
universal service is universal access, which is defined by a situation where every 
person has a reasonable means of access to a publicly available telephone. In practice, 
progress toward universal service has been measured by the percentage of households 
with telephone service (Cain and Macdonald, 1991). 
Several policies and strategies have been implemented in the past by many 
governments and institutions without success in order to solve the problem of universal 
service in telecommunications (Malecki, 2003; Melody, 1999; Strover, 2003). Among 
the most important policies are the privatization and liberalization of the telecom 
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market, Universal Service Funds, Universal Service Obligations, International Cross-
Subsidies, and grant-based funding.  
Previous studies have found the failure of private provision of services and 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications. The privatization of several services such 
as, airlines, bus services, and medical services has been related to the telecom 
privatization. After studying the failure on expanding their services to rural regions, it 
has been suggested that due to little revenue potential and high costs of the services, 
private companies are reluctant to serve rural areas (Calhoun, 1992). In a similar 
fashion, Khalid Saeed and Xu Honggang, using a System Dynamics approach, found 
that privatization of infrastructure delivery would create several problems, since private 
sector organizations are often not designed to deliver public goods (Saeed and 
Honggang, 2004). In addition, in a study of 30 African and Latin American countries 
between 1984 and 1997, privatization of telecommunications was found to be 
negatively related to main line penetration and connection capacity (Wallsten, 1999). 
Finally, it was observed that after telecom privatization in South Africa, almost two-
thirds of the new additional lines installed were disconnected as many of the newly 
connected lower income households were unable to keep up with the payments (Hodge, 
2004). 
The Universal Service Fund is a strategy implemented in more liberalized 
markets. It uses resources obtained from several network and service operators to 
finance capital expenditures on rural network deployment (Siochru, 1996). This type of 
fund has been organized and managed by telecom regulators, who have had limited 
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success in adapting the universal service goal to a competitive environment. The 
management of the fund  has been difficult due to problems in accurately measuring the 
costs of universal service provision, and setting up funding mechanisms that are 
efficient, equitable and that distort the market as little as possible (Duckworth, 2004). 
For instance, in Ecuador, CONATEL, the Ecuadorian telecom regulator, was unable to 
raise enough economic resources to finance significant telecom projects for the rural 
areas, and reduce the gap in telecom infrastructure between rural  and urban regions of 
the country (Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Development of World Bank, 
2001). In Ghana, the government plans to charge all operators a tax to create a fund for 
rural development but the fund still does not exist. In Ivory Coast, the fund exists but 
has not yet been used (Laffont and NGbo, 2000). 
Finally, the grant-based funding uses resources from the general budget to 
subsidize the deployment of telecom infrastructure (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). This 
strategy was found to improve considerably telecom penetration in developing countries 
(Ramos and Gerstenfeld, 2004), although it uses scarce economic resources that are 
generally unavailable for telecommunications investment. In addition, there are still 
several questions regarding the sustainability of the implementations, since there have 
been cases where the expansion of telecom infrastructure did not translate into 
sustainable projects. For instance, a rural telecom company from Chile, which has been 
subsidized by the government for implementing rural telecom projects, has been losing 
money (Wellenius, 2002).  
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2.4 Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies 
The principles dictated by welfare economics say that the price of each product 
or service should be set equal to its marginal cost, and output should be expanded to 
meet resulting demand at those prices. In this context, there should not be cross-
subsidization, whereby one service is priced above marginal cost to finance the supply 
of a service at a price below marginal cost (Littlechild, 1979). 
On the other hand, the cross-subsidies in telecommunications have been 
regarded as a useful mechanism for expanding networks in rural and poor areas of 
developing countries (Laffont and NGbo, 2000), even in the presence of competition 
(Gasmi et al., 2000). It has been proposed that cross-subsidizations through the 
provision of telecommunications at prices below cost may sometimes be desirable in 
order to spread the benefits of telecom access to disadvantaged and rural remote areas, 
where the cost of providing access is generally higher than in urban areas, the total 
traffic generated is relatively low, and the telecom income from the service provision is 
also low (Saunders et. al., 1994; The Telecommunications Development Bureau of ITU, 
and CITEL, 2000). These cross-subsidizations are supposed to create positive network, 
call, and social externalities, which should improve rural development and social 
efficiency and benefit (Crandall and Waverman, 2000; Saunders et al., 1994). The 
question addressed in this investigation is whether the intended improvement will 
actually happen in the long term given that there exist differences in income per capita 
and willingness to pay, telephone deployment and operating costs, and telephone 
deployment delays in urban and rural areas. 
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In several developing countries, cross-subsidization has been applied by 
overcharging for international long distance and providing local access below cost, and 
by applying Universal Service Obligations fees to telecom investment in less profitable 
rural areas (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). These cross-subsidization policies have been 
implemented in the past with the objective of increasing telephone density and 
promoting universal service in telecommunications. Universal service in 
telecommunications is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement of 1997 
and involves the development of telecom infrastructure in rural areas (The 
Telecommunications Development Bureau of ITU, and CITEL, 2000).  
These types of subsidies are typical for telephone services that are regulated and 
mandated by the government to provide an affordable and accessible service, such as 
the case of the fixed wired telephone service in most developing countries. On the 
other hand, the cellular telephone service, which is less regulated or more liberalized, is 
not significantly affected by these cross-subsidies. However, it was explained before 
that private telecom providers do not prefer to extend the service to unprofitable rural 
areas and are often not designed to deliver public goods (Calhoun, 1992; Madden et al., 
2004; Saeed and Honggang, 2004). 
 
2.4.1 International Cross-Subsidies. 
Traditionally the tariffs for telecom services have been based in political and 
social objectives, including advancing universal service, the result is the generation of 
cross-subsidies. These cross-subsidies can occur between different services, geographic 
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regions, and groups of consumers (The Telecommunications Development Bureau of 
ITU and CITEL, 2000). It could also be understood as a complex price averaging of 
services executed by telephone companies (Cronin et. al., 1997).  
Most regulators and telephone operating entities have traditionally favored 
charging below cost monthly rental fees in urban and rural regions, and overcharging 
for international services (Hank and McCarthy 2000). In most countries, this 
international cross-subsidy has been preferred over the one from domestic long-distance 
service, hence the international prices have been set much higher than the local long-
distance prices. This has occurred in spite of the fact that there is not significant cost 
difference between the domestic and international services (The ITU Secretariat, 1998).  
This international cross-subsidy has been applied in order to create positive 
externalities making basic services affordable and thus achieving maximum penetration 
feasible among users with low incomes (Crandall and Waverman, 2000). The World 
Bank has reported many cases of developing countries where the international revenue 
through its net settlement component, represents more than fifty percent of the income 
of the telephone operator (Primo et al., 1999). These below cost monthly rental fees 
have been applied in urban areas even though the urban willingness to pay for telephone 
access, which has been assumed twenty five percent of the willingness to pay for 
telephone services, has been found to be higher than the monthly rental fee. Telecom 
companies in Argentina have reported that local access represents more than twenty five 
percent of the revenue in urban areas (Goussal and Udrízar, 2000). In addition, it has 
also been observed that urban telephone access, which depends on the monthly rental 
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fee, is considerably inelastic when compared with rural areas (GAS 5 Economic Studies 
at the National Level in the Field of Telecommunications, 1984; Goussal and Udrízar, 
2000). 
The international cross-subsidy obligates operators to use funds obtained from 
international calls, to invest in the expansion of the urban and rural telecom network 
while maintaining the local prices and fees at low values in order to increase demand 
and telecom penetration. The common rationality of cross-subsidization is that users 
cannot afford to pay the full cost-based fee for service due to high costs involved in its 
implementation and operation (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). The provision of 
telecommunications at prices below cost may sometimes be desirable in order to spread 
the benefits of telecom access to smaller towns or rural remote areas, where the cost of 
providing access is generally higher than it is in urban areas, the total traffic generated 
is relatively low, and the telecom income from the service provision is also low 
(Saunders et. al., 1994). 
In developing countries, the urban and rural monthly rental fees have been held 
down under the common rationality of pricing basic service below cost in order to 
generate positive externalities and support the universal service policy. These 
externalities include network, call, and social externalities, which are generated by the 
action of one individual that benefits others without a corresponding payment, or 
revenue flow, to the individual generating them (Crandall and Waverman, 2000).  
Table 1 shows a list of countries that have applied cross-subsidization by 
holding the monthly rental fee at considerably lower values than the operating costs and 
 39 
at the same time overcharging for its international service. This situation is observed in 
the ratio of operating costs per telephone line to monthly rental fee in urban areas and in 
the cost of a 3-minute call to the United States from these developing countries. For 
instance, the ratio of urban operating costs per line to the urban monthly rental fee in 
Zambia is 20.25, which indicates that the operating costs per line are more than twenty 
times higher than the monthly rental fee in urban areas. On the other hand, it can also be 
observed that the international price of a 3-minute phone call from Zambia to the United 
States is 2.57 dollars, which has been used to create the international cross-subsidy. In 
the same manner, the operating costs per line in Botswana are thirty eight times higher 
than monthly rental fee in urban areas, and the international price of a 3-minute phone 
call from Botswana to the United States is 3.6 dollars. The operating costs per line in 
Bolivia are twenty five times higher than the monthly rental fee in urban areas, and the 
international price of a 3-minute phone call is 3.7 dollars.  
It is also observed that monthly rental fee is much lower than the willingness to 
pay for telephone access in urban areas, which indicates that local telephone access is 
underpriced. This can be observed in the ratio of willingness to pay for telephone access 
to monthly rental fee in urban areas. The ratio of urban willingness to pay for telephone 
access to urban monthly rental fee in Botswana is 8.39, which indicates that access 
willingness to pay is higher than eight times the monthly rental fee in urban areas. 
Similarly, the access willingness to pay in Bolivia is higher than three times the 
monthly rental fee in urban areas. In the same manner, the access willingness to pay in 
Thailand is higher than fourteen times the monthly rental fee in the urban areas. 
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The willingness to pay for the telephone service has been defined as five percent 
of the income per household (Hank and McCarthy, 2000; Kayani and Dymond, 1997), 
since the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has determined that household 
expenditure in telecommunications could be up to five percent of the income (Milne, 
2003). The operating cost has been defined as thirty percent of the capital costs, which 
is the world average. The cost per line is defined as a function of the cable distance, 
which is a function of the population density (Kayani and Dymond, 1997; Calhoun, 
1992; Webb, 2000). 
The capital costs per line depend on the average cable distance from the central 
office to the subscribers (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). It is defined as a function of the 
population density and a referential number of telephone lines per central office, which 
is assumed five thousand. As a reference, the cost of a telephone line in urban areas of 
Ecuador has been previously estimated below five hundred dollars (Plaza, 2005). The 
urban income per capita is defined as a function of the non-agricultural income and the 
urban population density depends on the urban area, which it assumes represents ten 
percent of the land area (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). 
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Table 1. International Cross-Subsidies in selected Developing Market Economies. 
Source: World Telecommunications Development Report (2001). Data estimated from: World 
Telecommunications Indicators Database (2004), World Development Indicators (2002) 
 
2.4.2 Universal Service Obligations 
Governments and regulatory authorities have created Universal Service 
Obligations to generate positive network, call, and social externalities and guarantee 
service above a certain threshold to rural areas, which are intended to accelerate rural 
development and to improve the social efficiency in developing countries. The 
Universal Service Obligations give priority to investment into rural areas, which usually 
go beyond the feasible cost/revenue limits and require cross-subsidization from more 
profitable urban regions and services (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). These obligations 
have been applied by increasing the investment in rural telecom capacity, even though 
there is evidence of higher operating costs and lower willingness to pay in rural areas 
with respect to urban areas. This process is expected to result in a faster expansion of 
 
Urban Urban Monthly Urban Urban Urban Urban Op. Cost / Cost of Call
Country Income Access Rental Acess Population Cost per Operating Mo. Fee to US $ per
per Capita Willingness Fee W. to Pay / Density Line Costs Ratio 3 minutes
(US to Pay (US Mo. Fee (US (US
dollars) (US dollars) dollars) Ratio (pop/km2) dollars) dollars) (year 2000)
Zambia 498 2.07 1.14 1.82 58 921 23.02 20.25 2.57
Bolivia 1230 5.13 1.62 3.17 47 1003 25.07 15.50 3.7
Ecuador 1708 7.12 6.20 1.15 284 515 12.87 2.07 4.9
Honduras 1599 6.67 2.43 2.74 252 535 13.39 5.50 4.2
Thailand 8155 33.98 2.33 14.60 262 529 13.21 5.68 2.5
Botswana 5088 21.20 2.53 8.39 17 1548 38.71 15.31 3.6
Colombia 2329 9.70 2.68 3.62 277 519 12.97 4.84 2.2
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rural telecom infrastructure, but it is achieved at the expense of limiting service to urban 
and high-density areas (Goussal and Udrízar, 2000). 
Table 2 shows a list of countries that have applied Universal Service 
Obligations, even though the ratio of willingness to pay to operating cost per line is 
much higher in urban areas with respect to rural areas. The ratio of willingness to pay to 
operating costs per line in the urban areas of Botswana is 0.88. This ratio is much higher 
than 0.01, which is the ratio of willingness to pay to operating costs per line in the rural 
areas. This shows the higher willingness to pay for telephone services and lower 
operating costs per line in the urban areas with respect to the rural areas in Botswana. 
Similarly, in Honduras, the ratio of willingness to pay for telephone services to 
operating costs per line in urban areas is 0.8, which is much higher than 0.07, the ratio 
of willingness to pay to operating costs per line in the rural areas. In the same manner, 
the ratio of willingness to pay for telephone services to the operating costs per line in 
the urban areas of Nepal is 0.55, which is much higher than 0.05, the ratio of 
willingness to pay for telephone services to operating costs per line in the rural areas. 
As indicated before, this shows the higher willingness to pay for telephone services and 
lower operating costs per line in the urban areas with respect to the rural areas in Nepal.  
It is also observed that the willingness to pay is higher in urban areas because of 
the higher incomes per capita in these regions. The willingness to pay for telephone 
services in the urban areas of Bangladesh is eight dollars, which is much higher than 
one dollar, the willingness to pay for telephone services in the rural areas. This is 
proportional to the income per capita of the urban and rural population in Bangladesh. 
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The income per capita in the urban areas of Bangladesh is 1,143 dollars and the income 
per capita in the rural areas is 120 dollars. Similarly, the willingness to pay for 
telephone services and the income per capita of the urban population in Honduras is 11 
dollars and 1,599 dollars respectively. On the other hand, the willingness to pay for 
telephone services and the income per capita of the rural population in Honduras is 2 
dollars and 311 dollars respectively.  
The operating costs are found to be higher in rural areas because of the lower 
population densities, which increase the cost of a telephone line and the capital costs. 
For instance, the rural operating costs in Ecuador are much higher than the urban 
operating costs. The rural population density of Ecuador is 19 people per square 
kilometer and the rural operating cost per line is thirty-seven dollars per month. On the 
other hand, the urban operating cost per line in Ecuador is thirteen dollars per month 
and its urban population density is 284 people per square kilometer. Similarly, the urban 
operating cost per line in Bolivia is twenty-five dollars per month, which is much lower 
than eighty-eight dollars per month, the rural operating cost per line. These values are 
inversely proportional to the urban and rural population densities. The Bolivian urban 
population density is 47 people per square kilometer and its rural population density is 3 
people per square kilometer.  
Table 3 shows details of the application of Universal Service Obligations in  
selected developing countries from Asia, Africa, and South America. Several countries 
in Asia have adopted Universal Service Obligations in order to expand rural 
telecommunications. The government of India created the Universal Service 
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Obligation, which requires the installation of ten percent of their total installed 
capacity in rural areas from all telecom operators (Hank and McCarthy, 2000; Peha, 
1999). In Nepal, the telecom regulatory authority mandates telecom operators to 
provide rural telecommunications in the entire country (Nepal Telecommunications 
Authority, 2004). The license of the telecom operator in Bangladesh obliges the 
installation of one exchange in each sub-District or Thana. In Pakistan, the telecom 
operator was mandated to install 150,000 new telephone lines in rural areas to reach 
villages with over 1,000 inhabitants and achieve a rural telephone density of 0.2 lines 
per 100 inhabitants by 1998. In Thailand, the government mandated the expansion of 
the telephone service to cover all villages with 2 lines in each sub-village (Kayani and 
Dymond, 1997). 
Africa seems to follow in the footsteps of Asia regarding the implementation of 
Universal Service Obligations. The government of Botswana mandated the state-owned 
telecom company to serve all identifiable demand in villages with a population higher 
than five hundred by the year 2000 (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). The government of 
Togo recently mandated the extension of rural telecommunications by providing a 
telephone within a distance of less than 5 km by 2010 (The Sun News On-Line, 2004). 
In Latin America several countries have implemented Universal Service 
Obligations either in their national programs or as part of the carriers license 
agreement. The privatized telecom company in Bolivia, ENTEL, has spent forty percent 
of its expansion budget on rural areas. The government of Honduras has a telecom 
Rural Master Plan, which gives rural areas priorities for investment. The telecom 
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operators in Ecuador are mandated to deploy rural telecommunications as part of their 
license agreement (Kayani and Dymond, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Indicators of Selected Developing Market Economies with Universal 
Service Obligations 
Source: Data estimated from World Development Indicators (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Togo 488 147 8 2 289 65 13 22 0.64 0.11
Nepal 1217 111 20 2 188 153 15 16 1.37 0.12
India 1199 155 20 3 865 247 9 13 2.15 0.19
Bangladesh 1143 120 19 2 2183 768 8 10 2.53 0.21
Pakistan 884 182 15 3 641 121 10 17 1.46 0.18
Bolivia 1230 644 21 11 47 3 25 88 0.82 0.12
Ecuador 1708 310 28 5 284 19 13 37 2.21 0.14
Honduras 1599 311 27 5 252 32 13 30 1.99 0.18
Thailand 8155 256 136 4 262 103 13 18 10.28 0.23
Botswana 5088 212 85 4 17 2 39 107 2.20 0.03
(dollars) (pop/Km2)
Operating 
(dollars)
Willingness toIncome
per Capita Pay Density Cost
Willingness to Pay /Population
(dollars)
Operating Costs
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Country UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION 
Togo The government of Togo recently mandated the extension of rural telecommunications 
by providing a telephone within a distance of less than 5 km by 2010. 
Nepal The telecom operators are obliged to make a contribution to the rural 
telecommunications fund annually for rural telecom projects. 
India It demanded the installation of ten percent of their total installed capacity in rural areas. 
Bangladesh The license of operation obliged the installation of one exchange in each sub-District 
(Thana) 
Pakistan The installation of 150,000 new telephone lines in rural areas to reach villages with over 
1,000 inhabitants and achieve a rural telephone density of 0.2 lines per 100 inhabitants 
by 1998. 
Bolivia The privatized telecom company ENTEL spends 40% of its expansion budget on rural. 
Ecuador Rural telecommunications is part of the operation license of the telecom operators 
Honduras The country has a telecom Rural Master Plan, which gives rural areas priorities of 
investment. 
Thailand The expansion of telephone service to cover all villages with 2 lines in each sub-village. 
Botswana The government mandated the telecom operator to serve all villages with a population 
higher than five hundred people. 
 
Table 3. Universal Service Obligation Policies in selected Developing Market 
Economies. 
Source: Kayani and Dymond (1997),  Peha (1999), The Sun News On-Line (2004), Nepal    
Telecommunications Authority (1994) 
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2.5 Performance of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-
Subsidies in Developing Countries. 
Table 4 shows that the International Cross-Subsidies applied in developing 
countries had little effect on improving the dispersion of telephone services. For 
instance, in Zambia the overall as well as urban and rural telephone densities were 
reduced, in spite of the application of the Internal Cross-Subsidy indicated in Table 1. 
The monthly rental fee in Zambia is about twenty times less than the operating cost, and 
two times lower than the willingness to pay for telephone access in urban areas. The 
below cost monthly rental fee is implemented by charging high prices for international 
traffic. In the same manner, in Bolivia and Colombia the telephone densities 
experienced little improvement and the rural telephone densities were reduced. This 
increased the telephone gap between urban and rural regions, in spite of implementing 
monthly rental fees that are much lower than the urban operating costs and the 
willingness to pay for telephone access. 
The application of Universal Service Obligations has also done little to improve 
the telephone density and especially the penetration of rural telephone lines in other 
developing countries, as observed in Table 4. For instance, in Bangladesh the 
penetration of telephone lines in rural areas grew from 0.03 lines per 100 inhabitants in 
1993 to 0.05 lines per 100 inhabitants in 2002, which did not reduce the service gap 
between urban and rural regions. In Bolivia and Ecuador the overall telephone densities 
had little improvement and the rural telephone densities were reduced. This increased 
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the urban-rural telephone gap and occurred in spite of the application of the USO 
policies described in Table 3. 
The model developed in this dissertation investigates if the society is going to 
benefit by overcharging for international services and charging monthly rental fees 
below cost, and by applying Universal Service Obligations in terms of achieving higher 
telephone densities and reducing the rural-urban telephone gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Dispersion of Telephones in Selected Developing Market Economies 
with USO and International Cross-Subsidies. 
Source: World Telecommunications Indicators Database (2004), Kayani and Dymond (1997),  Peha 
(1999), The Sun News On-Line (2004), Nepal Telecommunications Authority (2004). Data estimated 
from World Development Indicators (2002). 
 
 
 
Countries
1993 2002 1993 2002 1993 2002 1993 2002 1993 2002 USO INT
Zambia 0.92 0.81 1.89 1.70 0.30 0.24 20 18 0.160 0.140 
Togo 0.45 1.05 1.59 3.12 0.01 0.08 1 5 0.004 0.025 
Nepal 0.37 1.41 4.07 12.69 0.00 0.02 1 1 0.001 0.001 
India 0.89 3.98 3.20 10.38 0.12 1.49 10 27 0.037 0.144 
Bangladesh 0.21 0.46 0.99 1.84 0.03 0.05 10 8 0.026 0.026 
Pakistan 1.24 2.5 3.68 6.25 0.09 0.39 5 10 0.025 0.063 
Low Income 0.68 1.70 2.57 6.00 0.09 0.38 8 12 0.042 0.066 5 1
Bolivia 3.28 6.37 5.39 10.23 0.60 0.33 8 2 0.111 0.032  
Ecuador 5.45 11.02 8.92 16.97 1.21 0.89 10 3 0.136 0.053  
Honduras 2.1 4.81 4.45 7.83 0.40 1.67 11 17 0.090 0.213  
Thailand 3.93 10.5 13.24 27.00 1.75 6.11 36 46 0.132 0.226  
Botswana 3.12 8.28 5.86 13.18 1.22 3.57 23 22 0.208 0.271  
Colombia 8.46 17.94 8.95 24.08 7.37 1.33 27 2 0.823 0.055 
Middle Income 4.39 9.82 7.80 16.55 2.09 2.32 19 15 0.250 0.142 5 6
Rural Telep. DensityTelephone Density Urban Telep. Density
Lines per 100 Inhab Lines per 100 Inhab Lines per 100 Inhab Lines
Rural/Urban Telecom % Rural
Telep. Density Gap Policies
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Chapter 3 Methods of Analysis for Telecom Planning and Policies 
 
3.1 The Failure of Current Methods for Telecom Planning and Policy Design. 
The current policies and strategies for increasing telecommunications 
deployment in rural areas are often insufficient or unsuccessful, and the plans for 
expansion of local telephone networks are generally imprecise considering the scope of 
the investment (Malecki, 2003; Melody, 1999; Strover, 2003; Calhoun, 1992). The 
telecom gap between urban and rural regions and between the rich and poor people has 
not improved using current policies and strategies (Saunders et. al., 1994; Kayani and 
Dymond, 1997; Malecki, 2003; Cain and Macdonald, 1991). In addition, conventional 
management rationality such as the Get Big Fast strategy triggered the biggest crises 
of the telecom industry: the Internet stock bubble in the late 1990s and the dot.com 
crash of business to consumer (B2C) electronic commerce companies of the year 2000 
(Oliva et. al., 2002)  
One of the conventional methods used for telecom planning and policy design is 
the use of econometric modeling. This uses statistical methods to verify and quantify 
economic theory, which relies on statistical verification of model structure and 
parameters by tying the models firmly to statistical observations of real world systems. 
The econometric analysis uses correlated rather than directly causally related variables 
to proceed in spite of the empirical validation requirement (Meadows, 1980). 
The econometric modeling requires representing economic systems as linear, 
which allows the mathematical estimation of parameters; and includes fudge factors to 
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the output of a model with the purpose of fitting modelers intuition (Sterman, 2000). 
There is a problem related to the different estimation techniques used in econometric 
analyses, it has led to different conclusions about the effects of specific telecom policies 
in developing countries (Fink et. al., 2003). For instance, there are different conclusions 
about the impact of telecom privatization using econometric modeling. Wallsten found 
in a study of 30 African and Latin American countries between 1984 and 1997, that 
privatization of telecommunications was negatively related to main line penetration and 
connection capacity, and Ros and Banerjee found that telecom privatization is good for 
telecom expansion (Wallsten, 1999; Ros and Banerjee, 2000). In addition, 
counterproductive telecom policies could be derived as a result of the application of this 
methodology. Saeed and Honggang have proved that privation of public telephone 
services might not be good for telephone dispersion and achieving universal service in 
telecommunications ( Saeed and Honggang, 2004).   
The survey analysis for collecting and analyzing data is another common 
conventional methodology for telecom planning and policy design. This methodology 
requires designing questionnaires and distributing them over a target population, in 
order to gather information, such as the experiences, knowledge, opinions, or 
perceptions, from the main stakeholders of the system. The problems found in this 
methodology are related to the design of the questionnaires, which could be biased or 
poorly elaborated, and to the population surveyed, which could not be big enough or 
representative of the problem being studied. In addition, it relies on the limited 
rationality, and understanding of the problems related to the complex telecom system, 
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of the people being surveyed. For instance, a survey that collected information from the 
main representatives of the telecom sector in African countries suggested the policy of 
increasing the investment in rural areas of developing countries for improving 
teledensity (Mbarika, 2001). This policy was based on the experiences, knowledge, and 
perceptions of the main stakeholders of the telecom sector in the African countries, and 
relied on their limited and linear ability to understand the complex and dynamic 
structure of the regional telecom system, which will be described later in this 
dissertation. This thesis and previous studies show that this policy is counterproductive, 
since this does not consider the dynamic behavior, which is generated when it is applied 
to the regional telecom system. The regional telecom system includes the economical, 
demographic, and social differences between urban and rural areas in developing 
countries (Ramos and Gerstenfeld, 2004; Ramos et. al., 2005). 
The international best practice benchmarking approach uses a broad range of 
indicators, which provide an overall picture of relative performance in the telecom 
sector. This is considered constructive since, by helping to raise awareness of relative 
performance, it can exert the pressures of ’best practice’ and focus remedial attention on 
the areas with the most potential for performance improvement. This approach is 
supported by international organizations such as the International Telecommunications 
Union through its World Telecommunications Indicators Database, and The World 
Bank, which has designed the World Development Indicators report.  
The highly imperfect nature of markets, and the enormous income disparities 
and inequities that exist in developing countries, make the international best practice 
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approach insufficient to meet the challenges of universal service in telecommunications 
(Gillwald, 2005). The performance monitoring of the international benchmarking 
approach is a very complex assignment, since a range of assumptions are involved and 
simplifications are necessary regarding the meaning of the indicators, which are needed 
for international comparability. In addition, many of the indicators have shortcomings. 
For instance, it can be difficult to draw conclusions based on comparisons of absolute 
numbers or ratios because of different accounting or technical definitions and different 
demographic, economic, geographic and regulatory environments (Xavier, 1996).  
There are other methodologies and tools for telecom planning such as the net 
present value (NPV), which is a widely used financial management measurement. This 
parameter compares the value of a dollar today to the value of the same dollar in the 
future, taking inflation and returns into account. If the NPV of a prospective project is 
positive, it should be accepted. However, if the NPV is negative the project should 
probably be rejected because cash flows will also be negative 
(http://www.investopedia.com). The problem with this planning measure is that it 
disregards the relevance of the actual time when the cash inflows and outflows of the 
telecom company occurred. This is an important issue in telecom planning since a 
telecom project that required a huge investment during the first year, such as 
conventional wired technology, could be chosen over other projects that delayed most 
of the investment to future years, such as wireless technologies (Webb, 2000).   
The current methods to design policies and strategies do not consider an analysis 
and definition of the causal structure of the system. This is, the econometric, survey, 
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international benchmarking, and net present value analysis do not consider the structure 
of the regional telecom system for policy and strategy design. In addition, the use of 
microeconomic theory and the future scenario technique do not involve the study of 
the dynamic relationships between the different elements of the telecom system either. 
The future scenario technique has been used to anticipate customer expectations, 
economical constraints, and potential business models for telecom operators, which 
considers current trends in science and technology in order to project likely images of 
future societies (Unbehaun, 2002; Flament et. al., 1999) 
 
3.2 System Dynamics as a Methodology for Policy Design and Planning of Rural 
Telecommunications. 
The previous section described some clear problems related to the conventional 
methodologies used for telecom planning and evidenced the need of a more effective 
and appropriate methodology. The need for a systems framework to analyze the 
complexity of the rural telecommunication system and the importance of focusing on 
economic and social aspects rather than only the technological ones has been 
recognized to some degree (Andrew and Petkov, 2003). In addition, the importance of a 
procedure for rural telecom planning that can react to changing circumstances in a 
dynamic manner has been previously supported (Walsham, 1979), and a systematic 
investigation of the determinants of diffusion of mobile telecommunications, which 
could be used for rural telecommunications, has been previously recommended (Gruber, 
2001). The adoption of new modeling practices for the telecommunications industry, 
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which can incorporate the trade-offs raised by the emergence of wireless access 
alternatives, especially when applied to rural environments, has been suggested 
(Calhoun, 1992).  
Telecom planning using a long-term and non-linear system dynamics approach 
as compared to tactical approaches, which are reactive, short-term, and linear, has 
been advocated (Lyneis, 1994). The definition of the dynamic hypothesis in the system 
dynamics methodology determines the structure of the regional telecom system, which 
incorporates the social, economic, and demographic variables of the urban and rural 
areas and the interrelationships between them. For instance, this incorporates variables 
such as, the willingness to pay for telephone services and the income per capita of the 
urban and rural population, and the population densities and operating costs of the 
telecom network, and relationships such as, the connecting rate of telephones is a 
function of the telephone capacity. Computer simulation performed through system 
dynamics allows inferring future long-term behavior, as a result of the dynamic 
interaction of the different elements of the regional telecom system. The future behavior 
could be exponential or linear growth, oscillation, S-shaped growth, overshoot and 
collapse, goal seeking, and growth with overshoot. Once the regional telecom system 
has been built, the physical variables and the actual relationships of the system facilitate 
the design of new policies for improving the behavior of the regional telecom system, 
such as improving the number of telephone lines in rural areas of developing countries. 
The chance of implementation of new telecom policies, which have been designed by 
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system dynamics modeling, is relatively high, since the policies consider the actual real 
variables of the regional telecom system. 
As in every industry, telecommunications is composed of markets, 
organizations, regulations, resources, and technologies. The relationships between these 
entities is not static, there is a dynamic interaction which demands a dynamic analysis. 
The analysis of the interactions between different elements of the telecommunications 
industry can be appropriately done by the use of system dynamics. Jay Forrester in his 
book Industrial Dynamics showed how different elements of an industry are modeled 
as a set of relationships and feedback loops. Jay Forrester also modeled the market 
growth in a particular industry. System dynamics has already been used for modeling 
the growth of the telecom market through establishing relationships between different 
sectors of the telecom industry such as, demand and supply (Jensen et. al., 2002; Lyons 
et. al., 1997; Bui and Loebbecke, 1996; Ramos and Gerstenfeld, 2004; Dutta and Roy, 
2003).   
The study of policy issues and regulatory aspects of telecommunications is 
suitable to the use of system dynamics. System dynamics deals with the limitation of 
bounded rationality or a linear cause-and-effect relationship commonly applied in 
policy or strategy design and considers the main interactions between the different 
elements of the telecom market. For this reason, SD has been widely used in the design 
of policies and strategies in several fields. In fact, several papers and books have been 
written where system dynamics has been used as the methodology for modeling policies 
and strategies of corporations and nations (Saeed, 1994; Lyneis, 1980). The design of 
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policies and strategies for the telecommunications industry through system dynamics 
has already started and is growing. For instance, it has been used to explore different 
pricing policies for telecom services (Zhang and Liang, 1998; Wang et. al., 2001) and to 
explore strategies for a competitive or liberalized telecom market (Brady, 1999). 
Finally, system dynamics is used in this dissertation, specifically for investigating the 
impact of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies on the 
growth of rural telecom infrastructure.  
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Chapter 4 Formulation of the Regional Telecommunications System 
This model considers a case of government or privately owned telecom 
monopoly, whose tariffs are fixed and regulated by the government. The 
telecommunications in developing countries is still a monopoly in many senses, even 
when competition is introduced. The international experience has shown that the 
incumbent manages to retain its leadership position and market power long after 
liberalization (Makhaya and Roberts, 2003). Many countries implement this model in 
the public sector, but it is important to note that the implementation of Universal 
Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies also happens in privatized 
markets when mandated by telecom regulatory authorities. 
The model is divided into 4 sectors: 1) Telephone Demand, 2) Telephone 
Deployment, 3) Telephone Traffic, and 4) Financial Resources. These sectors are 
replicated for two regions: urban and rural. At an aggregate level, the interactions 
between the sectors can be represented by the causal diagram in Figure 4.  
Telephone Demand represents the subscribers with telephone lines and the 
unmet demand, which is composed of subscribers in the waiting list and potential 
subscribers willing to pay the monthly rental fee but not decided to pay the activation 
fee and the telephone device cost yet. The subscribers in the waiting list are connected 
at a rate, which depends on the new telephone capacity. Telephone Deployment 
represents the process of deployment of new telephone capacity, which is a function of 
the amount of economic resources available, the number of subscribers in the waiting 
list, the current number of new telephone lines ready to be connected, and the number 
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of telephone lines being deployed. Telephone Traffic represents the level of usage of the 
telephone network in urban and rural areas as a function of the price, income per capita 
of the population, and the current penetration of telephone lines in the region. Financial 
Resources accumulates the economic resources used in the expansion of telecom 
infrastructure in urban and rural areas. Financial Resources depends on the number of 
subscribers, the telephone traffic, the price of the service, the operating costs, and the 
amount of money invested in telecom infrastructure. 
Each sector shown in Figure 4 represents the regional telecom system and is 
driven by decision rules created by its own working environment while also reacting to 
information and inputs received from other sectors. The structure of each sector and 
detailed mathematical relationships of the model are discussed below. 
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Figure 4. A Simplified Sector Map of the Regional Telecom System. 
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4.1 Telephone Demand Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Telephone Demand Sector 
The Telephone Demand sector shown in Figure 5 is represented as a supply 
chain, both in rural and urban regions, where the population is the source of potential 
customers; the potential customers become subscribers in the waiting list; and 
subscribers in the waiting list become connected customers. 
The actual demand of telephone lines includes connected customers, customers 
in the waiting list, and potential customers. The population becomes potential 
consumers when the utility of the service is higher than its price. The price represents 
the monthly rental fee for the postpaid telephone service. The potential customers 
become customers in the waiting list after they are willing to pay for the activation 
charges and/or telephone devices (Warren, 2002). The customers in the waiting list 
become connected subscribers when they get connected, which depends on the 
connecting capacity of the telephone company (Jensen et. al., 2002). The connected 
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subscribers, therefore represent the part of the demand that can be served under the 
current conditions of supply (Ros and Banerjee, 2000). The connected subscribers 
create the revenue that feeds into the financial resources of the telephone company, as 
shown in Figure 5. 
Potential new customers adjust towards an indicated demand for new lines, 
which is a function of the total population, the impact of telephone density as a network 
externality factor, the monthly rental fee, and the income per subscriber. In addition, it 
is assumed that the impact of telephone density on rural access demand is lower than 
the impact on urban areas, which is borne out by evidence concerning the income and 
preferences of the rural population in developing countries (Goussal and Udrízar, 2000; 
GAS 5, 1984; Wellenius, 2002).   
The impact of the monthly rental fee on indicated demand is determined by the 
elasticity of the demand with respect to the monthly rental fee, which has been observed 
to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas, because of the lower income levels and 
perceived usefulness of the service (Cain and Macdonald, 1991).  
 
4.2 Equations of the Telephone Demand Sector 
It is assumed that the number of connected subscribers (CS) is increased by the 
connecting rate (CR) and decreased by the connected customers attrition rate (AR). The 
connecting rate (CR) is a function of the fraction of lines connected per month (FLC), 
the postpaid-prepaid waiting list fraction (PPWLF), and the telephone capacity (TC), 
which represents the telephone lines recently deployed and ready to be allocated to a 
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customer in the waiting list. In addition, the connected customers attrition rate (AR) is 
assumed a function of demand adjustment (DA), which represents the discrepancy 
between indicated demand (ID) and actual demand (AD). The actual demand (AD) 
adjusts towards the indicated demand (ID) value through an adjustment time (TAD). 
The demand adjustment (DA) can be positive or negative; when it is negative the 
attrition rate (AR) is higher than zero. Subscript i refers to any of the two sectors, urban 
(u) and rural (r), and superscript j to any type of telephone service, local (l), long 
distance (ld), and international (t):   
 
                                        (d / dt) CS i = CR i  AR i                                    (1) 
   CR i = TC i * FLC i * PPWLF i 
    
DA i = (ID i  AD i) / TAD                                              
    AR i = DA i             (If ID i < AD i)   
The postpaid waiting list (WL) is increased by the rate of new customers (RNC) 
and decreased by the connecting rate (CR). The rate of new customers (RNC) is a 
function of the number of potential customers who are willing to pay for the monthly 
rental fee, but not decided to pay for the activation fee and telephone device costs yet 
(PC), and the delay to accept the activation fee and telephone device costs (DAAF): 
 
                                    (d / dt) WL i = RNC i  CR i                                    (2) 
                                                 RNC i= PC i / DAAF i                                           
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The potential customers (PC) are increased by the new potential customer rate 
(NPCR) and decreased by rate of new customers (RNC). The new potential customers 
rate (NPCR) is a function of demand adjustment (DA). When demand adjustment (DA) 
is positive the new potential customer rate (NPCR) is higher than zero: 
 
                                 (d / dt) PC i= NPCR i  RNC i                                 (3) 
    NPCR i= DA i                           (If  ID i > AD i)                                                   
The indicated demand (ID) is a function of the population of telephone 
subscribers in the region (PTS) and the demand fraction (DF): 
 
      ID i = PTS i * DF i                                          (4) 
The actual demand (AD) is the sum of potential customers (PC), customers in 
the waiting list (WL), and connected subscribers (CS): 
 
 AD i = PC i + WL i + CS i                                    (5) 
The demand fraction (DF) is a function of the effect of price on demand (EPD) 
and the effect of attractiveness on demand (EAD). The effect of price on demand (EPD) 
is equal to the monthly rental fee fraction (MRFF) and the effect of attractiveness on 
demand (EAD) is equal to the network externality impact (NEI): 
 
DF i = EPD i* EAD i                                             (6) 
 EPD i = MRFF i 
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 EAD i = NEI i 
The monthly rental fee fraction (MRFF) is a function of the discrepancy between 
actual monthly rental fee (MRF) and normal monthly rental fee (NMRF):  
 
         MRFF i = f 1i (MRF i / NMRF i)                              (7) 
                      Where f 1i < 0  
The network externality impact (NEI) is a function of the telephone density 
fraction (TDF). As it was explained before the impact of network externality on demand 
in urban areas is higher than the impact on the rural ones. This characteristic is 
represented by the nonlinear function f 2: 
 
                                      NEI i = f 2i (TDF i)                                               (8) 
                                           Where f 2i  > 0                                    
The telephone density fraction (TDF) is function of the urban and rural 
telephone density (TD), and the coefficients a1 and a2. These coefficients determine the 
weight of urban and rural telephone density, respectively, on network externality. It is 
assumed that most of the value of the telephone network comes from the same regional 
network. For instance, in urban and rural areas more than 50% of the value comes from 
the urban and rural network respectively. It has been established that a high proportion 
of the rural traffic is sent to the urban network, which indicates that the rural population 
places a high value to the urban network (Kayani and Dymond, 1997).  
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In addition, it is also assumed that the urban population values less the size of 
the rural network than the rural population values the size of the urban network. It could 
be the case that the telephone density in rural areas is very low, but because the 
telephone density in urban areas is considerably higher than rural areas, the telephone 
demand in rural areas influenced by the telephone density in urban areas will not be 
very low, as it would be if the rural telephone density were the only factor influencing 
the rural demand. Finally it was assumed that coefficient a1 is 0.9 and 0.5 for urban and 
rural areas respectively, and coefficient a2 is 0.1 and 0.5 for urban and rural areas 
respectively:   
 
                                  TDF i = TD u * a 1i + TD r * a 2i                         (9) 
The urban and rural telephone density (TD) is the relationship between the total 
telephone subscribers (TTS) and the population of telephone subscribers (PTS):  
 
                   TD i = TTS i / PTS i                                    (10) 
The total telephone subscribers (TTS) is the sum of postpaid connected 
subscribers (CS), prepaid telephone subscribers (VASU i pp), and virtual telephony 
subscribers (VTS): 
 
        TTS i = CS i + VASU i pp + VTS i                          (11) 
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4.3 Telephone Deployment Sector 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Telephone Deployment Sector 
The telephone deployment process in both urban and rural regions is represented 
by a supply chain, shown in Figure 6. The new orders of telephone deployment depend 
on a decision making process which addresses the shortfall as well as the supply of new 
telephone connections; a decision rule widely used for managing supply chains (Lyneis, 
1980). 
As the deployment process involves a considerable delay, a stock of telephone 
deployment in progress is included in the supply chain. It is important to note that the 
telephone deployment delay varies between urban and rural regions, mainly due to the 
population density and the availability of human resources and complementary 
infrastructure (Clarkstone et. al., 1990; Wellenius, 2002; The International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consultative Committee of ITU, 1985). For this reason, the deployment 
delay in rural regions is generally higher than it is in urban areas. 
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The number of orders in the waiting list, which is a function of the connecting 
rate of telephone lines and the flow of potential customers interested in becoming new 
subscribers, determine the demanded telephone capacity (Jensen et. al., 2002). The 
financial resources available and the cost of a telephone line determine the supplied 
telephone capacity, which is often lower than the demanded one because of the lack of 
economic resources. Indeed, in the developing countries, the supply of telephone lines 
is usually lower than the demand (Ross and Banerjee, 2000). It is also important to note 
that the cost of deploying a telephone line in rural regions is generally higher than the 
cost in urban areas because of the lower population density and complementary 
infrastructure (Goldschmidt, 1987; Kayani and Dymond, 1997; Crandall and 
Waverman, 2000), which is factored in the models cost structure. 
The actual telephone capacity planned is a function of the supply and demand of 
telephone capacity. It is equal to the supplied telephone capacity if supply is lower than 
the demanded capacity. On the other hand, when the financial resources improve and 
the supply of telephone capacity becomes higher than the demanded capacity, the actual 
telephone capacity planned is equal to the demanded telephone capacity.  
 
4.4 Equations of the Telephone Deployment Sector 
The telephone capacity (TC) is increased by the telephone lines deployment rate 
(TDR), the postpaid telephone attrition rate (AR), and the prepaid phone attrition rate 
(ARVAS i pp), and decreased by the postpaid telephone connecting rate (CR), the 
prepaid phone connecting rate (PPCR), and the telephone discard rate (DR). The 
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telephone deployment rate (TDR) is a function of telephone deployment in progress 
(TDIP) and telephone deployment delay (TDD). The telephone discard rate (DR) is 
function of the average connection rate (ACR), the telephone capacity planned (TCPL), 
the current telephone capacity (TC), telephone deployment in progress (TDIP), and the 
delay to adjust telephone capacity (DAT): 
 
          (d / dt)TC i = TDR i + AR i + ARVAS i pp  CR i  PPCR i  DR i              (12) 
          TDR i = TDIP i / TDD i       
          DR i = ACR i + (TC i + TDIP i  TCPL i) / DAT i                
The telephone deployment in progress (TDIP) is increased by the new orders of 
telephone deployment (NOTD) and decreased by telephone deployment rate (TDR). 
The new orders of telephone deployment (NOTD) are function of the average 
connection rate (ACR), the telephone capacity planned (TCPL), the current telephone 
capacity (TC), telephone deployment in progress (TDIP), and the delay to adjust 
telephone capacity (DAT): 
  
             (d / dt) TDIP i = NOTD i  TDR i                                                      (13)                               
                     NOTD i = ACR i + (TCPL i  TC i TDIP i) / DAT i             
The average connection rate (ACR) is a first order exponential average of the 
connecting rate (CR). The averaging process uses the time constant T1, where 1 is the 
first order exponential average: 
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                          ACR i = 1 [CR i, T1]                                               (14) 
The telephone capacity planned (TCPL) is a function of the supplied telephone 
capacity (STC) and demanded telephone capacity (TCD): 
 
               TCPL i = STC i  (If TCD i > STC i)                               (15) 
                                TCPL i = TCD i (If STC i > TCD i)                                 
The demanded telephone capacity (TCD) is function of the number of postpaid 
subscribers in the waiting list (WL), the prepaid subscribers in the waiting list (PPWL), 
and the number of telephone lines per subscriber (LPS): 
     
              TCD i = (WL i + PPWL i )* LPS                                  (16) 
The supplied telephone capacity (STC) is function of the financial resources 
allocated for telephone investment (PTI) and the deployment cost of a telephone line 
(COT). The financial resources allocated for telephone investment (PTI) is a function of 
the telecom cash balance (TCB) and the telephone investment fraction per region (IFR):  
 
                                  STC i = PTI i / COT i                                   (17) 
     PTI i = TCB * IFR i 
 
 
 
 
 70 
4.5 Telephone Traffic Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 7. Telephone Traffic Sector 
This sector represented in Figure 7 assumes that the monthly rental fee of the 
postpaid telephone service includes free local minutes, and that rural subscribers enjoy 
rates that are lower than urban rates (Crandall and Waverman, 2000). The telephone 
traffic, both in urban and rural areas is a function of the income per subscriber (Kayani 
and Dymond, 1997). However, as previous research indicates, the traffic per person is 
lower in rural areas than in urban areas (Hudson, 1984; The International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Committee of ITU, 1985; Wellenius, 2002).  
Telephone density increases of telephone of calls made by the subscribers, and 
hence increases their expenditure on service (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The higher the 
telephone density, the higher the expenditure on telephone services per line and also the 
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expenditure on telephone traffic. It is important to note that the increase of urban traffic 
is generally more sensitive to the increase of telephone density than the rural case. 
The incoming international traffic per line generated overseas is also included in 
this sector, and is defined as a function of the outgoing international traffic per line and 
the incoming-outgoing imbalance of international traffic. It has been observed in several 
developing countries that the imbalance between incoming and outgoing international 
traffic has been able to generate more than fifty percent of the revenue of the telephone 
company via net settlements (Primo et. al., 1999).  
 
4.6 Equations of the Telephone Traffic Sector 
The telephone traffic per service (TTS) adjusts toward referential telephone 
traffic per service (RTTS) during a telephone traffic adjustment time (TTAT). The 
referential telephone traffic per service (RTTS) is function of the telephone traffic 
expenditure per service (TES), the price of telephone traffic per service (PRTS), and the 
free minutes consumed per service (FCS): 
  
                           (d / dt) TTS i  j =  [RTTS i  j   TTS i  j] / TTAT              (18) 
                  RTTS i  j= (TES i  j/ PRTS i  j) + FCS i  j                                     
The telephone traffic expenditure per service (TES) is a function of the 
expenditure on telephone traffic per subscriber (ETT) and the percentage of traffic 
expenditure per telephone service (PTES): 
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               TES i  j= ETT i * PTES i  j                                              (19) 
The expenditure on telephone traffic per subscriber (ETT) is a function of the 
normal expenditure on telephone traffic (NETR) and the telecom expenditure increase 
fraction (TEI).  
 
                   ETT i = NETR i * TEI i                                               (20) 
The telecom expenditure increase fraction (TEI) is equal to the telecom 
expenditure increase from size of the network fraction (TEISN) and telecom 
expenditure increase from mobility (TEIM): 
                             TEI i = TEISN i * TEIM i                                           (21) 
The telecom expenditure increase from size of the network fraction (TEISN) is a 
non-linear function of the network externality impact (NEI): 
 
 TEISN i = f 3i (NEI i)                                   (22) 
                                     Where f 3i  > 0          
The telecom expenditure increase from mobility (TEIM) is a function of the 
number of mobile customers (MC) and the total telephone subscribers (TTS):  
 
                TEIM i = f 4i (MC i / TTS i )                                         (23) 
                             Where f 4i  > 0          
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The normal expenditure on telephone traffic (NETR) is a function of the income 
per subscriber (IPS) and the fraction of the income per subscriber as expenditure on 
telephone traffic (FISETR): 
 
                              NETR i = IPS i * FISETR i                                     (24) 
 The willingness to pay for telephone services or subscriber expenditure on 
telecommunications (SET) is a function of the normal expenditure on 
telecommunications per subscriber (NETS) and the telecom expenditure increase 
fraction (TEI): 
 
                                 SET i = NETS i  * TEI i                                     (25) 
The normal willingness to pay or expenditure on telecommunications (NETS) is 
function of the income per subscriber (IPS) and the fraction of the income per 
subscriber as expenditure on telecommunications (FISET):  
 
                       NETS i = IPS i * FISET i                                    (26) 
 The incoming international traffic per line (IIT) is defined as a function of the 
outgoing international traffic per line (TTS
 i 
t) and the incoming-outgoing international 
traffic ratio (IOIR): 
 
         IIT i = TTS i t  * IOIR                                          (27) 
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The normal monthly rental fee (NMRF) is function of the subscriber expenditure 
on telecommunications (SET) and the expenditure on traffic per subscriber (ETT): 
 
                                         NMRF i  = SET i  - ETT i                                       (28) 
 
 
4.7 Financial Resources Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Financial Resources Sector 
This sector represented in Figure 8, assumes that all revenue remains in the 
system. The cash balance is increased by income from the telephone and value added 
services and decreased by the operating costs and the amount of money invested in 
telephone expansion and value added service infrastructure.  
The income from the postpaid telephone service includes net settlements 
received by the imbalance of outgoing and incoming international traffic with other 
countries, the income from national and international telephone traffic generated in 
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urban and rural regions, and the income from monthly rental fees. The income from 
national and international traffic depends on the connected subscribers in urban and 
rural areas, the telephone traffic per call, and the price of telephone traffic per call. 
The operating cost is represented as a percentage of the capital costs. The world 
average was used in the model, which is about thirty percent of the capital costs (Kayani 
and Dymond, 1997). The profits of the telecom operation are accumulated in the cash 
balance, which are reinvested in telecom expansion (Hudson, 1984). It is also assumed 
that the telephone company invests a fraction of its the cash balance in expansion of 
telecom infrastructure in urban and rural areas. 
 
4.8 Equations of the Financial Resources Sector 
The telecom cash balance (TCB) is increased by the telecom income (TI) and 
decreased by the telecom expenses (TE) of the telephone company. The telecom income 
(TI) is function of the income from telephone traffic (ITR), net settlement (NS), 
activation income (AI), and the income from monthly rental fee (IMRF). The telecom 
expenses (TE) are function of the operating costs (OC), telephone investment (TINV), 
value added service investment (VSINV), and license expenses per month (LE). The 
superscript m refers to any type of value added service, payphone (php), virtual 
telephony (vtp), and prepaid phone (pp). The superscript n refers to any type of value 
added service infrastructure, mailboxes (mb), payphone devices (pphd), and calling card 
numbers (ccn): 
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                                 (d / dt) TCB = TI  TE                                       (29) 
                                                TI = ITR + NS + AI + IMRF                                      
                                                TE =  i (OC i + TINV i +VSINV i) + LE                                                                  
The income from telephone traffic (ITR) is the sum of the income from postpaid 
telephone traffic per service (I), which includes the income from local, long distance, 
and outgoing international traffic, and the income from different value added services 
(IVAS):  
 
               SI =  j ( I u j   + I r j ) +  m ( IVAS u m   + IVAS r m )             (30) 
The income from postpaid telephone traffic per service (I) is function of the 
telephone traffic per service (TTS), the free minutes granted per service (FS), the 
number of connected subscribers (CS), and the price of telephone traffic per service 
(PRTS): 
 
                        I i j = (TTS i j - FS i j)* PRTS i j * CS i                         (31) 
The income from value added services (IVAS) is a function of the number of 
VAS users (VASU) and the price of value added services (PVAS): 
 
                            IVAS i m = VASU i m  * PVAS i m                             (32)  
The net settlement (NS) is function of the number of postpaid connected 
subscribers (CS), the prepaid telephone subscribers (VASU i pp), the imbalance of 
international traffic per subscriber per month (IIT), and the settlement rate (SR): 
 77 
 
                          NS =  i [(CS i + VASU i pp )* IIT i * SR ]               (33) 
The activation income (AI) is function of the connecting rate of postpaid 
customers (CR), the rate of connecting prepaid customers (PPCR), and the activation 
fee (AF): 
 
                               AI =  i [(CR i + PPCR i) * AF i]                         (34) 
The income from monthly rental fee (IMRF) is function of the number of 
connected subscribers (CS) and the monthly rental fee (MRF): 
 
                                         IMRF =  i (CS i * MRF i )                                    (35) 
The operating costs (OC) are function of the capital costs (CCO), the percentage 
of capital costs as operating costs per year (PCIOC), and the monthly fraction of 
operating costs (MFOC): 
             
                            OC i = CCO i * PCIOC i * MFOC                        (36) 
 The capital costs (CCO) is function of the telephone capital costs (TCCO) and 
value added services capital costs (VSCCO): 
 
                                   CCO i   = TCCO i  + VSCCO i                                   (37) 
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 The telephone capital costs (TCCO) is function of the number of postpaid 
connected subscribers (CS), prepaid telephone subscribers (PPTS), telephone capacity 
(TC), telephone deployment in progress (TDIP), and the cost of a telephone line (COT): 
 
                      TCCO i = (TS i + PPTS i + TC i + TDIP i)* COT i                     (38)    
 
The value added service capital cost (VSCCO) is function of the amount of 
value added service infrastructure (VASI) and the cost of each VAS infrastructure 
(COVSI): 
 
              VSCCO i  =  n  (VASI in * COVSI in )                        (39) 
 The value added service infrastructure (VASI) is function of the number of VAS 
users (VASU), the amount of VAS infrastructure per user (VASIPU), the payphone 
infrastructure installed (PAYII), and the payphone infrastructure being deployed 
(PAYDIP). 
 
                VASI iccn  = (VASU ivtp + VASU iphp + VASU ipp)* VASIPU iccn      (40) 
                        VASI imb  = (VASU ivtp)* VASIPU imb 
      VASI ipphd = PAYII i  + PAYDIP i  
The telephone investment (TINV) is function of the new orders of telephone 
deployment (NOTD) and the cost of a telephone line (COT): 
 
 TINV i  = NOTD i   * COT i                                           (41) 
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 The value added service investment (VSINV) is function of the new VAS 
infrastructure (NVASI) and the cost of each VAS infrastructure (COVSI): 
 
          VSINV i   =  n  (NVASI in * COVSI in )                        (42)     
 
4.9 The Reference Mode of the Regional Telecom System 
 The reference mode generated by the base case simulation of the Regional 
Telecom System is observed in Figures 9, 10, and 11. Table 5 shows the base case 
values used to replicate the reference mode. The behavior observed in these figures is 
generated by the structure of the model described in this chapter, and represents the 
historical behavior described in chapter 2 over a period of nine years or 108 months. 
The base case values used to generate the reference mode are the following:  
 
 
Model Parameters Base Case 
1. Monthly Rental Fee (Urban and Rural) $1  
2. Urban Income per Capita $ 550  
3. Rural Income per Capita $309 
4. Total Connected Subscribers Initial 210,000 
5. Percent. Rural Lines 2.5% 
6. ITU Waiting List 50,000 
7. Waiting List Unreported Factor 4 
8. Initial Population 200,000,000 
9. % Rural Population 60% 
10. Urban Population Growth Rate 2.3% 
11. Rural Population Growth Rate 0.2% 
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12. Urban Cost per Line $100 
13. Rural Cost per Line $500 
14. Telephone Deployment Time (Urban) 2 mo. 
15. Telephone Deployment Time (Rural) 4 mo. 
16. Number of Telephones per Urban House 1 
17. Number of Telephones per Rural House 1 
18. Initial Cash Balance $10 Millions 
19. Investment in Rural Areas 3.5% 
20. Delay to Accept Activation Fee 3 mo. 
21. Wireless Flag (urban and rural) 0 
22. License Cost $0  
23. Activation Fee (Urban) $ 76 
24. Activation Fee (Rural) $ 22 
25. Price of International Traffic per Minute $ 1 
26. Time to Recognize Attractiveness  6 mo. 
27. Time to Adjust Demand (Urban and Rural) 60 mo. 
28. Incoming-Outgoing International Traffic Ratio 3 
29. Delay to Adjust Lines (Urban and Rural) 3 mo. 
30. Initial Telephones to Connect (Urban) 10,000 
31. Initial Telephones to Connect (Rural) 100 
32. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Urban) 0.9 
33. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Rural) 0.1 
34. Fraction of Telephone Capacity per Month 0.25 
35. Free Local Minutes (Urban and Rural) 100 min 
36. Fraction of Cap Cost as part of Op. Cost 0.3 
38. Urban Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.9 
39. Urban Weight on Externality (Rural)  0.5 
40. Rural Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.1 
41. Rural Weight on Externality (Rural) 0.5 
42. Free Local Minutes Used (Urban) 100 
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43. Free Local Minutes Used (Rural) 50 
44. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Urb) 0.01 
45. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Rur) 0.006 
46. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Urban) 0.015 
47. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Rural) 0.015 
48. Number of People per House 4 
49. Referential Price (Market Price Policy) $ 1 
 
                  Table 5. Base Case values used to generate the Reference Mode 
 
The Figure 9 shows the low levels and growth of telephones densities in 
developing countries, which are less than 6 phones per 100 households in the base case 
simulation. This figure indicates the telephone tendisity at the national level, which is 
obtained dividing the total number of telephone lines to the total number of households 
in the country. The low levels of income per capita observed in developing countries 
generate low levels of financial resources to the telephone company, which are used for 
telephone expansion, as shown in positive feedback loops 1 and 2 of Figure 14. This 
reduces the telephone density in urban and rural areas of developing countries. 
The Figure 10 shows the supply problem of telephone lines in developing 
countries, where the waiting lists of subscribers are higher than the new telephone lines 
available to connect. It can be seen that the gap between the waiting lists and the new 
telephones installed is increasing through time. This behavior indicates the lack of 
supply of new urban and rural telephone capacity because of the low levels of financial 
resources of the telephone company, which are used for telecom investment, as 
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observed in positive feeback loops 1, 2, 7, and 8 in Figure 14. In addition, the rate of 
new telephone subscribers in urban and rural areas depends on the monthly rental fee of 
the telephone service, as seen in positive feedback loops 3 and 4 of Figure 14. It has 
been observed in several developing countries that the urban monthly rental fees are 
lower than the willingness to pay of the population.   
The gap in telephone penetration between rural and urban areas of developing 
countries is shown in Figure 11. This indicates the ratio between rural and urban 
telephone densities, which is very low. It can be observed that the urban telephone 
densities are higher than ten times the telephone densities in rural areas. Additionally, 
the ratio between rural and urban telephone densities is decreasing, which indicates that 
the regional telephone gap in developing countries is increasing.  The lower income per 
capita of the rural population with respect to the urban population in developing 
countries, and the higher costs and obstacles experienced when deploying rural telecom 
infrastructure reduce even more the rural telephone densities with respect to the urban 
telephone densities, since they affect the positive feedback loops 2 and 8 in Figure 14.     
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                   Fig. 9. National Telephone Density of the Reference Mode 
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Chapter 5. The Impact of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-
Subsidies on the Dispersion of Telephone Services in Developing Countries 
As it was earlier stated, the Universal Service Obligation and International 
Cross-Subsidy policies have not helped to increase the dispersion of telephone services 
into rural areas. Many experiments were performed with the model described in the 
previous chapter in order to see the impact of these policies on the growth of telephone 
services. It was simulated several Universal Service Obligation options, with different 
percentages of the total investment assigned to rural and urban regions, and several 
levels of International Cross-Subsidies implemented by below cost monthly rental fees. 
 The base case, with no subsidy policies in place replicates the reference mode, 
which is characterized by low levels and slow growth of rural and national telephone 
densities. This behavior is generated by the structure of the model described in chapter 
4. It represents the historical behavior described in chapter 2 over a period of nine years 
or 108 months. The base case assumes a Rural Investment Fraction of 3.5 % and a 
monthly rental fee of one dollar. 
   
5.1 The Impact of Implementing Universal Service Obligations 
This policy shown in Figures 12 and 13 is simulated by increasing the Rural 
Investment Fraction (RIF) from 3.5, which represents the base case, to 20 and 65 
percent. This increase is made, even though the ratio of willingness to pay over 
operating costs is much higher in urban areas than in rural areas. 
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It is observed in Figures 12 and 13 that increasing the RIF from 3.5 % to 65 % 
reduces the national telephone density from the beginning and the rural telephone 
density in the very long run with respect to the base case. This happens because the 
increase in this obligation reduces the revenue from telecom services and the financial 
resources available for telecom investment. The decrease in financial resources not only 
reduces the urban telephone density; it also diminishes the telephone density in rural 
areas in the long run. The reduction of urban and rural telephone densities diminishes 
the overall telephone density of the country, as observed in Figure 13. 
It is important to note that a Rural Investment Fraction of twenty percent also 
reduce the overall telephone density, but performs better in the long run than a Rural 
Investment Fraction of 65 %. In fact, the rural telephone density is improved and the 
urban and overall telephone densities are reduced again, with respect to the base case. 
The RIF of 20 % reduces less the urban and overall telephone densities than a RIF of 65 
%. This happens because lower values of RIF are able to maintain the overall revenues 
at a higher level, which affects the rural telephone density in the long run. On the other 
hand, RIF values higher than sixty five percent produce a behavior similar to the sixty 
five percent case.  
When the RIF is increased, the amount of money allocated for rural telecom 
investment is improved with respect to the base case in the short run, as indicated by 
feedback loop 2 of Figure 14. The increased investment in rural areas is achieved by 
reducing the portion of investment assigned to urban telecom capacity. The additional 
telecom investment assigned to rural areas turns into a lower number of new telephone 
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lines than the case when this extra amount of investment were assigned to the expansion 
of the urban telephone network. This happens due to the higher costs and deployment 
delays of the rural telephone lines with respect to the urban lines. 
The improvement in the supply of new rural telephone lines increases the 
connecting rate of telephones in rural areas and the number of rural connected 
subscribers. The improved rural connecting rate tends to reduce the rural waiting list, as 
observed in negative feedback loop 6 in Figure 14. The additional rural connected 
subscribers improve the network externality impact in rural areas that enhances the rural 
demand for telephone access and the rate of new rural customers, which tend to increase 
the rural waiting list, as indicated by positive feedback loop 4.   
The additional rural connected subscribers improve the rural traffic per line with 
respect to the base case because of the impact of the size of the network on traffic, as 
indicated by positive feedback loop 2 of Figure 14. The increase in rural connected 
subscribers and rural traffic per line improves the revenue of the telephone company 
from rural areas, as indicated by positive feedback loops 2 and 8 of Figure 14. However, 
the extra numbers of rural connected subscribers and rural traffic per line produced by 
the increase of the RIF, generate less revenue than if these extra numbers were in the 
urban network. This happens because the willingness to pay for telephone services in 
rural areas, which is a function of the income per capita, is lower than it is in urban 
areas. 
The developing countries often have weak policy implementation institutions. 
This is a policy may often not be applied consistently and continuously. For this reason, 
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the increase of the Rural Investment Fraction only in the first four years is also shown in 
Figures 12 and 13. It is observed in Figure 12 that the rural telephone density is 
improved in the short run, but is reduced in the long term with respect to the base case. 
On the other hand, as observed in Figure 13, it reduces the national telephone density 
permanently. This happened because the increase of the RIF during the first four years 
of the simulation reduced the financial resources with respect to the base case, which 
turns into lower numbers of telephone lines and densities. The increase of the RIF 
during the first four years was able to improve the rural telephone density in the short 
term in spite of the reduction of financial resources, as seen in Figure 12.  
 
5.2 The Impact of Implementing International Cross-Subsidies 
As described in chapter 2, the International Cross-Subsidy is implemented by 
having a below cost monthly rental fee in urban and rural areas and keeping the prices 
of international telecom traffic high and at above costs levels. In this case, the 
International Cross-Subsidy is implemented, even though the urban willingness to pay 
for telephone access is higher than the urban monthly rental fee and the demand for 
urban telephone access is relatively inelastic. The impact of this policy is shown in the 
normalized values observed in Policy 2 of Table 6. This shows that the ratio of urban 
operating cost to urban monthly rental fee and the ratio of urban access willingness to 
pay to urban monthly rental fee are higher than one, which indicates that the urban 
monthly rental fee is lower than the operating costs and the access willingness to pay in 
urban areas. 
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The performance of the International Cross-Subsidy is shown in Figures 12 and 
13. It can be observed in Figure 12 that reducing the urban and rural monthly rental fee 
from one to 0.8 and 0.5 dollars reduces the rural telephone density with respect to the 
base case. This happens because the reduction of the urban monthly rental fee 
diminishes the revenue and the financial resources of the telephone company, which are 
used for investment in rural telecom capacity. In addition, the reduction of financial 
resources also diminishes the urban telecom investment, which reduces the supply of 
new urban telephone lines and the urban telephone density, as seen in Table 6. The 
reduction of rural and urban telephone densities reduces the overall telephone density of 
the country with respect to the base case, as shown in Figure 13. Finally, the higher the 
reduction of the urban monthly rental fee, the higher is the decrease of the financial 
resources of the telephone company and of the rural and overall telephone densities. 
Therefore, a urban monthly rental fee of 0.5 dollars will reduce more the financial 
resources, telephone investment, and telephone densities than a monthly rental fee of 
0.8 dollars, as shown in Figures 12 and 13. 
When the urban monthly rental fee is reduced, it increases the ratio of urban 
operating cost to urban monthly rental fee as well as the ratio of urban access 
willingness to pay to urban monthly rental fee with respect to the base case (observed in 
Policy 2 of Table 6). It can be seen that the normalized values of these ratios are equal 
to 2 at time zero, which indicates that the application of this international cross-subsidy 
has doubled the ratio of urban operating cost to urban monthly rental fee and the ratio of 
urban access willingness to pay to urban monthly rental fee, with respect to the base 
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case. This situation determines an increase in the level of international cross-
subsidization, where the telephone company becomes more dependent on above cost 
international traffic and revenue. The decrease of the urban monthly rental fee 
diminishes the revenue and the financial resources of the telephone company, which 
reduces the gain of the positive feedback loop 7 in Figure 14. This situation diminishes 
the urban telephone investment, the supply of new urban telephone lines, and the 
number of urban telephone subscribers, which reduces again the revenue and financial 
resources of the telephone company, as observed in positive feedback loops 1 and 7.  
The diminution of financial resources also decreases the gain of positive 
feedback loops 2 and 8, which diminishes the rural telephone investment, the supply of 
new rural telephone lines, the connecting rate of rural telephone lines, and the number 
of rural telephone subscribers, which also decrease the revenue and financial resources 
of the telecom company, with respect to the base case.   
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Figure 12. Rural Telephone Density for USO and International Cross-Subisidy 
Policies
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Figure 13. National Telephone Density for USO and International Cross-Subisidy 
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Figure 14. Causal Structure of Demand and Supply of the Regional Telecom 
System 
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5.3 Policies for Improving Telephone Penetration. 
Several experiments were conducted with different pricing mechanisms and 
Universal Service Obligations policies, the following results summarize the best 
policies that considerably improved the regional dispersion of telephones in developing 
countries. Table 6 summarizes the performance of Universal Service Obligations, 
International Cross-Subsidies, Market-Clearing Pricing, and a combination of Market-
Clearing Pricing with Universal Service Obligations. 
 
5.3.1 Market-Clearing Pricing 
This policy is implemented by defining the urban monthly rental fee as a 
function of the supply of additional urban telephone capacity, which depends on the 
financial resources, and demand for urban telephone capacity, which is a function of the 
urban waiting list of telephone subscribers. Figure 15 shows the behavior of the urban 
monthly rental fee when the market pricing mechanism is applied. The base case 
represents the behavior of a regulated and fixed monthly fee of one dollar. Figure 16 
shows the feedback structure driving changes in monthly rental fee. 
Whenever the market pricing mechanism is applied to urban areas, the urban 
monthly rental fee is increased when the ratio between the supplied urban telephone 
capacity and the demanded urban telephone capacity is lower than one. When supply of 
additional urban lines equals the demand for them, the monthly rental fee is assumed to 
be equal to a reference price of one dollar. When the financial resources are large 
enough, such that the supplied urban telephone capacity could be higher than the 
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demanded urban telephone capacity, the lower the urban monthly rental fee is, as 
indicated in the structure shown in Figure 16. 
It is observed in Figure 16 that the increase of the urban monthly rental fee will 
tend to reduce the growth of urban potential telephone subscribers and improve the 
financial resources of the telephone company. The diminution of urban potential 
telephone subscribers decreases the gain of positive feedback loop 11, which reduces 
the urban waiting list and the demanded urban telephone capacity. On the other hand, 
the improvement in the financial resources increases the supply of urban telephone 
capacity. The augment of the supply of urban telephone capacity and the reduction of 
the demanded urban telephone capacity decrease the urban monthly rental fee in the 
long run, as observed in Figure 15. This improves the number of urban potential 
subscribers, the urban waiting list, and the demanded telephone capacity in urban areas 
also in the long run, as indicated by positive feedback loop 11 in Figure 16. This 
situation considerably increased the urban telephone density, the rural telephone 
density, the national telephone density, and the financial resources of the telephone 
company, as observed in the normalized values of Policy 3 in Table 6. 
It is observed in Policy 3 ofTable 6 that the increase of the urban monthly rental 
fee through market pricing considerably improves the financial resources and the 
telephone densities of the telephone company with respect to the base case. For instance 
at year 15, the national telephone density was increased from its normal value of 12.32 
(Base Case) to 44.31 (Policy 3), and the financial resources were increased from 3.86 
(Base Case) to 63.40 (Policy 3). The increase of the monthly rental fee in urban areas 
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has little effect on urban access demand, since this is relatively inelastic and the 
willingness to pay for urban telephone access is higher than the urban monthly rental 
access fee, as observed in Table 6.  
The base case shows that the ratio of urban access willingness to pay to urban 
monthly rental fee is higher than 1. When the market pricing policy is applied to urban 
areas, it increases the urban monthly rental fee, which reduces this ratio in the short 
term and enlarges the financial resources and telephone densities of the telecom 
company. The growth of telephone densities enhances the network externality impact, 
which improves the willingness to pay for telephone access in urban areas. The 
improvement of the urban access willingness to pay and the reduction of the urban 
monthly rental fee in the long run, improve the ratio of urban access willingness to pay 
to urban monthly rental fee also in the long run, as observed in the normalized values of 
Policy 3 in Table 6.  
 
5.3.2 Market-Clearing Pricing with Universal Service Obligation. 
This policy considers the market-clearing pricing policy described in the 
previous section, combined with an implementation of USO, which increases the RIF 
only after the urban telephone density reaches thirty percent. This means that thirty over 
100 households have a telephone line. This level of connectivity occurs when the supply 
of telephone capacity in urban areas equals the demanded urban telephone capacity 
using a market-clearing pricing mechanism.  
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The addition of this particular implementation of USO to the market-clearing 
policy improves considerably the rural telephone density and the rural-urban telephone 
density gap in the long term with respect to the implementation of market-clearing 
pricing alone, without reducing the number of urban telephone lines and urban 
telephone density, as shown in the normalized values of Policies 3 and 4 in Table 6. The 
rural telephone density was improved from its normalized value of 19.72 (Policy 3) to 
57.56 (Policy 4) in year 15, and the rural-urban telephone density gap was improved 
from 0.53 (Policy 3) to 1.53 (Policy 4) also in year 15. In fact, it slightly improves the 
national telephone density in the long run.  
After the urban supply of telephone capacity equals the urban telephone demand 
when the market-clearing pricing is applied to urban areas, the financial resources 
considerably improve because the number of urban telephone lines has been increased 
by the action of positive feedback loops 1 and 7 in Figure 14, and the urban waiting list 
has been reduced by the action of negative feedback loop 10 in Figure 16.   
The improvement of the financial resources to a level where the supply of urban 
telephone capacity equals the demanded urban telephone capacity reduces the strength 
of negative feedback loops 9 and 10 in Figure 16. The excess of financial resources can 
now be used to satisfy the rural waiting list by increasing the RIF, which improves the 
rural telecom investment and rural telephone lines and density. This situation raises the 
gain of positive feedback loops 2 and 8 in Figure 14, which increases the rural 
connecting rate and the gain of negative feedback loop 6, reducing the rural waiting list 
at the same time. However, the improvement of rural investment in the long term 
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diminishes the financial resources with respect to application of market-clearing pricing 
alone. This can be observed in the normalized values of financial resources 
corresponding to Policies 3 and 4 in Table 6.  The financial resources are reduced from 
63.40 (Policy 3) when the market price is implemented alone to 41.27 (Policy 4) when 
market pricing is combined with the increasing of the rural investment fraction when 
the telephone density reaches thirty percent. 
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Table 6. Performance of Different Telecom Policies in Developing Countries 
Policy Telecom Indicators 0 0 (N) 9 15
Base Run Rural Tel. Density 0.02 1.00 1.78 3.67
Urban Tel. Density 1.02 1.00 4.11 10.54
National Tel. Density 0.42 1.00 4.51 12.32
Rural/Urban T D Gap 0.02 1.00 0.41 0.35
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.00
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.40
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.12 1.00 1.07 1.39
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 0.12 1.00 1.00 1.02
Financial Resources (Mill) 10.00 1.00 0.95 3.86
1. Universal Service Rural Tel. Density 1.00 4.17 6.72
    Obligation Urban Tel. Density 1.00 2.27 2.99
RIF = 25 % National Tel. Density 1.00 2.56 3.62
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 1.88 2.35
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 1.10 1.40
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.02 1.04
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Financial Resources 1.00 0.27 0.41
2. International Rural Tel. Density 1.00 1.17 1.28
    Cross-Subsidy Urban Tel. Density 1.00 1.63 1.87
M. Fee = $ 0.5 National Tel. Density 1.00 1.79 2.20
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 0.71 0.71
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 2.00 2.00 2.00
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 2.00 2.02 2.03
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.01 1.02
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Financial Resources 1.00 0.09 0.15
3. Market-Clearing Rural Tel. Density 1.00 2.50 19.72
    Pricing Urban Tel. Density 1.00 7.00 37.76
National Tel. Density 1.00 7.67 44.31
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 0.35 0.53
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.46 0.80
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.53 1.50
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.17 1.93
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.01 1.08
Financial Resources 1.00 3.29 63.40
4. Market-Clearing Rural Tel. Density 1.00 2.50 57.56
    Pricing with USO Urban Tel. Density 1.00 7.00 37.76
RIF = 45 % National Tel. Density 1.00 7.67 45.14
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 0.35 1.53
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.46 0.76
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.53 1.48
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.17 1.93
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.01 1.08
Financial Resources 1.00 3.29 41.27
Years
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Figure 16. Feedback Loops affecting Urban Telephone Capacity 
 
5.3.3 Formulation of Market-Clearing Pricing 
 The market-clearing pricing mechanism (MCP) adjusts this price towards an 
indicated monthly rental fee (IMRF), which is a function of the current monthly rental 
fee (MRF) and a non-linear function of the ratio between the supplied telephone 
capacity (STC) and the demanded telephone capacity (TCD). The time to adjust market 
price (TAP) depends on this non-linear function and a referential time to adjust market 
price (RTAP):  
 
                             (d / dt)MCP u = (IMRF  MCP u) / TAP i                  (43) 
                             IMRF = MRF * f 4 (STC i / TCD i)     
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                             TAP i  = RTAP * (1 + f 4 (STC i / TCD i)),     Where f 5 is < 0 
 
5.3.4 Sensitivity of Policies for Improving Rural Telecommunications 
An important instrument in the policy framework outlined in the preceding 
section is the application of market-clearing pricing to urban areas, which improves the 
revenue and the financial resources of the telecom company reducing the urban unmet 
demand at the same time. In addition, the market-clearing pricing combined with 
animplementation of USO was able to improve the rural telephone density without 
diminishing the urban telephone density. 
New experiments were conductedto test the sensitivity of market-clearing 
pricing combined with USO, to changes in the urban income per capita, cost of 
providing service, deployment time of telephone lines, and the network externality 
impact. The network externality impact is a non-linear function of the telephone 
density, which improves the attractiveness and demand of the telephone service and the 
expenditure on telephone traffic, as the telephone density increases. The urban income 
per capita, deployment time and cost of telephone lines were increased, and the network 
externality impact was reduced (the slopes of the curves that define this impact in urban 
and rural areas, which are shown in the appendix, were reduced).  
The urban income per capita was increased from 550 dollars to 1,500 dollars, the 
deployment time was increased from two to four months in urban areas and from four to 
six months in rural areas, the cost of a telephone line was increased from 100 to 150 
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dollars in urban areas and from 500 to 700 dollars in rural areas. The simulation results 
of this sensitivity analysis are summarized in the normalized values of Table 7. 
It is observed in Table 7 that the application of market-clearing pricing to urban 
areas, shown in Policy 1, stillimproves both the urban and rural telephone densities with 
respect to the base case. It can be seen in year 15, that the rural telephone density is 
increased from its normalized value of 18.22 (Base Case) to 40.28 (Policy 1), and the 
urban telephone density is increased from its normalized value of 36.88 (Base Case) to 
40.39 (Policy 1), when market pricing is applied. The market-clearing pricing 
mechanism initially increases the urban monthly rental fee and later reduces it. This 
improves the financial resources and the number of telephone lines, and reduces the 
unmet demand.  
The implementation of market-clearing pricing combined with the 
implementation of USO when the urban telephone density reaches thirty five percent is 
shown in Policy 2. This appears to considerably increase the rural telephone density and 
the rural-urban telephone density gap in the long term compared with the application of 
market-clearing pricing alone. It is observed in the normalized values of Policies 1 and 
2 in year 15 that the rural telephone density is increased from 40.28 (Policy 1) to 161.33 
(Policy 2), and the rural-urban telephone density gap is improved from 1 (Policy 1) to 
4.12 (Policy 2). When market pricing is combined with USO, the financial resources are 
reduced with respect to the application of market pricing alone. It can be seen in Table 7 
that the normalized values of financial resources are reduced from 244.20 (Policy 1) to 
130.20 (Policy 2). 
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Table 7.  Performance of Market-Clearing Pricing Polices for Higher Income per 
Capita, Implementation Costs and Deployment Times, and Lower Network 
Externality Impact. 
 
5.3.5 Conclusions 
Governments and international organizations often attempt to achieve the 
universal service and increase the rural telecom infrastructure in developing countries 
by implementing Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies. 
These organizations, however, do not have a clear understanding of the implications and 
Policy Telecom Indicators 0 0 (N) 9 15
Base Run Rural Tel. Density 0.02 1.00 2.83 18.22
Urban Tel. Density 1.02 1.00 7.39 36.88
National Tel. Density 0.42 1.00 8.10 43.24
Rural/Urban T D Gap 0.02 1.00 0.35 0.47
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 3.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 7.63 1.00 1.18 1.78
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 2.03 1.00 1.18 1.78
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 0.11 1.00 1.02 1.06
Financial Resources (Mill) 10.00 1.00 6.19 141.60
1. Market-Clearing Rural Tel. Density 1.00 3.28 40.28
    Pricing Urban Tel. Density 1.00 8.98 40.39
National Tel. Density 1.00 9.83 47.81
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 0.35 1.00
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.47 0.80
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.58 1.55
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.26 1.80
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.02 1.07
Financial Resources (Mill) 1.00 9.26 244.20
2. Market-Clearing Rural Tel. Density 1.00 3.28 161.33
    Pricing with USO Urban Tel. Density 1.00 8.98 40.39
RIF = 45 % National Tel. Density 1.00 9.83 50.52
Rural/Urban T D Gap 1.00 0.35 4.12
Op. Cost / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.47 0.87
Access W.t.P / M. R. Fee (Urb) 1.00 0.58 1.55
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Urb) 1.00 1.26 1.80
W.t.P / Op. Cost (Rur) 1.00 1.02 1.07
Financial Resources (Mill) 1.00 9.26 130.20
Years
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impacts of such policies. The Universal Service Obligation policy increases the 
percentage of investment in rural areas, while reducing the percentage in urban areas. 
The International Cross-Subsidy policy maintains the international service prices high 
while keeping the urban monthly rental fee below the urban operating cost and urban 
willingness to pay for telephone access values. We found that these policies are 
counterproductive because of they limit growth in service due to financial constraints 
they create. 
The simulations showed that market-clearing pricing applied to urban areas was 
able to considerably improve the number of rural and urban telephone lines and the 
financial resources of the telecom company. However, if the Universal Service 
Obligation policy is implemented simultaneously after the urban telephone density 
reaches thirty percent, while the supply of urban telephone capacity equals the 
demanded capacity, a considerable increase of rural telephone density is obtained. 
The findings of this research are useful for telecom operators and regulators, 
since they can identify the pervasive impact of cross-subsidies on the dispersion of 
telephone services. However, the actual implementation of these policies and strategies 
in real life requires the model to be constantly updated to capture changes in telecom 
policies and technologies.  
More research under new and different scenarios is needed in order to identify 
new strategies and policies that could increase telephone dispersion in developing 
countries. The investigation of new pricing mechanisms and service combinations that 
could improve telephone penetration in developing countries will be of value. The 
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impact of competition and quality of service are other important issues that can be 
addressed by extending the model presented in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 6. A Value Added Service Strategy for the Improvement of Telephone 
Density in Rural Areas of Developing Countries. 
 
6. 1 Abstract 
Telephone densities in developing countries are typically extremely low. This is 
often a consequence of poor planning and inadequate pricing policies. The regional 
telecom model is extended to deal with the complexity of the telecommunication system 
in a developing country, giving special attention to the discrepancies between urban and 
rural areas. This model is used to test several combinations of service offerings and 
pricing policies that exploit positive feedback loops of the telecom system. Simulations 
suggest that the dispersion of telephone services in rural areas may significantly 
improve when a prepaid pricing scheme is applied simultaneously to the telephone, 
virtual telephony, and the payphone services. Other schemes are also tested but fail to 
bring significant improvements to the underdeveloped telecommunication system. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
The current policies and technologies for increasing telecommunications 
deployment in rural areas are considered to be insufficient or unsuccessful, and the 
plans for expansion of local telephone networks are considered to be imprecise 
considering the scope of the investment (Malecki, 2003; Melody, 1999; Strover, 2003; 
Calhoun, 1992). However, the value added services (VAS) are considered to have the 
potential to increase the telephone access in developing countries, but it is still not clear 
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if they will be able to improve the telephone density in unprofitable rural areas and 
reduce the rural-urban telephone density gap after their implementation.  
In some cases, the low level of telephone penetration in developing countries has 
been attributed to an outdated telecommunications system that prevents development of 
value added services, which are supposedly able to generate more revenue required for 
telecom investment (Fretes-Cibils et. al., 2003). In some cases, the resources invested in 
value added services, or intelligent network platform, have been considered worthwhile 
after the revenue of the telecom company is increased, and better service to the 
subscribers is provided (Hamersma, 1996). In spite of this, there are few studies that 
have been developed in order to assess the impact that these innovative solutions have 
on increasing the connectivity of nations (Barendse, 2004). 
The impact of pricing structures on the adoption of mobile telephones has not 
received much attention in the past (Hodge, 2005). The prepaid pricing alternative 
provides an opportunity for individuals to manage their telephone expenses, since the 
number of calls that can be made is restricted. This and the relatively simple 
subscription process generate a broad customer acceptance for prepaid phone services 
(Hamilton, 2003). In this dissertation, Systems Dynamics is used to investigate the 
prepaid pricing mechanism of telephone services, which could be used to design a value 
added service strategy that considerably improves the number of rural telephone lines 
based on the synergic impact ofthese services on network externality of the regional 
telephone system. 
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It was found that the implementation of prepaid phone, virtual telephony, and 
payphone services together significantly improved the financial resources of the 
telephone company and accelerated the rural dispersion of telephone services in 
developing countries. However, the success of this strategy will depend on the 
friendliness of the user interface and the availability of these services in the region. 
Finally, it is important to note that the implementation of these services in isolation only 
achieved a moderate improvement. 
 
6.3 Value Added Services in Telecommunications 
The provision of value added services, such as voice mail, virtual telephony, 
prepaid phone, and payphone services, among others, represent an opportunity to 
improve the productivity or revenue from the local loops, and provide extra value or 
better service to the subscribers. The implementation of value added service platforms, 
which are called intelligent networks (IN), involves improving this network and 
introducing new services on this platform (Thorner, 1994).  
The low level of telephone penetration in a country has sometimes been 
attributed to the fact that the telecommunications network is outdated. This prevents the 
deployment of value added services (Fretes-Cibils et. al., 2003). There is certain 
evidence that the introduction of prepaid phone services in mobile telephony has been 
able to expand the number of telephone lines in developing countries. However, the 
actual impact of this innovative pricing mechanism, which uses a VAS platform, is still 
unclear (Hodge, 2005). The Table 8 shows the growth of prepaid and postpaid cellular 
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phones in selected developing countries (World Telecommunication Indicators 
Database, 2004). It can be observed the exponential growth of prepaid telephones, 
which is much higher than the growth of postpaid phones. In addition, it can also be 
observed in this table the increasing gap between the number of prepaid and postpaid 
telephones through years. 
There is a management trend in developing countries to overlook or delay the 
provision of valued added services, since the focus has been to address the large number 
of waiting lists or outstanding demand in the system (Saunders et. al., 1994). For 
instance, the investment in payphone services, which use the intelligent network 
platform, has been very low. The Table 9 shows the low level of penetration of 
payphone devices in selected developing countries, although there has been some 
growth. The penetration of payphones in developing countries is much lower than the 
penetration of payphones in developed countries, which is generally higher than two 
payphones per 1000 people (World Telecommunication Indicators Database, 2004).  
The investment in value added services reduces the investment in telecom 
expansion but there is a potential to increase the financial resources of the telephone 
company in the long run. In addition, there is a belief in the telecom industry that 
investment in more advanced VAS from revenue generated in basic services, such as 
telephony, could divert the focus from the expansion of basic telecom infrastructure and 
universal service (Siochru, 1996). For this reason, the investment cost of the VAS 
platform needs to be trade-off against the potential increase of revenue and provision of 
better services to the subscribers (Hamersma, 1996).  
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In spite of the potential benefits that value added services could provide to the 
expansion of telephone services in developing countries, there are few studies 
developed in order to assess the impact that these innovative solutions have on 
increasing telecom penetration in these nations (Barendse, 2004). This research will 
study the impact of three different services: virtual telephony, payphone, and prepaid 
phone services.  
The VAS studied in this dissertation target different markets and need several 
VAS infrastructures. The prepaid payphone service is offered to the population who is 
not interested in subscribing to the telephone service. This service requires the 
deployment of calling card numbers and public payphones. In addition, the virtual 
telephony service is offered to subscribers in the waiting list. This service is a 
combination of voice mail and payphone services. Therefore, it requires the deployment 
of mailboxes, calling card numbers, and public payphones. Finally, the prepaid phone 
service is offered to the population who does not have a telephone and is able to use 
this. This service requires the same infrastructure as the conventional postpaid 
telephone service and the deployment of calling card numbers, which is implemented in 
the intelligent network platform. 
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Table 8. The Dispersion of Prepaid Cellular Phones in Selected Developing 
Market Economies. 
Source: World Telecommunication Indicators Database (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. The Dispersion of Payphones in Selected Developing Market 
Economies. 
Source: World Telecommunications Indicators Database (2004). 
 
6.4 Impact of Value Added Services on Telephone Expansion 
In this section, several experiments were conducted with different value added 
service implementations, which did not strategically consider the interactions and 
feedback loops of the regional telecommunications system. The base case, which 
indicates a cellular service without VAS implementation, is shown at the top of Table 
10.  
Prepaid-Postpaid Prepaid-Postpaid
Countries Prepaid Postpaid Ratio (1998) Prepaid Postpaid Ratio (2002) Prepaid Postpaid
Togo 6000 1500 4 168000 2000 84 2700 33
Bolivia 112247 127025 0.9 674710*** 105207*** 6.4*** 501 -17
Ecuador 18450* 108055* 0.2* 1272333 288528 4.4 6796 167
Honduras 11875 23021 0.5 259156 67352 4 2082 192
Thailand 391000** 2665000** 0.15** 12735000 3382000 4 3157 26
* year 1997, ** year 2000, *** year 2001
2002-1998 Growth (%)20021998
1998-1993 2002-1998
Countries 1993 Payph/1000 pe 1998 Payph/1000 pe 2002 Payph/ 1000 pe Payph Growth Payph Growth
Zambia 526 0.06 554 0.05 878 0.08 0.05 0.58
Togo 68 0.01 132 0.03 12257 2.5 0.94 91.85
India 172000 0.1 527000 0.5 2006000 1.9 2.06 2.8
Bangladesh 1982 0.01 2023 0.01 2208 0.01 0.02 0.09
Pakistan 6000 0.04 28000 0.2 99000 0.6 3.66 2.53
Ecuador 3024 0.2 3846 0.3 5003 0.3 0.27 0.3
Honduras 861 0.1 2582 0.4 2583 0.3 2 0
Botswana 528 0.3 2449 1.5 2242 1.3 3.63 -0.08
Payphones
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6.4.1 Payphone Service 
The prepaid payphone service uses payphones and calling card numbers as basic 
infrastructure. This service is intended for each person capable of using a payphone, 
who is not interested on being a subscriber of the current telephone service. The 
potential subscribers are attracted to the payphone service after considering its price, 
user-friendly interface, availability, and the number of subscribers reachable in the 
network, which is represented in the model by the network externality impact. The 
higher the network externality impact, the higher the number of people reachable in the 
network. This service is implemented in the model by setting the VAS Offered variable 
for Payphone services in both urban and rural areas to 1, and by increasing the VAS 
investment referential variable to 0.04. The VAS investment referential variable 
considers payphones as the only significant value added service infrastructure in terms 
of costs and deployment delays.   
The total price paid by the payphone subscribers for the total number of calling 
cards used is relative to the willingness to pay for fixed telephone services, which 
depends on the network externality impact. The network externality is a function of the 
telephone density in the region (Saunders et. al., 1994). It is observed in Figure 17 that 
the number of telephone subscribers in the network affects the network externality 
impact of the system. The higher the telephone density and the network externality 
impact, the higher the willingness to pay for fixed telephone services and the number of 
calling cards consumed by the payphone subscribers. In addition, the payphone 
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subscribers consume an amount of prepaid calling cards based on the willingness to pay 
for fixed telephone services. The money spent in prepaid calling cards is called the 
payphone price in the model.  
 The performance of payphone services on the regional telecommunications 
system is observed in VAS 1 of Table 10. The national and regional telephone densities 
show a moderate improvement after the payphone service implementation, since the 
financial resources used for telephone expansion have been  increased. For instance, in 
year 15, the financial resources were increased from its normalized value of 1.320 (Base 
Case) to 3.529 (VAS 1). On the other hand, the rural-urban telephone density gap is not 
improved in spite of the rural telephone density growth. This indicates that the 
improvement of financial resources is not strong enough to reduce also the rural-urban 
telecom gap. 
The higher the number of telephones in the region the higher the network 
externality impact, which improves the payphone demand and the willingness to pay for 
fixed telephone services, as observed in positive feedback loops 17 and 18 of Figure 17. 
The enhancement on willingness to pay for fixed telephone services increases the 
number of prepaid payphone cards used in the system, which expands the payphone 
price. This situation enlarges the financial resources of the telephone company, as 
observed in positive feedback loop 18.  
The improvement on payphone demand increases the number of payphone users, 
which also expands the financial resources of the telephone company because the 
revenue from payphone services is augmented, as observed in positive feedback loops 
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13 and 17 of Figure 17. As described before, the expansion of financial resources 
improves the number of telephone lines. The investment in payphone infrastructure is 
subtracted from the investment in telephone expansion, as shown by negative feedback 
loop 16 of Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 17. Payphone Service Impact on Telephone Expansion 
 
6.4.2 Virtual Telephony Service 
 The virtual telephony service is a form of fixed telephone service, which 
is a combination of voice mail and prepaid payphone services. This implies that virtual 
telephony requires mailboxes, payphones, and calling cards, as basic infrastructure. This 
service targets telephone subscribers in the waiting list, who have decided to subscribe 
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to the service and to pay for the telephone device and activation fee, but the telephone 
company has not connected them yet. This service is implemented in the model by 
setting the VAS Offered variable for Virtual Telephony services in both urban and rural 
areas to 1, and by increasing the VAS investment referential variable to 0.04. The VAS 
investment referential variable considers payphones as the only significant value added 
service infrastructure in terms of costs and deployment delays.   
The subscribers of virtual telephony were attracted to this service after 
considering its price, and other features such as user-friendly interface and availability. 
The price paid for the virtual telephony service is proportional to the willingness to pay 
for the fixed telephone service, which depends on the network externality impact. The 
virtual telephony users consume a number of calling cards relative to this willingness to 
pay. It is observed in Figure 18 that the number of telephone subscribers in the network 
affects the network externality impact of the system. The virtual telephony subscribers 
consume an amount of prepaid calling cards based on the willingness to pay for fixed 
telephone services. This determines the amount of money spent on these cards, which is 
called the virtual telephony price in the model. 
The performance of virtual telephony on the regional telecommunications 
system is observed in VAS 2 of Table 10. It is observed that the virtual telephony 
service is able to slightly improve in the long term the national and regional telephone 
densities, and the rural-urban telephone density gap is not improved. For instance, in 
year 9, the rural telephone density is reduced from its normalized value of 14.545 (Base 
Case) to 14.091 (VAS 2), and the urban telephone density is slightly improved from its 
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normalized value of 9.501 (Base Case) to 9.552 (Virtual Telephony). However in year 
15, the rural telephone density is somewhat improved from 33.455 (Base Case) to 
34.182 (VAS 2). The telephone density improvement is relative to the expansion of 
financial resources, which depends on the number of virtual telephony users and the 
price charged for the virtual telephony service, as observed in Figure 18.  
The financial resources are not improved with respect to the base case, in spite 
of the minimum improvement on telephone densities. The increase of telephone 
densities is too low to improve the telephone revenue and the financial resources during 
the first fifteen years of the simulation. On the other hand, the increase on telephone 
densities and virtual telephony users enlarges the telephone expenses, in the form of 
telecom investment and operating costs. The Table 10 shows that in year 15, after the 
application of virtual telephony, the financial resources are still lower than the base 
case. 
The simulations proved that the impact of virtual telephony on the system is low, 
which is described as follows. The growth in the number of virtual telephony and 
telephone subscribers improve the impact of network externality on the system, as 
observed in positive feedback loops 23 and 25 of Figure 18. This situation enhances 
telephone demand and the number of telephone subscribers in the network, which is 
shown in positive feedback loop 22. The improvement on telephone demand enlarge the 
number of potential telephone subscribers and the quantity of telephone subscribers in 
the waiting list, which also augment the number of virtual telephony users, as observed 
in positive feedback loop 24 in Figure 18. The higher network externality impact also 
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increases the willingness to pay for fixed telephone services, which improves the 
number of calling cards used by the virtual telephony subscribers. This situation is 
represented by the virtual telephony price observed in positive feedback loops 23 and 
25 in Figure 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Virtual Telephony Service Impact on Telephone Expansion 
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telephone densities, and financial resources are improved with respect to the 
implementation of these services in isolation. However, the rural-urban telephone 
density gap is not reduced in spite of the rural telephone density growth. 
The functioning of these two services was described in previous sections. 
However, it is important to emphasize that both services share a specific VAS 
infrastructure deployed in the region, the payphones. The sharing of this infrastructure 
makes the use of payphones more productive, since the investment in costly payphones 
is being recovered from revenue generated from both virtual telephony and payphone 
services, which is a result of the conjoint action of positive feedback loops 13, 17, 18, 
19, 23, and 25 in Figures 17 and 18. This situation improves the financial resources of 
the telephone company, which is used for VAS and telephone expansion.  
When these two services are combined, the number of virtual telephony 
subscribers enhances the network externality impact, as shown in positive feedback 
loop 24 of Figure 18. This improves the number of payphone users and the number of 
calling cards consumed by payphone subscribers, as observed in positive feedback 
loops 17 and 18 in Figure 17. This situation expands the financial resources of the 
telephone company and the number of telephone lines. The higher number of telephone 
lines strengthens even more the network externality impact, as observed in positive 
feedback loops 17, 18, and 25 in Figures 17 and 18.  
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6.4.4 Prepaid Phone Service 
This service consists on the use of a VAS infrastructure implemented in the 
intelligent network of the telephone company, the prepaid calling card. The prepaid 
calling card is used as a mechanism of pricing, which replaces the conventional 
postpaid scheme. This service uses calling cards as basic infrastructure, where each 
subscriber will consume an amount of cards proportional to his/her willingness to pay. 
This service is implemented in the model by setting the VAS Offered variable for 
Prepaid Phone services in both urban and rural areas to 1, and by resetting the VAS 
investment referential variable to 0.  
The prepaid cellular telephone service is implemented in parallel to the 
conventional postpaid cellular telephone service. The prepaid phone service allows 
subscribers not interested in the postpaid service, because of the commitment to pay the 
monthly rental fee and complex paper work requirement, to become interested in the 
telephone service according to their willingness to pay. It is important to note that the 
subscription process of this prepaid service does not involve major paper work and is 
usually delivered in a simple service pack.  
 The performance of the prepaid telephone service is observed in VAS 4 of Table 
10. It can be seen that the implementation of a prepaid telephone service improves 
considerably the regional and national telephone densities, and the financial resources, 
in the long term with respect to other VAS implementations. However, the rural-urban 
telephone density gap disimprove since the urban telephone density has increased in a 
larger proportion than the rural density. For instance in year 15, the normalized 
 119 
financial resources increased to 6.434 (VAS 4), which is much higher than the base case 
value of 1.32, and higher than the value of 4.178, obtained from the combined 
implementation of virtual telephony and payphones. The rural telephone density 
increased from the normalized value of 33.455 (Base Case) to 107.364 (VAS 4), and the 
rural-urban telephone density ratio reduced from 1.481 (Base Case) to 1.111 (VAS 4).  
 The relatively simple subscription process and the price based on the willingness 
to pay of the prepaid telephone service reduce the adoption delay with respect to the 
postpaid telephone service. This situation expedites the adoption of telephone lines for a 
prepaid telephone service, as observed in positive feedback loop 27 in Figure 19. In 
addition, the higher the willingness to pay for telephone services, the higher the number 
of prepaid calling cards demanded by the prepaid subscribers, as observed in positive 
feedback loops 26 and 27 of Figure 19. The higher the prepaid telephone service price, 
or the number of calling cards used, the higher the revenue and financial resources of 
the telephone company, which are used for telephone expansion.  
The telephone expansion achieved by the improvement of the financial resources 
enhances the network externality impact of the system, as seen in positive feedback 
loops 26 and 27 of Figure 19. The higher network externality impact increases the 
willingness to pay for telephone services and the number of calling cards consumed by 
the prepaid subscribers. On the other hand, the improvement of the network externality 
impact increases the postpaid and prepaid telephone demand, which expands the 
number of postpaid and prepaid telephone lines respectively, as observed in positive 
feedback loops 28 and 29 
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Figure 19. Prepaid Phone Service Impact on Telephone Expansion 
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          Table 10. Impact of Different Value Added Services on Telephone Expansion 
 
Base Run Rural Tel. Density 1.000 11.000 14.545 33.455
Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.292 9.501 25.592
National Tel. Density 1.000 6.599 10.212 28.525
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.852 1.852 1.481
Financial Resources 1.000 0.099 0.223 1.320
1. Payphones Rural Tel. Density 1.000 10.636 15.727 53.364
Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.232 10.836 43.711
National Tel. Density 1.000 6.535 11.631 48.664
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.852 1.852 1.481
Financial Resources 1.000 0.125 0.330 3.259
Payphones/ 1000 people 0 0.067 0.096 0.325
2. Virtual Rural Tel. Density 1.000 10.636 14.091 34.182
Telephony Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.232 9.552 27.518
National Tel. Density 1.000 6.535 10.258 30.641
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.852 1.852 1.481
Financial Resources 1 0.092 0.219 1.437
Payphones/ 1000 people 0 0 0 0
3. Virtual Rural Tel. Density 1.000 10.909 16.091 63.455
Telephony and Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.516 11.592 53.569
Payphones National Tel. Density 1.000 6.829 12.433 59.631
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.852 1.481 1.481
Financial Resources 1 0.128 0.367 4.178
Payphones/ 1000 people 0.000 0.067 0.098 0.382
4. Prepaid Rural Tel. Density 1.000 7.636 15.455 107.364
Phones Urban Tel. Density 1.000 7.722 15.150 97.082
National Tel. Density 1.000 7.995 16.147 107.880
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.111
Financial Resources 1 0.189 2.766 6.434
Prepaid/Postpaid Ratio 0.000 2.021 0.616 8.492
Years
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6.4.5 Equations of Value Added Services 
The value added service users (VASU) are increased by the rate of adoption of 
value added services (RAVAS) and by the prepaid phone connection rate (PPCR), and 
decreased by the attrition rate of value added services (ARVAS). The adoption rate of 
value added services (RAVAS) is a function of the parameter VAS users increase 
(VASUI). In the same manner, the attrition rate of VAS (ARVAS) is a function of VAS 
users decrease (VASUD). Finally, the prepaid phone connecting rate is function of the 
telephone capacity (TC), the fraction of lines connected per month (FLC), and the 
postpaid-prepaid waiting list fraction (PPWLF): 
 
    ( d / dt ) VASU i m = RAVAS i m  ARVAS i m       (if m = php or vtp)           (44) 
    ( d / dt ) VASU
 i 
m
 = PPCR - ARVAS i m       (if m = pp) 
               RAVAS i m = VASUI i m 
               ARVAS i m = VASUD i m 
               PPCR i = TC i * FLC i * (1-PPWLF i) 
The potential users of value added services (PUVAS) are increased by the rate 
of growth of potential VAS users (GPUVAS) and by the attrition rate of value added 
services (ARVAS), and are decreased by the adoption rate of VAS (RAVAS), the rate 
of new prepaid phone customers (RNPPC), and by the discard of potential VAS users 
(DPUVAS): 
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( d / dt ) PUVAS i m = GPUVAS i m + ARVAS i m  RAVAS i m  - DPUVAS i m                
(if m = php or vtp)                                                             (45) 
( d / dt ) PUVAS i m = GPUVAS i m + ARVAS i m  RNPPC i - DPUVAS i m                             
(if m = pp) 
 The waiting list of prepaid phone subscribers (WLPP) is increased by the rate of 
new prepaid phone customers (RNPPC) and decreased by the prepaid phone connection 
rate (PPCR):  
 
                                ( d / dt )WLPP i = RNPPC i - PPCR i                                (46) 
 The rate of growth of potential VAS users (GPUVAS) for the case of payphones 
(php) is function of the population growth (GPO) and the fraction of population able to 
use calling cards (FPAUC), and GPUVAS for virtual telephony is the sum of the rate of 
new postpaid customers (RNC) and the rate of new prepaid customers (RNPPC), which 
are the flows of people interested in the telephone service but not connected yet. 
Finally, the GPUVAS for prepaid phones is equal to the growth of the population of 
telephone subscriber (GPTS): 
 
                                         GPUVAS i php = GPO i * FPAUC i                           (47) 
                                         GPUVAS i vtp = RNC i  + RNPPC i      
                                         GPUVAS i pp = GPTS i 
 The discard of potential VAS users (DPUVAS) for payphones (php) is function 
of the rate of new postpaid users (RNC) and the rate of new prepaid users (RNPPC). 
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The DPUVAS for virtual telephony (vtp) is a function of the rate of connecting postpaid 
subscribers (CR) and the rate of connecting prepaid customers (PPCR). Finally, the 
DPUVAS for prepaid phone (pp) is equal to the rate of people willing to pay the 
monthly rental fee of the postpaid telephone service or new potential customer rate 
(NPCR): 
 
                               DPUVAS i php = RNC i + RNPPC i                                     (48) 
                               DPUVAS i vtp = CR i  + PPCR i      
                               DPUVAS i pp = NPCR i        
 The VAS users increase (VASUI) and VAS users decrease (VASUD) are a 
function of the VAS users adjustment (VASUAD): 
     
                           VASUI i m = VASUAD i m          (if VASUAD i m > 0)             (49) 
                           VASUD i m = -VASUAD i m       (if VASUAD i m < 0)  
The VAS users adjustment (VASUAD) is a function of the indicated VAS users 
(IUVAS), the actual VAS users (VASU), and the delay to adjust VAS users (DADUV).  
 
               VASUAD i m = (IUVAS i m - VASU i m) / DADUV                (50) 
 The indicated users of value added services (IUVAS) are a function of the 
maximum demand for a particular VAS (MAXDVAS) and the demand fraction of VAS 
(DFVAS): 
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                            IUVAS i m  = MAXDVAS i m * DFVAS i m                           (51) 
 The maximum demand of virtual telephony (vt), payphone (php), and prepaid 
phone (pp) services (MAXDVAS) is function of the number of value added service 
users (VASU), the potential VAS users (PUVAS), and the population of potential and 
actual telephone subscribers (PTS): 
                               
                MAXDVAS i m = VASU i m  + PUVAS i m      (if m = vt or php)         (52) 
                MAXDVAS i m = PTS i  (if m = pp) 
             The demand fraction of VAS (DFVAS) is function of the price fraction of VAS 
(PFVAS), the availability of VAS fraction (AVASF), the easy to use of VAS factor 
(EUVASF), and the network externality impact (NEI). The user interface of the 
payphone service is a characteristic that indicates how easy is to handle a payphone 
with a prepaid calling card. This will influence the efficient use and adoption of this 
VAS (Thorner, 1994). The friendliness of this interface has been ranked from zero to 
one, which indicates impossible and very easy to use respectively. The normal values 
used in the model for the payphone easy to use factor are 0.7 for rural areas and one for 
urban areas. On the other hand, the user interface of the virtual telephony service is a 
characteristic that indicates how easy is to handle a payphone, a prepaid calling card, 
and a mailbox together. The normal values used in the model for the virtual telephony 
easy to use factor are 0.5 for rural areas and 0.7 for urban areas. Finally, the easy to use 
factor value of the prepaid telephone service is assumed one. This indicates that the 
prepaid calling card is very easy to handle: 
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    DFVAS im = PFVAS im * AVASF im * EUVASF im      (if m = vtp)               (53) 
    DFVAS im = (PFVAS im * AVASF im * EUVASF im )*NEI i     (if m = php or pp) 
The price fraction of VAS (PFVAS) is a non-linear function of the ratio between 
the price of VAS (PVAS) and the normal price of VAS (NPVAS): 
 
              PFVAS i m = f 6i (PVAS i m / NPVAS i m)                                              (54) 
             Where f 6i < 0 
The prices of VAS (PVAS) and the normal prices of VAS (NPVAS) are 
function of the willingness to pay for telephone services (WTPTS), which could be 
fixed or mobile, and the willingness to pay for fixed telephone services (WTPFTS). 
This indicates that the price of prepaid phone services equals the willingness to pay for 
telephone services and that the price of virtual telephony and payphone services equals 
the willingness to pay for fixed telephone services: 
 
   NPVAS i m  = PVAS i m = WTPTS i             (if m = pp)                      (55) 
               NPVAS i m  = PVAS i m = WTPFTS i           (if m = vt or php) 
The willingness of pay for telephone services (WTPTS) is equal to the 
subscriber expenditure on telecommunications (SET). On the other hand, the 
willingness to pay for fixed telephone services (WTPFTS) is function of the normal 
expenditure on telecommunications (NETS) and the telecom expenditure increase from 
size of the network (TEISN): 
 127 
 
     WTPTS i = SET i                                                            (56) 
WTPFTS i = NETS i  * TEISN i 
The availability of VAS fraction (AVASF) for payphones (php) is function of 
the infrastructure availability (IA) of payphone devices (phpd) and the infrastructure 
availability (IA) of calling card numbers (ccn). The availability of VAS fraction 
(AVASF) for virtual telephony is a function of the infrastructure availability (IA) of 
mailboxes (mb), the infrastructure availability (IA) of payphone devices (phpd), and the 
infrastructure availability (IA) of calling card numbers (ccn). Finally, the AVASF for 
prepaid phones is a function of the infrastructure availability of calling card numbers 
(ccn). The availability of payphone and virtual telephony services is mainly influenced 
by the availability of payphone infrastructure. The superscript n refers to any type of 
value added service infrastructure, mailboxes (mb), payphone devices (pphd), and 
calling card numbers (ccn): 
 
        AVASF i php = IA i phpd * IA i ccn                                         (57) 
        AVASF i vtp = IA i mb * IA i phpd * IA i ccn 
        AVASF i pp = IA i ccn 
The infrastructure availability (IA) of payphone devices (pphd) is a function of the 
payphone infrastructure installed (PAYII) , the population of the region (POP), and the 
referential payphone device availability per person (RPA): 
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 IA i pphd = (PAYII i / POP i ) / RPA                                          (58) 
 The infrastructure availability (IA) of mailboxes and calling card numbers is 
assumed one in the model, since the deployment delays and costs of each of these VAS 
infrastructures are much lower than the deployment delay and cost of the payphone 
infrastructure. This means that mailboxes and calling card numbers are always 
considered available.  
            The referential payphone device availability per person (RPA) has a maximum 
level of three payphones per 1000 people. This threshold is typical for developed 
countries with a considerable penetration of payphones (World Telecommunication 
Indicators Database, 2004). 
The payphone devices infrastructure installed (PAYII) are increased by 
payphone deployment rate (PAYDR) and decreased by payphone discard rate 
(PAYDIR). The payphone deployment rate (PAYDR) is function of the payphone 
deployment in progress (PAYDIP) and the payphone deployment delay (PAYDD). The 
payphone discard rate is function of the payphone infrastructure installed (PAYII), the 
payphone deployment in progress (PAYDIP), the desired payphone infrastructure 
installed (DPAYII), and the delay to adjust payphone Infrastructure (DAPAYI): 
 
                             ( d / dt ) PAYII i  = PAYDR i   PAYDIR i                       (59)            
                             PAYDR i   = PAYDIP i  / PAYDD i  
                                            PAYDIR i  = (PAYII i  + PAYDIP i   DPAYII i ) / DAPAYI i  
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 The implementation of mailboxes and calling cards are simplified in the model, 
since the deployment delay of mailboxes and calling card numbers could be less than 
six months (Macías, 2005). We are assuming that the deployment delay of calling cards 
and mailboxes is one month. On the other hand, the implementation of payphone 
devices includes the cellular line deployment time, which is three months for urban 
areas and six months for rural areas (Plaza and Iæiguez, 2005), and the payphone device 
installation time, which is also assumed one month.   
The payphone deployment in progress (PAYDIP) is increased by new orders of 
payphone infrastructure deployment (NOPAYD) and decreased by payphone 
deployment rate (PAYDR). The new orders of payphone infrastructure deployment 
(NOPAYD) are function of the payphone infrastructure installed (PAYII), the payphone 
deployment in progress (PAYDIP), the desired payphone infrastructure installed 
(DPAYII), and the delay to adjust payphone infrastructure (DAPAYI): 
 
                            ( d / dt ) PAYDIP i  = NOPAYD i   PAYDR i                  (60)            
                 NOPAYD i  = (DPAYII i  - PAYII i  - PAYDIP i ) / DAPAYI i  
 The desired payphone infrastructure (DPAYII) is function of the supplied 
payphone infrastructure (SPAYI) and the maximum payphone infrastructure demanded 
(MPAYID): 
 
                         DPAYII i  = SVASI i   ( if  MPAYID i  > SPAYI i  )                    (61) 
                         DPAYII i  = MPAYID i   ( if  SPAYI i  > MPAYID i )    
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 The cost of the payphone infrastructure or payphone device (CPAYI i) is the 
sum of the cost of the payphone device (CPD) and the cost of telephone line (COT). 
The cost of the payphone device is assumed 500 dollars, and the cost of a cellular 
telephone line is assumed 200 dollars for urban areas and 300 dollars for rural areas 
(Plaza and Iæiguez, 2005). The cost of payphone infrastructure is relatively high when 
compared with the cost of calling cards and mailboxesThe cost of the payphone device 
is assumed 500 dollars, and the cost of a cellular telephone line is assumed 200 dollars 
for urban areas and 300 dollars for rural areas (Plaza and Iæiguez, 2005). The cost of 
payphone infrastructure is relatively high when compared with the cost of calling cards 
and mailboxes. The cost of a calling card number is five dollars and the cost of a 
mailbox is ten dollars (Macías, 2005). : 
 
                     CPAYI i  = CPD + COT i                                           (62)  
 The maximum infrastructure demanded for payphone devices (MPAYID i ) is a 
function of the population (POP) and the referential payphone availability per person 
(RPA): 
 
      MPAYID i  = POP i * RPA                                                     (63) 
 The investment in payphone infrastructure (IPAYI) is a function of the total 
allocated investment in payphones (TIPAY) and the fraction of investment in payphone 
infrastructure (FIPAYI). The total investment in payphone (TIPAY) is a function of the 
total potential investment (TPI) and the percentage of investment in value added service  
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(PIVAS). As described before, we are assuming that infrastructure availability (IA) of 
mailboxes and calling card numbers is one. Therefore, the process of deployment of 
mailboxes and calling card numbers can be simplified and the only VAS infrastructure 
deployment process actually simulated in the model is the correspondent to payphone 
infrastructure. For this reason, the percentage of investment in VAS (PIVAS) is equal to 
the percentage of payphone investment, which is assumed 0.4 percent: 
 
       IPAYI i n = TIPAY * FIPAYI i n                                           (64) 
       TIPAY = TPI * PIVAS   
  
6.5 A Value Added Service Strategy for Improving Regional Telecommunications 
The implementation of a prepaid phone service alone without any other VAS 
implementation is observed at the top of Table 11 (VAS 1) and represents a referential 
case for the following set of simulations that describe the VAS strategy. The strategy 
will show the synergy that is generated when different value added services are 
strategically combined and strengthen some key positive feedback loops of the system.  
The strategy combines the individual impact that prepaid phone, virtual 
telephony, and payphone services have on telephone expansion, which was described in 
previous sections and are shown in Figures 17, 18, and 19. The implementation of a 
prepaid phone service together with virtual telephony and payphone services uses the 
same investment in payphones for the virtual telephony and payphone services 
simultaneously. This makes costly payphones more productive since revenues from 
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virtual telephony and payphone phone calls are collected using the same payphone 
infrastructure. It is important to note that the major portion of the investment required to 
provide virtual telephony and payphone services is on the payphone infrastructure, 
which is subtracted from the investment in telephone expansion, as observed in negative 
feedback loops 16 and 21 of Figures 17 and 18 respectively. 
The performance of this VAS strategy is observed in VAS 2 and VAS 3 of Table 
11. The VAS 2 implementation has a low payphone investment of 0.4 percent of the 
total investment budget. This improves the national and regional telephone density of 
the country, with respect to the referential case. However, the rural-urban teledensity 
gap is not improved in spite of the rural telephone density growth. For instance in year 
15, the normalized rural telephone density is improved from its normalized value of 
107.36 (VAS 1) to 284.90 (VAS 2), and the urban telephone density is improved from 
97.082 (VAS 1) to 138.72 (VAS 2).  
On the other hand, the VAS 3 implementation increases the payphone 
investment from 0.4 to 4 percent. It is observed that the improvement on the level of 
payphone infrastructure considerably increases the national and regional telephone 
density of the country and increases the rural-urban telephone density ratio. For instance 
in year 15, the rural telephone density increases to 2,270 (VAS 3), which is much higher 
than 284.9 (VAS 2) and 107.36 (VAS 1). The urban telephone density increases to 
162.49 (VAS 3), which is higher than 138.725 (VAS 2) and 97.082 (VAS 1). The rural-
urban telephone density ratio is increased to the normalized value of 16.67 (VAS 3), 
which is much higher than the value of 1.11 observed in VAS 1 and VAS 2. This occurs 
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due to the combined action of positive feedback loops 13, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
and 29 in Figures 17, 18, and 19, which strengthen the network externality impact in the 
system. As described before, this improves the telephone service willingness to pay and 
the prepaid and postpaid telephone demand, which expand the financial resources of the 
telephone company and the total number of telephone lines. 
This combination of services enhances the network externality impact by 
expanding the number of people connected to the system. The network externality 
improvement increases the willingness to pay for telephone services and the prepaid and 
postpaid telephone demand. The improvement on the telephone service willingness to 
pay expands the expenditure on prepaid virtual telephony, payphone, and telephone 
services, as shown in Figures 17, 18, and 19. This situation increases the revenue and 
financial resources of the telephone company, as seen in VAS 2 and VAS 3 of Table 11. 
The enhanced prepaid and postpaid telephone demand improves the number of prepaid 
and postpaid telephone subscribers in the network, as observed in positive feedback 
loops 28 and 29 of Figure 19. This expands the financial resources of the telephone 
company, as indicated in positive feedback loops 26 and 27. 
The higher the number of payphones functioning in the region, the higher the 
availability of payphone and virtual telephony services. This situation increases the 
willingness to pay for these services, which improves their demand and adoption. The 
growth of virtual telephony and payphone users expands the financial resources of the 
telephone company, as observed in positive feedback loops 13 and 19 of Figures 17 and 
18 respectively. The performance and behavior of the VAS implementations described 
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in this and previous sections are also observed in Figures 20 and 21, which show the 
national teledensity and the rural-urban teledensity gap. 
 
 
Table 11. Value Added Service Strategy for Improving Rural Telephony in 
Developing Countries with a Cellular Access Network 
 
VAS Telecom Indicators 0 5 9 15
1. Prepaid Phone Rural Tel. Density 1.000 7.636 15.455 107.364
without any other Urban Tel. Density 1.000 7.722 15.150 97.082
VAS National Tel. Density 1.000 7.995 16.147 107.880
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.111
Financial Resources 1.000 0.189 0.616 8.492
Prepaid/Postpaid Ratio 0 2.021 2.060 2.000
2. Prepaid Phone Rural Tel. Density 1.000 8.000 19.818 284.909
,Virtual Telephony Urban Tel. Density 1.000 8.643 22.697 138.725
, and Payphone Serv. National Tel. Density 1.000 8.935 24.129 156.313
with Low Payphone Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.111
Financial Resources 1.000 0.232 1.139 39.718
Payphones/ 1000 people 0 0.048 0.123 1.688
Prepaid/Postpaid Ratio 0 2.055 2.172 2.198
3. Prepaid Phone Rural Tel. Density 1.000 14.091 322.818 2270.000
,Virtual Telephony Urban Tel. Density 1.000 31.360 162.493 162.493
, and Payphone Serv. National Tel. Density 1.000 32.120 175.991 209.263
with Higher Payphone Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 0.370 2.222 16.667
Financial Resources 1.000 1.313 26.436 170.383
Payphones/ 1000 people 0 0.742 2.203 3.000
Prepaid/Postpaid Ratio 0 2.579 3.174 2.700
Years
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Figure 20. Normalized National Teledensity for VAS Implementations 
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Figure 21. Normalized Rural Urban Teledensity Gap for VAS 
Implementations 
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6.6 Base Case Values 
 
Model Parameters Base Case 
1. Monthly Rental Fee (Urban and Rural) $1  
2. Urban Income per Capita $1708  
3. Rural Income per Capita $310 
4. Total Connected Subscribers Initial 50,000 
5. Percent. Rural Lines 2.5% 
6. ITU Waiting List 30,000 
7. Waiting List Unreported Factor 4 
8. Initial Population 23,000,000 
9. % Rural Population 40% 
10. Urban Population Growth Rate 2.3% 
11. Rural Population Growth Rate 0.2% 
12. Urban Cost per Line $200 
13. Rural Cost per Line $300 
14. Cost of each Mailbox $10 
15. Cost of each C.Card Number $5 
16. Cost of each Payphone Dev. $500 
17. Telephone Deployment Time (Urban) 3 mo. 
18. Telephone Deployment Time (Rural) 6 mo. 
19. Percentage Payphone Investment 0% 
20 Number of Telephones per Urban House 2 
21. Number of Telephones per Rural House 1 
22. Initial Cash Balance $50 Millions 
23. Investment in Rural Areas 3.5% 
24. Delay to Accept Activation Fee 3 mo. 
25. Easy to Use Factor Virtual Telephony (Urban) 0.7 
26. Easy to Use Factor Virtual Telephony (Rural)  0.5 
27. Easy to Use Factor Payphone (Urban) 1 
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28. Easy to Use Factor Payphone (Rural) 0.7 
29. Easy to Use Factor Prepaid Phone  1 
30. Referential Payphone Availability 0.003 
31. Wireless Flag (urban and rural) 1 
32. License Cost $50 Millions 
33. Activation Fee (Urban) $ 76 
34. Activation Fee (Rural) $ 22 
35. Price of International Traffic per Minute $ 1 
36. Time to Recognize Attractiveness  6 mo. 
37. Time to Adjust Demand (Urban and Rural) 60 mo. 
38. Incoming-Outgoing International Traffic Ratio 3 
39. Delay to Adjust Lines (Urban and Rural) 3 mo. 
40. Initial Telephones to Connect (Urban) 10,000 
41. Initial Telephones to Connect (Rural) 100 
42. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Urban) 0.8 
43. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Rural) 0.2 
44. Fraction of Telephone Capacity per Month 0.25 
45. License Duration  15 years 
46. Free Local Minutes (Urban and Rural) 100 min 
47. Fraction of Cap Cost as part of Op. Cost 0.3 
48. Urban Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.9 
49. Urban Weight on Externality (Rural)  0.5 
50. Rural Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.1 
51. Rural Weight on Externality (Rural) 0.5 
52. Free Local Minutes Used (Urban) 100 
53. Free Local Minutes Used (Rural) 50 
54. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Urb) 0.01 
55. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Rur) 0.006 
56. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Urban) 0.015 
57. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Rural) 0.015 
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58. Number of Payphone Users per House 2 
59. Delay to Adjust VAS (Users) 3 mo. 
60. Delay to Adjust Payphone Infrastructure 3 mo. 
61. Payphone Devices Implementation Delay 1 mo. 
62. Urban Investment Fraction (Payphone Infra) 0.965 
63. Number of People per House 4 
64. VAS Investment referential 0 
65. VAS Offered 0 
 
                   Table 12. Base Case values of Value Added Services Analysis 
 
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Value Added Service Strategy 
Several experiments were conducted to test the sensitivity of the VAS strategy to 
changes in the characteristics and costs of these value added services and different 
perceptions of the population about them. The user interface of these services became 
more complex and difficult to handle, then the easy to use factor of virtual telephony, 
payphone, and prepaid phone services were considerably reduced. On the other hand, 
the perception of the population about the availability of payphones in the region got 
more stringent, and then the payphone availability referential was increased. Finally, the 
investment in VAS infrastructure comes to be more costly, and then the cost of each 
calling card, mailbox, and payphone was raised. The simulation results of the sensitivity 
analysis are shown in Table 13.  
The virtual telephony easy to use factor was reduced from 0.7 to 0.3 in urban 
areas and from 0.5 to 0.15 in rural areas. The payphone easy to use factor was reduced 
from one to 0.5 in urban areas and from 0.7 to 0.3 in rural areas. The cellular prepaid 
phone easy to use factor was reduced from one to 0.5 in urban and rural areas. On the 
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other hand, the referential payphone availability was increased from three payphones 
per 1000 people to five payphones per 1000 people. Finally, the cost of a calling card 
number was increased from five to ten dollars, the cost of a telephone mailbox was 
increased from ten to twenty dollars, and the cost of each payphone device was raised 
from 500 to 800 dollars. 
It is observed in VAS 2 and VAS 3 of Table 13 that the provision of prepaid 
phone, virtual telephony, and payphone services together using a cellular network still 
improve the national and regional telephone densities under this new scenario, in the 
long term, with respect to the base case and the prepaid phone service implemented 
alone, which is indicated in VAS 1. In addition, it is also observed in VAS 2 and VAS 3 
that increasing the investment in payphone expansion from four to ten percent improve 
the telephone densities and the rural-urban telephone density gap. However, this 
sensitivity analysis also shows that the rural-urban telephone density gap is not 
improved with respect to the base case, in spite of an important growth in telephone 
densities and financial resources. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the 
positive impact of VAS described in previous sections depends mainly on the 
friendliness of the user interface or easy to use factor and the availability or easy to 
acquire of these services in the region. The better the user interface and more reachable 
are these value added services in the country, the higher the improvement that this VAS 
implementation is able to produce in the regional telecom system. 
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Table 13. Value Added Service Strategy for Improving Rural Telephony in 
Developing Countries with a Higher VAS Infrastructure Costs and Payphone 
Availability Referential, and Lower VAS Easy to Use Factor. 
 
VAS Telecom Indicators 0 5 9 15
Base Run Rural Tel. Density 1.000 11.000 14.545 33.455
Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.292 9.501 25.592
National Tel. Density 1.000 6.599 10.212 28.525
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.852 1.852 1.481
Financial Resources 1.000 0.099 0.223 1.320
1. Prepaid Rural Tel. Density 1.000 7.455 14.091 77.909
Phone, without Urban Tel. Density 1.000 7.462 13.671 70.198
any other VAS National Tel. Density 1.000 7.724 14.571 78.018
Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.111
Financial Resources 1.000 0.167 0.482 5.662
2. Prepaid Rural Tel. Density 1.000 6.727 12.727 98.273
Phone, Virtual Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.853 13.538 98.244
Telephony, and National Tel. Density 1.000 7.092 14.410 108.986
Payphone Serv. Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.111
4% Payphone Inv. Financial Resources 1.000 0.140 0.465 7.824
Payphones/ 1000 people 0.000 0.275 0.536 3.405
3. Prepaid Rural Tel. Density 1.000 5.727 10.818 130.000
Phone, Virtual Urban Tel. Density 1.000 6.088 12.688 106.232
Telephony, and National Tel. Density 1.000 6.295 13.484 118.249
Payphone Serv.& Rural/Urban T D Ratio 1.000 1.111 1.111 1.481
10% Payphone Financial Resources 1.000 0.107 0.398 9.579
Investment Payphones/ 1000 people 0.000 0.572 1.093 3.663
Years
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6.8 Conclusions 
 This chapter presents an investigation of value added services on the expansion 
of telephone capacity in developing countries. It was found that a strategic 
implementation of value added services are able to accomplish the purpose of 
improving the telephone penetration in the country. The implementation of these value 
added services in isolation moderately improved the number of telephone lines. 
However, it proved that prepaid phone, virtual telephony, and payphone services, which 
are innovative services over the telephone network, are able to considerably improve 
the financial resources of the telephone company and accelerate the dispersion of 
telephone lines in rural areas of developing countries, only when implemented together.  
 The prepaid phone service pricing mechanism is based on the willingness to pay 
of the subscribers. The combination of virtual telephony with prepaid phone service 
reinforces the impact of network externality on the system, which increases the 
willingness to pay and revenue of the telephone service per subscriber. The addition of 
the payphone service to the previous combination improves the revenue and financial 
resources of the telephone company, which are used for telephone expansion and value 
added service implementation. Finally, the easy to use and easy to acquire of these 
value added services are important characteristics that need to be constantly improved 
in order to be able to reach the important growth in telephone penetration observed in 
this study. 
 
 
 142 
Chapter 7. An Analysis of Wireless Technologies on the Regional Dispersion of 
Telephone Services in Developing Countries. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The access plant of the traditional telephone network, as opposed to the switches 
and backhaul connections, is extremely unproductive and underutilized, and shows 
fewer economies of scales since it is largely dedicated. The access plant is considered 
the largest asset of the telephone network, since this can account for more than half of 
the total assets of the company.  The traditional access plant is wired, and is largely a 
function of the distance from the subscriber to central office or switching equipment. 
For this reason, the cost to provide a telephone line to a rural subscriber could be ten 
times the cost for an urban subscriber (Calhoun,1992). 
Wireless technologies, such as cellular networks and Wireless Local Loop 
(WLL), are being seen as a way to increase telephone density in developing countries, 
due to its rapid deployment and lower cost (Noerpel, 1997). The cellular networks have 
grown rapidly in developing countries in recent years, especially in cities and other 
urban areas. The wireless technologies are less sensitive to distance than traditional 
wired technologies, which makes them more attractive for deployment in dispersed or 
scattered rural environments. However, there are still several questions regarding their 
viability in developing countries. For instance, the lack of electricity and reliable power 
supply has been considered the biggest challenge in deploying wireless systems in rural 
areas (Rycroft, 1998).  
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Due to the high cost of subscriber equipment and quality problems, the 
implementation of of WLL services in developing countries has been limited (Robledo 
and Arathoon, 2002). My investigation showed, however, that WLL could be a viable 
alternative, especially in low-density areas, where the cost of wired systems increases 
considerably and the large coverage and low deployment delay of WLL systems 
become significant determinants of dispersion of telephone services. 
 Cellular systems are considered the best technology currently in the market that 
is able to accelerate the growth of telephone services in developing countries for urban 
areas. However, it was found that in thinly populated rural areas, WLL performs better 
than any other access technology including cellular systems. In this scenario, the 
cellular access network still performs better than the conventional wired telephone 
network. 
 
7.2 Impact of Access Technologies on Telephone Expansion 
The wired access plant is the largest component of a conventional telephone 
network, since the cost of the backhaul connections and switches are considered 
insignificant when compared with the cost of the access component (Webb, 2000). 
Figure 22 shows a schematic of the wired telephone network, which includes the wired 
local loop, the switching office also known as central office or local exchange, and the 
backhaul connections. The wired local loop connects the switching office to the 
subscriber, and the backhaul connections interconnect the switching offices. The wired 
access plant, which goes from the switching office to the subscriber, includes the local 
 144 
loops associated with access and can account for more than fifty percent of the book 
assets of the telephone company.  
 
          
Figure 22. Schematic of a Wired Telephone Network 
It has been observed that the costs of wired local loops increases at a greater 
than linear rate as a function of the distance, and decreases as the subscriber density 
increases (Calhoun, 1992; Mannisto and Tuisku, 1994; Webb, 2000). This situation 
occurs because longer wired loops require more cable, and also the additional loading 
coils and larger gauge cable. Historically, the telecom implementation has started in 
more dense urban areas, and then it has moved toward less dense suburban or rural 
areas, which have represented a transition to lower economies of scale, longer loop 
distances, and higher deployment costs (Saunders et. al., 1994). In rural areas, where the 
population density is very low, the cost of the wired local loop could be more than ten 
times the cost in urban areas (Calhoun, 1992).  
The wireless technologies are seen as an alternative to the access plant, which 
can replace the dedicated and underutilized copper wire with a shared and more 
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efficient radio spectrum among subscribers (Duckworth, 2004). Figure 23 shows the 
schematic of a telephone network with a wireless access plant, where the wired local 
loop of a conventional telephone network has been replaced with a wireless link, which 
can be fixed for the case of Wireless Local Loop systems or mobile for the case of 
cellular systems. The cost of wireless systems has less sensitivity to distance and 
subscriber density than wired systems, since it has little impact where the subscribers 
are located inside the area of coverage of the radio cell. However, it is important to 
emphasize that there could be some extra costs associated with very remote subscribers 
living in fringe coverage zones, where it may be necessary to install a higher subscriber 
antenna with higher gain (Calhoun, 1992). 
 
 
Figure 23. Schematic of a Telephone Network with Wireless Access Plant 
 
The wireless technologies, such as cellular and WLL, have been considered to 
have the potential to increase telephone density in developing countries, because of its 
rapid deployment and lower implementation costs (Noerpel, 1997; Hamersma, 1996). In 
addition, wireless systems are supposed to reduce the relative cost difference between 
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urban and rural deployment, so while rural access still remains more costly, the 
difference is not as big as for wireed technology. In spite of the potential advantages of 
wireless technologies, there are still several questions regarding the quality of service 
and viability of implementation. The lack of electricity and reliable power supply in 
developing regions has been considered the biggest challenge in deploying wireless 
systems (Rycroft, 1998).  
The causal structures for the development of wired and wireless access 
technologies in the regional telecommunications system are shown in Figures 24 and 25 
respectively. In these figures, it can be observed that the cost of the access technology 
affects the provision of new telephones, which increases the total number of connected 
subscribers. The increase of connected subscribers improves the telephone density, 
which determines the population density of unserved areas or new connections. The 
higher the telephone density, the lower the population density of new connections, 
which become more remote or rural (Warren, 2002). In addition, the population density 
determines the average distance between subscribers. This distance has a direct impact 
on the cost of a wired telephone line and also influences the deployment time (Webb, 
2000), which affects the supply of new telephone lines as shown in Figure 24. 
The causal structure of the wireless access technology is shown in Figure 25. 
The population density of new connections determines the area of the cell, which has a 
direct impact on the cost of the subscriber units.  As the distance from the subscriber to 
the base station increases, more expensive equipment is needed on the subscriber side. 
In addition, the access to electricity has an important impact on the cost of the 
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subscriber unit. Also, additional power supplies, like solar panels or batteries, might be 
required, which further escalates costs. The population density of new connections 
determines the number of subscribers per base station, which influences the cost of a 
base station per subscriber. The higher the cost of the base station per subscriber and 
subscriber equipment, the higher the deployment cost of a wireless telephone in the 
system.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Causal Structure of Wired Technology in the Regional 
Telecommunications System 
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Figure 25. Causal Structure of Wireless Technologies in the Regional 
Telecommunications Systems 
 
7.3 Access Technologies Formulation 
7.3.1 Equations of Wired Access Network 
The cost of the wired network per line (CWIRE) is the sum of the cost of 
external plant per line (CEXTP) and the cost of the core network per line (CCORE), 
which includes the switching office and backhaul connection costs. Subscript i refers to 
any of the two regions, urban (u) and rural (r): 
 
                                CWIRE i = CEXTP i + CCORE i                                            (65) 
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The cost of the external plant per line (CEXTP) is function of the average 
distance from the central office to the households (ADCTH), the cost per meter of cable 
(CMC), and a referential base cost (RBC), which is considered to be about $ 150 
(Kayani and Dymond 1997):  
 
                    CEXTP i = RBC + (ADCTH i * CMC)                                    (66) 
The average distance from the central office to the households (ADCTH) is 
function of the area of coverage of the central office (ARCCO), which assumes a 
circular shaped area. The area of coverage of the central office is function of the number 
of telephone lines per central office (NTLCO) and the number of telephone lines per 
area (NLPA):  
 
                 ADCTH i = SQRT(ARCCO i / 2*3.1416)                                (67) 
      ARCCO i = NTLCO / NLPA 
 The number of lines per area (NLPA) is function of the normal number of lines 
per area (NNLPA) and the telephone lines-telephone density adequacy (TLTDA). The 
telephone lines-telephone density adequacy (TLTDA) is a non-linear function of the 
wired network telephone density (WNTD): 
 
                                  NLPA i = NNLPA i * TLTDA i                                                   (68) 
                                  TLTDA i = f 7i (WNTD i)                 Where f 7i  < 0 
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 The normal number of lines per area (NNLPA) is function of the population 
density (POPD) and the number of people per line (NUMPL), which depends on the 
number of lines per house (NUMLH) and the number of people per house (NUMPH): 
 
                                  NNLPA i = POPD i / NUMPL i                                          (69) 
             NUMPL i = NUMPH i / NUMLH i  
The time to deploy a wired telephone line (TDWDL) is function of the time to 
install the switching equipment (TISW), the external plant deployment time (DTEXP), 
and the time to couple the external plant with the switching equipment (TCXPSW): 
 
TDWDL i = TISW i  + DTEXP i  + TCXPSW i               (70)  
The external plant deployment time (DTEXP) is function of the referential 
external plant deployment time (REXPDT) and the distance from the central office to 
the household ratio (DCOHR). It has been assumed that laying a external plant in a 
developing country with an urban population density of 284 people per square 
kilometers takes about one year: 
 
                        DTEXP i = REXPDT i   * DCOHR i                               (71)    
The distance from the central office to the household ratio (DCOHR) is function 
of the average distance from the central office to the households (ADCTH) and a 
referential distance from the central office to the households (RDCTH): 
 
 151 
                      DCOHR i  = ADCTH i / RDCTH i                                 (72) 
 
7.3.2 Equations of Wireless Access Networks 
The cost of a wireless telephone line (CWLH), which includes cellular and 
wireless local loop systems, is the sum of the cost of the base stations per line (CBSL), 
the cost of the core network per line (CCNL), and the cost of the subscriber stations per 
line (CSSL): 
 
                    CWLH i = CBSL i + CCNL i + CSSL i                            (73) 
 The cost of the base stations per line (CBSL) is equal to the cost of a base station 
(CABS) divided by the number of wireless lines per base station (WLBS):  
 
                                           CBSL i = CABS / WLBS i                                       (74) 
 The number of wireless lines per base station (WLBS) is a function of the area 
of the cell covered by the base station (ACBS), the number of wireless lines per area 
(NLA), the area of the cell indicated (ACBSI), the maximum area of the cell (MARC), 
and the maximum number of wireless lines per base station (MWLBS). The maximum 
area of the cell assumes a circular cell and is function of the maximum radius of the 
base station (MRAD). The area of the cell indicated (ACBSI) is function of the 
maximum number of wireless lines per base station (MXWLBS) and the number of 
wireless lines per area (NLA): 
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            WLBS
 i  = ARC  * NLA i      (If ACBSI i >= MARC)                     (75) 
                      WLBS
 i  = MWLBS i      (If ACBSI i < MARC) 
                      MARC = pi * (MRAD)2 
                          
    ACBSI
 i  = MXWLBS i * NLA i      
The area of the cell (ARC) is function of the maximum area of the cell (MARC) 
and the area of the cell indicated (ACBSI): 
 
           ARC
 i   =  MARC    (If ACBSI i >= MARC)                                 (76) 
           ARC
 i   = ACBSI i   (If ACBSI i < MARC)        
 The cost of the subscriber stations per line (CSSL) is equal to the total cost of 
the subscriber equipment inside a base station (TCSEBS) divided by the number of 
wireless lines per base station (WLBS):   
 
           CSSL i = TCSEBS i / WLBS i                                           (77) 
 The total cost of the subscriber equipment inside a base station (TCSEBS) is the 
sum of the total cost of special subscriber equipment in a base station (TCSPSE), the 
total cost of normal subscriber equipment in a base station (TCNSE), and the cost of 
extra power supply for subscriber units without access to electricity (CPS): 
  
                 TCSEBS i  = TCSPSE i  + TCNSE i + CPS i                             (78) 
The total cost of special subscriber equipment in a base station (TCSPSE) is 
equal to the cost of special subscriber equipment (CSPSE) multiplied by the number of 
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wireless phones outside the normal area of a cell (WPONAC). The total cost of normal 
subscriber equipment in a base station (TCNSE) is equal to the cost of normal 
subscriber equipment (CNSE) multiplied by the number of wireless phones inside the 
normal area of a cell (WPINAC): 
 
TCSPSE i  = CSPSE * WPONAC i                                               (79) 
            TCNSE i  = CNSE * WPINAC i                                            
 The number of wireless phones outside the normal area of the cell (WPONAC) 
is function of the number of wireless lines per area (NLA), the area of the cell (ARC), 
and the normal area of the cell (NARC). The number of wireless phones inside the 
normal area of the cell (WPINAC) is function of number of wireless lines per base 
station (WLBS) and the number of wireless phones outside the normal area of the cell 
(WPONAC). The normal area of the cell is a function of the normal radius of the base 
station (NRAD): 
 
 WPONAC
 i  = NLA i * (ARC i  - NARC i)     (If   ARC i  > NARC i)       (80) 
            WPONAC
 i  = 0   (If   ARC i  <= NARC i)    
            WPINAC i  = WLBS i  - WPONAC i   
 NARC
 i  = pi * (NRAD)2 
The cost of power supply of subscriber units without access to electricity in a 
base station (CPS) is function of the number of wireless phones per base station 
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(WLBS), the percentage of wireless phones without access to electricity (PWPWE), and 
the cost of each solar panel equipment per subscriber (CESPE): 
 
                             CPS i  = WLBS i  * PWPWE i * CESPE                                  (81) 
 The wireless phones outside the normal area of the cell in a wireless network 
require especial equipment in order to be able to connect to the base station. 
Additionally, the households with cellular phones outside the normal area of the cell 
will have their cellular equipment fixed or attached to the wall, which means a lack of 
mobility. For this reason, a higher number of households located outside the normal 
area of the cell translate into less mobility of the cellular system. In other words, the 
higher the number of households inside the normal area of the cell, the higher the 
mobility of the subscribers in the cellular network.  
 The average number of wireless phones inside the normal area of the cell 
(AWPINAC) and the average number of wireless phones per base station (AWLBS) 
determine the fraction of wireless phones in a base station with mobility (FWPWM). 
The AWPINAC and AWLBS are first order exponential averages of the number of 
wireless phones inside the normal area of the cell (WPINAC) and the number of 
wireless phones per base station (WLBS) respectively. These averaging processes use 
the time constant T2 and 1 is the first order exponential average: 
 
FWPWM i = AWPINAC i / AWLBS i                                                (82)        
AWPINAC i  = 1 [WPINAC i, T2] 
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AWLBS i = 1 [WLBS i, T2]   
The fraction of mobile users in the system (FMUS) is a function of the postpaid 
connected subscribers (CS), the prepaid telephone subscribers (VASU i pp), the total 
wireless subscribers (WSUB), and the fraction of wireless phones in a base station with 
mobility (FWPWM): 
 
       FMUS
 i  = WSUB i * FWPWM i /(CS i + VASU i pp )                        (83) 
The total wireless subscribers (WSUB) is function of the postpaid service 
connecting rate (CR), the prepaid service connecting rate (PPCR), the postpaid service 
attrition rate (AR), and the prepaid service attrition rate (ARVAS i pp): 
     
             ( d / dt ) WSUB
 i = CR  +  PPCR  - AR  -  ARVAS i pp                (84) 
 
7.4 Telephone Dispersion for Different Access Networks 
In this section, I simulate the historical and future behavior of the growth of the 
cellular (Cellular #1) and conventional wired telephone networks in Ecuador, which is 
shown in Figures 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31. In addition, two hypothetical cases, which 
consist on the implementation of Wireless Local Loop (WLL) and cellular networks 
(Cellular #2) by the telephone operator as a replacement of the wired access network in 
year 1993, are also simulated. 
The simulations are calibrated for the case of Ecuador, which has an urban 
income per capita of 1,708 dollars and a rural income per capita of 310 dollars. In 
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addition, its urban population density is 284 people per square kilometer and its rural 
population density is nineteen people per square kilometer (World Development 
Indicators, 2002). In Figure 26, it is possible to observe the moment when the number 
of cellular phones surpassed the number of conventional telephone lines in year 2002. It 
is important to note that most of the implementation of the cellular network has been in 
urban regions.  
The implementation of cellular systems in urban and rural areas involves the 
deployment of base stations that have a normal radius of coverage of five kilometers 
and an extended radius of coverage of thirty kilometers. The maximum number of 
subscribers supported by each base station is 5,000. The normal cost of each cellular 
base station is 150,000 dollars. In addition, the cost of a normal subscriber unit is fifty 
dollars, and the cost of a special subscriber unit, which is used outside the normal 
coverage of the base station, is 400 dollars. The normal subscriber unit is mobile since it 
can move inside the normal area covered by a base station, but the especial subscriber 
unit is fixed since it requires a special antenna attached to the wall of the house in order 
to communicate with the base station. The access to electricity in urban areas is ninety 
eight percent and in rural areas is fifty percent of the population. The cost of a solar 
panel, which is used to supply with electricity the subscriber equipment in each house 
without electricity, is 500 dollars. The license fee for cellular systems is assumed 
50,000,000 dollars for a license period of fifteen years. 
The implementation of WLL is similar to the cellular implementation. It 
considers the same level of access to electricity and the use of the same solar panels as 
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the cellular case. It involves the deployment of base stations, which have a normal 
radius of coverage of fifteen kilometers and an extended coverage of thirty-five 
kilometers. The maximum number of users supported by each base station is 5,000 
households. The normal cost of each base station is 150,000 dollars; the cost of a 
normal subscriber unit is 400 dollars, and the cost of a special subscriber unit, which is 
used outside the normal coverage of the base station, is 600 dollars. The license fee for 
Wireless Local Loop has been set to 5,000,000 dollars for a license period of fifteen 
years. 
The deployment of the cellular network has produced the fastest growth of 
telephones in urban and rural areas. It is observed in Figure 26 that the cellular network 
increased exponentially in urban areas, which represents the historical behavior 
observed in past years. The number of cellular subscribers keeps increasing 
exponentially until they achieve steady state growth, which is indicated by a linear 
growth. This situation is also observed in the hypothetical case in urban areas where the 
telecom operator decides to replace the wired access network by a cellular access 
network, as shown in Figure 26. The exponential growth of cellular phones is also 
observed in rural areas. 
The number of urban and rural telephones is considerably improved by the 
implementation of the cellular network because it has the lowest cost per telephone and 
the lowest deployment delay in both regions, as observed in Figures 28, 30, 29, and 31.  
The improvement in the cost per telephone occurred in spite of the lack of electricity in 
rural areas, which increases the cost of the cellular subscriber equipment due to the need 
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of solar panels. In addition, the low rural population density requires the use of more 
expensive subscriber equipment, which is fixed to each house. Therefore, the 
improvement on the telephone deployment costs and implementation delays observed in 
cellular networks increase considerably the supply of urban and rural telephones, which 
increase the revenue and financial resources of the telecom company. 
When the cellular system is implemented in the regional telecom system, the 
cellular subscribers increase the telephone density of the whole region. The higher the 
telephone density, the lower the population density of the new connected subscribers as 
shown by negative feedback loop 34 in Figure 25. The reduction of the population 
density of the new connected subscribers because of the growth of the telephone density 
increases the number of subscribers outside the normal area covered by a cellular base 
station, as shown by negative feedback loop 33 in Figure 25. This determines a higher 
number of subscribers requiring fixed antennas and especial equipment in order to 
connect to the base stations from home, which represents higher costs for the subscriber 
units. In addition, the low access to electricity is a major factor influencing the cost of 
the subscriber unit, which increases the cost of deploying a phone in the system.  
The higher the number of subscribers with fixed antennas located outside the 
normal area covered by the base stations, the lower the number of subscribers with 
mobility in the cellular network, as shown by negative feedback loop 32 in Figure 25. 
The mobility and portability are characteristics of the cellular network that tend to 
increase the traffic of the network since the willingness to pay and usefulness of a 
telephone has been improved. This is also shown in negative feedback loop 32. 
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It is observed in Figure 27 that the hypothetical implementation of WLL slightly 
improves the number of rural telephone lines in the long run with respect to the 
conventional wired access network. This situation occurs because of the lower cost and 
lower implementation delay of the WLL system with respect to the conventional wired 
technology in rural areas, which is shown in Figures 29 and 31.  
When the WLL technology is implemented in the regional telecom system, the 
new WLL subscribers increase the telephone density of the region. The higher the 
telephone density, the lower the population density of the new subscribers being 
connected which is shown by negative feedback loop 34 in Figure 25. In addition, the 
low access to electricity in developing countries is a major factor influencing the cost of 
the subscriber unit, as shown in negative feedback loop 33 of Figure 25. The higher the 
subscriber cost, the higher the cost of a WLL telephone line.  
The growth of telephone lines in the conventional wired network also reduces 
the population density of the new connected subscribers as the telephone density of the 
region increases. This situation increases the distance between households as shown by 
negative feedback loop 30 in Figure 24, which considerably increases the deployment 
delay and the cost of a wired telephone line. The relatively high deployment delay and 
cost of a wired telephone line reduces the supply of new telephone lines and the number 
of connected households, as shown in negative feedback loops 30 and 31 of Figure 24. 
This behavior can also be observed in Table 14. 
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Figure 26. Urban Phones for Different Access Networks 
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      Figure 27. Rural Phones for Different Access Networks 
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Figure 28. Urban Cost for Different Access Networks 
 
WLL Wired 
Cellular #1 
Cellular #2 
   500 
  650 
      800 
1993     1998  2003  2008  2014 
Years 
D
o
lla
rs
 
 
Figure 29. Rural Cost for Different Access Networks 
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Figure 30. Urban Delay for Different Access Networks 
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Figure 31. Rural Delay for Different Access Networks 
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  Table 14. Performance of Different Access Technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology Telecom Indicators 1993 2003 2014
1. Cellular #1 Urban Phones (Phones) 0 1,656,907 4,338,018
Rural Phones (Phones) 0 19,192 465,241
Urban Cost (Dollars) 130 130 130
Rural Cost (Dollars) 589 591 657
Urban Delay (Months) 6 6 6
Rural Delay (Months) 8 8 8
2. Wired Urban Phones (Phones) 538,418 1,529,822 2,280,357
Rural Phones (Phones) 59,829 71,814 170,910
Urban Cost (Dollars) 376 477 498
Rural Cost (Dollars) 777 778 799
Urban Delay (Months) 9 11 12
Rural Delay (Months) 22 22 23
3. WLL Urban Phones (Phones) 538,418 1,220,959 2,299,933
Rural Phones (Phones) 59,829 73,456 193,268
Urban Cost (Dollars) 480 480 480
Rural Cost (Dollars) 720 720 720
Urban Delay (Months) 6 6 6
Rural Delay (Months) 8 8 8
4. Cellular #2 Urban Phones (Phones) 538,418 3,027,613 4,592,831
Rural Phones (Phones) 59,829 262,337 539,896
Urban Cost (Dollars) 130 130 130
Rural Cost (Dollars) 589 606 658
Urban Delay (Months) 6 6 6
Rural Delay (Months) 8 8 8
Years
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7.5 Base Case Values 
 
Model Parameters Base Case 
1. Monthly Rental Fee (Urban and Rural) $1  
2. Urban Income per Capita $1708  
3. Rural Income per Capita $310 
4. Total Connected Subscribers Initial 598,287 
5. Percent. Rural Lines 1 % 
6. ITU Waiting List 30,000 
7. Waiting List Unreported Factor 4 
8. Initial Population 11,000,000 
9. % Rural Population 40% 
10. Urban Population Growth Rate 2.3% 
11. Rural Population Growth Rate 0.2% 
12. Number of Telephones per Urban House 1 
13. Number of Telephones per Rural House 1 
14. Initial Cash Balance $30 Millions 
15. Investment in Rural Areas 3.5% 
16. Delay to Accept Activation Fee 3 mo. 
17. Wireless Flag (urban and rural) 0 
18. License Cost $ 0 
19. Activation Fee (Urban) $ 76 
20. Activation Fee (Rural) $ 22 
21. Price of International Traffic per Minute $ 1 
22. Time to Recognize Attractiveness  6 mo. 
23. Time to Adjust Demand (Urban and Rural) 60 mo. 
24. Incoming-Outgoing International Traffic Ratio 3 
25. Delay to Adjust Lines (Urban and Rural) 3 mo. 
26. Initial Telephones to Connect (Urban) 10,000 
27. Initial Telephones to Connect (Rural) 100 
28. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Urban) 0.9 
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29. Regional Fraction Waiting List (Rural) 0.1 
30. Fraction of Telephone Capacity per Month 0.25 
31. License Duration  15 years 
32. Free Local Minutes (Urban and Rural) 100 min 
33. Fraction of Cap Cost as part of Op. Cost 0.3 
34. Urban Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.9 
35. Urban Weight on Externality (Rural)  0.5 
36. Rural Weight on Externality (Urban) 0.1 
37. Rural Weight on Externality (Rural) 0.5 
38. Free Local Minutes Used (Urban) 100 
39. Free Local Minutes Used (Rural) 50 
40. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Urb) 0.01 
41. Expenditure on Traffic as Fr. of Income (Rur) 0.006 
42. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Urban) 0.015 
43. Fraction of Expenditure on Telecom (Rural) 0.015 
44. Number of People per House 4 
45. Cost of the Core Network per Line $ 40 
46. Time to Install Switching Equipment (Urban)  8 mo. 
47. Time to Install Switching Equipment (Rural) 18 mo. 
48. Time to Couple Ext. Plant with Switch. Equip. 1 mo. 
49. Referential Ext. Plant Deployment Time  12 mo. 
50. Referential Population Density 284 
51. Number of Lines per Central Office 5,000 
52. Referential Cost of External Plant $ 150 
53. Population Density (Urban) 284 
54. Population Density (Rural) 19 
55. Referential Cost per Meter of Cable $ 0.1  
56. Cost of Base Station $ 150,000 
57. Cost of Solar Panel $ 500 
58. Cost of Normal Subscriber Unit $ 50 
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59. Cost of Special Subscriber Unit $ 400 
60. Access to Electricity (Urban) 0.98 
61. Access to Electricity (Rural) 0.5 
62. Maximum Radio of the Cell 30 km 
63. Normal Radio of the Cell 5 k5 
64. Maximum Wireless Lines per Base Station 5,000 
 
      Table 15. Base Case values of the Access Technologies Analysis 
 
7.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Different Access Technologies 
 The preceding section showed how cellular technologies were able to 
considerably improve the number of telephones in urban and rural areas of Ecuador. 
New experiments were conducted to test the sensitivity of the cellular system and other 
access technologies to changes in population densities. The population densities were 
reduced from 284 people per square kilometer to seventeen people per square kilometer 
in urban areas, and from nineteen people per square kilometer to two people per square 
kilometer in rural areas. The simulation results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in 
Table 16.  
 It is observed that a lower population density reduces the impact of the cellular 
technology in the regional telecom system, but this technology is still able to increase 
the number of phones in urban and rural areas when compared with the conventional 
wired technology. This situation is observed in the hypothetical case when the cellular 
access network is implemented as a replacement of the wired external plant, which is 
indicated by technologies 1 and 4 in Table 16. However, it is observed that WLL 
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provides the best performance in urban and rural regions under this new scenario. This 
happens due to the larger coverage of the WLL cell with respect to the cellular cell, 
which reduces the cost. The larger radio of coverage per base station requires a lower 
number of special and more expensive equipment required to connect the subscriber 
with the base station in areas outside the normal coverage. It is also observed that the 
cellular system improves the number of urban telephone lines in the very long run, for 
its hypothetical case.  
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Technology Telecom Indicators 1993 1998 2003 2008 2014
1. Cellular #1 Urban Phones 0 86,675 111,651 162,828 276,715
Rural Phones 0 965 1,231 1,777 2,999
Urban Cost 246 249 249 250 252
Rural Cost 706 706 706 706 706
Urban Delay 6 6 6 6 6
Rural Delay 8 8 8 8 8
2. Wired Urban Phones 538,458 548,448 548,784 548,940 549,013
Rural Phones 59,829 56,236 46,142 33,420 21,671
Urban Cost 648 606 569 546 530
Rural Cost 1,338 1,335 1,329 1,322 1,316
Urban Delay 91 85 78 76 74
Rural Delay 195 194 193 192 191
3. WLL Urban Phones 538,458 776,121 1,307,627 1,602,804 1,809,448
Rural Phones 59,829 63,860 73,048 112,214 181,203
Urban Cost 480 480 519 531 531
Rural Cost 853 853 854 856 862
Urban Delay 6 6 6 6 6
Rural Delay 8 8 8 8 8
4. Cellular #2 Urban Phones 538,458 733,486 1,011,228 1,543,091 2,586,728
Rural Phones 59,829 62,128 65,512 72,481 88,396
Urban Cost 272 280 295 329 387
Rural Cost 707 707 707 707 707
Urban Delay 6 6 6 6 6
Rural Delay 8 8 8 8 8
Years
 
Table 16. Performance of Different Access Technologies for a Thinly Populated 
Country 
 
 The reduction in the population densities increased the operating costs and 
deployment delays of the telephone company for wireless and wired access network 
technologies.  However, the sensitivity analysis of the equipment, material, and labor 
costs used in this investigation are left for future research. 
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7.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents an investigation about the use of three different access 
technologies: wired access networks, Wireless Local Loop, and cellular systems. The 
wireless technologies were able to considerably improve the regional dispersion of 
telephone services. 
There is no specific access technology that provides the best performance for 
every type of environment. For instance, Wireless Local Loop was found the best 
technology for improving the number of urban and rural telephones in a thinly 
populated country. On the other hand, the cellular system implementation showed the 
best performance for the specific case of Ecuador because of the lower deployment 
delays and lower implementation costs in both urban and rural regions.  
 It is important to note that developing countries have experienced a low level of 
implementation of Wireless Local Loop services in past years. However, this 
investigation found that WLL could be a viable alternative in spite of its relative high 
cost, especially in low-density countries, where the cost of wired systems increases and 
the low deployment delay and relatively large coverage of WLL systems become 
crucial factors on the dispersion of telephone services. 
An important aspect observed in the analysis of this investigation was the impact 
of deployment delay on the dispersion of telephone services. It was observed to be a 
very important factor for increasing the number of telephone lines in developing 
countries.  
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Chapter 8. Research Contribution and Conclusion 
8.1 Practical Applications 
 This dissertation has a practical application in the telecommunications industry 
besides it contribution to policy design for expansion of telecom services. The telecom 
regulatory authorities, telecom operators, and telecom manufacturers, could find this 
dissertation useful for different purposes.  
This dissertation could be helpful for telecom regulatory authorities and telecom 
operators of developing countries. These entities could clearly uderstand the 
implications of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross Subsidies on the 
dispersion of telephone services. Since these subsidies were shown to be 
counterproductive, telecom regulatory authorities have a useful tool than can be used to 
support their decisions when making complex deliberations regarding telephone subsidy 
policies and regulations. On the other hand, telephone operators and regulators will find 
in this document a detailed analysis of telephone pricing mechanisms that can make a 
positive impact on telephone dispersion, such as market and prepaid pricing. 
The combination of prepaid payphone, virtual telephony, and phone services 
was found to improve the telephone density. Telecom operators could implement this 
service combination in order to increase their financial resources and telephone 
infrastructure both in urban and rural areas. They could pay more attention to the 
availability of payphones and other types of infrastructure described in this work for 
rural areas, since this was regarded as a crucial factor for the success of this 
implementation. 
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The impact of wireless technologies in low density regions was covered in this 
investigation. Telecom operators will have a better understanding of the functioning of 
these technologies and their suitability for rural telephone deployment. 
 The manufacturers of telecom equipment could also find this investigation 
useful, so they can focus on improving the user interface of several telecom equipments 
and systems such as mailboxes, calling cards, and payphones. This investigation 
emphasized that the friendliness of this interface was crucial for the adoption of 
different value added services in the regional telecom system.  
 
8.2 Counterintuitive Policies and Counterproductive Telecom Systems 
 As a result of this investigation two counterintuitive telecommunications 
policies were found. The Universal Service Obligations are intended to create positive 
network externalities that are able to improve the telephone dispersion in developing 
countries. This increases the number of rural telephone lines in the short run but reduces 
it in the long run. In addition, the total number of urban and rural telephone lines is 
reduced since the financial resources of the telephone company are also decreased. This 
behavior occurs, because a higher investment in rural areas reduces the investment in 
more profitable urban areas, which decreases the financial resources in the long run, 
reducing both urban and rural telephone lines.  
 The second counterintuitive telecommunications policy is the application of 
International Cross-Subsidies. This policy reduces the monthly rental fee of the 
telephone service in order to increase its demand and the number of telephone lines in 
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urban and rural regions. However, it was observed in the model experiments that the 
reduction of the monthly rental fee reduces the financial resources of the telephone 
company, which are needed for the supply of new telephone lines in developing 
countries. These countries are characterized for having a large unsatisfied demand and 
waiting list of telecom services.  
 Cellular systems are considered the best technology currently on the market that 
is able to accelerate the dispersion of telecom services in developing countries. 
However, it was found that in thinly populated countries the Wireless Local Loop 
systems could outperform cellular systems. This occurs due to the larger coverage of the 
WLL system with respect to the cellular technology. This situation reduces the cost of 
the base station per subscriber in scattered and rural regions. 
 
8.3 New Policies Found 
 There are several new policies that were found as a result of my investigation. 
Most significanlt, market clearing pricing was found to be important for improving the 
regional dispersion of telephone services in developing countries. The market pricing 
mechanism increases the urban monthly rental fee when the ratio between the supply of 
telephone capacity and the demanded telephone capacity is lower than one.  
The combination of market clearing pricing with Universal Service Obligations 
was also another important policy recommended in this dissertation. This increases the 
Universal Service Obligations only after the urban telephone density reaches about forty 
percent. This level of connectivity occurs when the supply of telephone capacity in 
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urban areas equals the demanded telephone capacity using a market-clearing pricing 
mechanism. 
 The prepaid pricing mechanism was found to have a positive impact on telecom 
systems, since this depends on the willingness to pay of the subscribers. The adoption of 
telephone services is expedited using this prepaid scheme, since complex paper work is 
bypassed and the commitment to pay a monthly rental fee is not necessary any more. 
This mechanism could be exploited positively by combining services that enhance the 
willingness to pay, which depends on the network externality of the system. 
 
8.4 Value Added Service Strategy Proposed 
 This investigation also identified the causal structure of different telephone 
services that use value added infrastructure. The simulations showed a moderate impact 
of these services when implemented in isolation. However, if these services are 
implemented together they are able to trigger some key positive feedback loops, which 
improve the telephone density in developing countries. 
The prepaid payphone, virtual telephony, and phone services implemented 
together enhances the network externality impact by expanding the number of people 
connected to the system. The network externality improvement increases the 
willingness to pay for telephone services and the prepaid and postpaid telephone 
demand. The improvement on the telephone service willingness to pay expands the 
expenditure on prepaid virtual telephony, payphone, and telephone services. This 
situation increases the revenue and financial resources of the telephone company. The 
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enhanced prepaid and postpaid telephone demand improves the number of prepaid and 
postpaid telephone subscribers in the network. This expands the financial resources of 
the telephone company. 
 
8.5 Application to the Dispersion of other Services in Developing Countries. 
 It is important to note that this dissertation is about the regional dispersion of 
telephone services in developing countries, but the basic causal structure of the regional 
telecommunications system can be adapted to other types of services such as electricity, 
potable water, transportation, and gas, among others.  
 The economic, cultural, and social differences between urban and rural regions 
have a significant impact on the dispersion of services in developing countries. These 
differences are emphasized in the structure of the regional telecom system described in 
this dissertation and remain in the implementation of other regional services. In 
addition, these public services present similar cross-subsidies than the presented in this 
investigation, and some pricing mechanisms studied here could also be adapted to these 
services.  
In the case of electric power service, urban areas have a significantly higher 
consumption of electricity than rural areas. The cost of providing electric service in 
rural areas will be higher than the provision in urban areas, because of the lower 
population density in rural areas, and the lack of complementary infrastructure. Finally, 
the revenue from urban electric service is higher than in the rural case, not only because 
of the higher level of consumption but also because of the higher prices paid in urban 
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regions. The same analogy can be developed to other types of services in developing 
countries.  
 
8.6 Conclusion  
The conclusions of the research of this dissertation are summarized below: 
 
1. The Universal Service Obligation and the International Cross-Subsidy policies 
are counterproductive because of the dynamic structure of the regional telecom 
system. 
2. The market-clearing pricing was able to considerably improve the number of 
rural and urban telephone lines and the financial resources of the telecom 
company. 
3. The implementation of market-clearing pricing with the Universal Service 
Obligation policy after the urban telephone density reaches forty percent, when 
the supply of urban telephone capacity equals the demanded capacity, produces 
a considerable increase of rural telephone density.  
4. The prepaid phone, virtual telephony, and payphone services, which are 
innovative services over the telephone network, are able to considerably 
improve the financial resources of the telephone company and accelerate the 
dispersion of telephone lines in rural areas of developing countries, only when 
implemented together.  
5. The wireless technologies were able to considerably improve the regional 
dispersion of telephone services. Wireless Local Loop was found the best 
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technology for improving the number of urban and rural telephones in a thinly 
populated country.  
 
8.7 Future Work   
More research is needed in order to identify new technological strategies that 
could improve the regional dispersion of telephone services in developing countries. For 
instance, the deployment of telephone services through power lines and the combination 
of several technologies such as satellite, wired, and cellular systems. A further analysis 
of value added services is required since new innovative solutions could make a 
difference on improving the financial resources of the telecom company and increasing 
the telephone dispersion.  
The actual implementation and application of the new policies and service 
strategies found in this dissertation is very important as a further validation step of this 
investigation. The final conclusion will be drawn after observing the actual behavior of 
the system in real life. 
The impact of quality of service on the dispersion of telecom services is an 
important issue than needs to be investigated as part of a future work. This is the impact 
of quality of service on wireless systems such as Wireless Local Loop and value added 
services such as virtual telephony. 
The study of the impact of cellular phones on social and economic development 
using a System Dynamics approach is strongly recommended as a future research. This 
is how cellular phones can affect the welfare of the population and their income per 
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capita through their contribution in businesses, commerce, security, and health, among 
others. 
The study of the dispersion of new telecom services besides telephony, such as 
Internet and Cable TV, in developing countries is also necessary, since the gap in the 
regional dispersion of these services is also increasing with the time. 
Last, but not least, the generic structure of the model of this thesis can be 
extended to explore the policies addressing other types of infrastructure, such as 
electricity, water supply, health and education services, and transportation networks. 
Further work focusing on specific agendas for different infrastructures should be 
persued. 
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APENDIX A: BEHAVIORAL RELATIONSHIPS 
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TEIM i = f 4i [MC i / (TS i + VASU i pp)]                        
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PFVAS i m = f 5i (PVAS i m / NPVAS i m) 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL LISTINGS 
 
   EQUATIONS OF THE REGIONAL TELECOM SYSTEM 
 
 
                  TELEPHONE DEPLOYMENT EQUATIONS: 
 
 
 
Avg_Connection_Rate[Urban](t) = Avg_Connection_Rate[Urban](t - dt) + 
(Avg_Con_Capac_Change[Urban]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Connection_Rate[Urban] = 0 
 
Avg_Connection_Rate[Rural](t) = Avg_Connection_Rate[Rural](t - dt) + 
(Avg_Con_Capac_Change[Rural]) * dt 
INIT Avg_Connection_Rate[Rural] = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
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Avg_Con_Capac_Change[Region] = (Connection_Rate[Region]-
Avg_Connection_Rate[Region])/Avg_Con_Capac_Adj_Time 
New_Telephone_Capacity[Region](t) = New_Telephone_Capacity[Region](t - dt) + 
(Telephone__Lines_Deployment_Rate[Region] + 
Line_Growth_by_Customer_Attrition[Region] - 
Telephone_Lines_Discard_Rate[Region] - Connection_Rate[Region]) * dt 
INIT New_Telephone_Capacity[Region] = Init_Telephones_to_Connect[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Telephone__Lines_Deployment_Rate[Region] = 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Region]/Telephone_Lines__Deployment_Delay[
Region] 
Line_Growth_by_Customer_Attrition[Region] = 
Connected__Subscribers__Attrition_Rate[Region]+VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Pho
ne, Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Telephone_Lines_Discard_Rate[Region] = 
Discard__Adequacy[Region]*Lines__Discarded[Region] 
Connection_Rate[Region] = 
Connecting_Rate[Region]+P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone, Region] 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Urban](t) = 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Urban](t - dt) + 
(New_Orders__of_Telephone_Deployment[Urban] - 
Telephone__Lines_Deployment_Rate[Urban]) * dt 
INIT Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Urban] = 0 
 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Rural](t) = 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Rural](t - dt) + 
(New_Orders__of_Telephone_Deployment[Rural] - 
Telephone__Lines_Deployment_Rate[Rural]) * dt 
INIT Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Rural] = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
New_Orders__of_Telephone_Deployment[Region] = 
Line_Ordering_Adequacy[Region]*Telephone_Lines_Adjustment[Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Telephone__Lines_Deployment_Rate[Region] = 
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Region]/Telephone_Lines__Deployment_Delay[
Region] 
Avg_Con_Capac_Adj_Time = 3 
Cost_of__Telephone_Line[Region] = 
IF(Wireless_Flag[Region]=1)THEN(Cost_of_Wireless__Telephone_Line[Region])ELS
E(Cost_of_Wired__Network_per_Line[Region]) 
Delay_to__Adjust_Lines[Urban] = 3 
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Delay_to__Adjust_Lines[Rural] = 3 
Demanded_Telephone__Lines[Region] = 
Waiting_List[Region]+PPWaiting_Lines[Region] 
Desired_Telephone_Capacity[Region] = Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Region]-
Afforded__Expected_Adequacy[Region]*(Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Region]-
Demanded_Telephone__Lines[Region]) 
Init_Telephones_to_Connect[Urban] = 10000 
Init_Telephones_to_Connect[Rural] = 100 
Lines__Discarded[Region] = 
Telephone_Lines_Adjustment[Region]*Lines_Adjustment_Adequacy[Region] 
PPWaiting_Lines[Region] = 
Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Region] = 
Potential_Region_Investment[Region]/Cost_of__Telephone_Line[Region] 
Telephone_Lines_Adjustment[Region] = 
Avg_Connection_Rate[Region]+(Desired_Telephone_Capacity[Region]-
New_Telephone_Capacity[Region]-
Telephone_Deployment__in_Progress[Region])/Delay_to__Adjust_Lines[Region] 
Telephone_Lines__Deployment_Delay[Region] = 
IF(Wireless_Flag[Region]=1)THEN(Wireless_Line_Deployment_Time[Region])ELSE
(Time_to_Deploy_Telephone_Line[Region]) 
Wireless_Flag[Region] = 0 
Wireless_Line_Deployment_Time[Urban] = 6 
Wireless_Line_Deployment_Time[Rural] = 8 
Afforded__Expected_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Region]/(Demanded_Telephone__Lines[Region]
+0.0001)) 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.38), (1.02, 0.68), (1.03, 0.825), (1.04, 0.91), (1.05, 0.97), (1.06, 
0.995), (1.07, 1.00), (1.08, 1.00), (1.09, 1.00), (1.10, 1.00) 
Discard__Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(New_Telephone_Capacity[Region]/(Lines__Discarded[Region]+1)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.335), (2.00, 0.535), (3.00, 0.705), (4.00, 0.82), (5.00, 0.895), (6.00, 
0.94), (7.00, 0.975), (8.00, 0.99), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00) 
Lines_Adjustment_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Telephone_Lines_Adjustment[Region]) 
(-1.00, -1.00), (-0.9, -0.7), (-0.8, -0.45), (-0.7, -0.295), (-0.6, -0.19), (-0.5, -0.115), (-0.4, 
-0.065), (-0.3, -0.025), (-0.2, -0.01), (-0.1, -0.005), (-1.39e-016, 0.00) 
Line_Ordering_Adequacy[Region] = GRAPH(Telephone_Lines_Adjustment[Region]) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.275), (0.2, 0.5), (0.3, 0.66), (0.4, 0.78), (0.5, 0.865), (0.6, 0.92), 
(0.7, 0.955), (0.8, 0.975), (0.9, 0.99), (1, 1.00) 
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FINANCIAL RESOURCES EQUATIONS: 
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Telecom_Cash__Balance(t) = Telecom_Cash__Balance(t - dt) + (Telecom_Income - 
Telecom__Expenses) * dt 
INIT Telecom_Cash__Balance = Initial_Cash_Balance 
 
INFLOWS: 
Telecom_Income = 
Total_Telephone_Serv_Income+Activation_Income[Urban]+Activation_Income[Rural]
+Net_Settlement+Total_VAS_Income 
OUTFLOWS: 
Telecom__Expenses = 
Actual_T_Line_Investment_per__Month[Urban]+Actual_T_Line_Investment_per__M
onth[Rural]+Operating_costs[Urban]+Operating_costs[Rural]+Total_VAS__Investmen
t+License_Expense 
Activation_Fee[Urban] = 76 
Activation_Fee[Rural] = 22 
Activation_Income[Region] = 
Activation_Fee[Region]*(Connecting_Rate[Region]+P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users) 
Actual_T_Line_Investment_per__Month[Region] = 
New_Orders__of_Telephone_Deployment[Region]*Cost_of__Telephone_Line[Region
] 
Capital__Costs[Region] = 
Telephone__Capital_Costs[Region]+VAS_Capital_Costs[Region] 
CCard_Infra_per_User = 1 
CCard__Infra[Region] = 
(VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Region]+VAS_Users[Payphone,Region]+VAS_Users[
Prepaid_Phone,Region])*CCard_Infra_per_User 
Fraction_of_Cap_Costs_as_part_of_Operating_Costs = 0.3 
Free_Service__Minutes[URLOCAL] = 100 
Free_Service__Minutes[RULOCAL] = 100 
Free_Service__Minutes[INTERURB] = 0.0001 
Free_Service__Minutes[INTERRUR] = 0.0001 
Free_Service__Minutes[LDURB] = 0.0001 
Free_Service__Minutes[LDRUR] = 0.0001 
Imbalance_Internat_Traffic_per_Subscriber[Urban] = 
Incoming_International_Traffic[Urban]-Service_Time_per_Line[INTERURB] 
Imbalance_Internat_Traffic_per_Subscriber[Rural] = 
IF(Incoming_International_Traffic[Rural]-Service_Time_per_Line[INTERRUR] > 0 ) 
THEN (Incoming_International_Traffic[Rural]-Service_Time_per_Line[INTERRUR]) 
ELSE (0) 
Initial_Cash_Balance = 0 
Inv_Fract = 1 
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License_Expense = License__Cost/License__Duration/Months_per_Year 
License__Cost = 0 
License__Duration = 15 
Maibox_Infra[Region] = 
VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Region]*Mailbox_Infra_per_User 
Mailbox_Infra_per_User = 1 
Monthly_Fraction_Operating_Costs = 1/12 
Net_Settlement = 
(Total_Phone_Lines[Urban]*Imbalance_Internat_Traffic_per_Subscriber[Urban]*Settle
ment_Rate)+(Total_Phone_Lines[Rural]*Imbalance_Internat_Traffic_per_Subscriber[R
ural]*Settlement_Rate) 
New_CCard_Infrastructure[Region] = 
(VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Region]+VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Region]+P_Ph
one_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Region])*CCard_Infra_per_User 
New_Mailbox_Infrastructure[Region] = 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Region]*Mailbox_Infra_per_User 
New_Payphone_Infrastructure[Region] = 
New_Orders__of_Payphone_Deployment[Payphones, Region] 
Operating_costs[Region] = 
Capital__Costs[Region]*Fraction_of_Cap_Costs_as_part_of_Operating_Costs*Monthl
y_Fraction_Operating_Costs 
Payphone_Infrastructure[Region] = Payphone__Installed[Payphones, 
Region]+Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[Payphones, Region] 
Payphone_Total_Investment = 
Potential_Total__Investment*VAS__Investment_Fraction 
Potential_Region_Investment[Urban] = 
Potential_Total__Investment*Urban_Inv_Fr+0*Rural_Investment_Fraction 
Potential_Region_Investment[Rural] = 
Potential_Total__Investment*Rural_Investment_Fraction+0*Urban_Inv_Fr 
Potential_Total__Investment = 
Telecom_Cash__Balance*Inv_Fract*Investment__Adequacy 
Rural_Investment_Fraction = Universal_Service__Obligation 
Service_Customers[URLOCAL] = Connected__Subscribers[Urban] 
Service_Customers[RULOCAL] = Connected__Subscribers[Rural] 
Service_Customers[INTERURB] = Connected__Subscribers[Urban] 
Service_Customers[INTERRUR] = Connected__Subscribers[Rural] 
Service_Customers[LDURB] = Connected__Subscribers[Urban] 
Service_Customers[LDRUR] = Connected__Subscribers[Rural] 
Settlement_Rate = Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[INTERURB]/2 
Telephone_Service__Income[URLOCAL] = 
((Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[URLOCAL]*(Service_Time_per_Line[URLOCAL]-
Free_Service__Minutes[URLOCAL])*Local_Time_Adequacy[URLOCAL])+M_Renta
l_Fee[Urban])*Service_Customers[URLOCAL] 
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Telephone_Service__Income[RULOCAL] = 
((Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[RULOCAL]*(Service_Time_per_Line[RULOCAL]-
Free_Service__Minutes[RULOCAL])*Local_Time_Adequacy[RULOCAL])+M_Renta
l_Fee[Rural])*Service_Customers[RULOCAL] 
Telephone_Service__Income[INTERURB] = 
(Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[INTERURB]*Service_Customers[INTERURB]*Service
_Time_per_Line[INTERURB])+0*M_Rental_Fee[Urban]*Free_Service__Minutes[IN
TERURB]*Local_Time_Adequacy[INTERURB] 
Telephone_Service__Income[INTERRUR] = 
(Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[INTERRUR]*Service_Customers[INTERRUR]*Service
_Time_per_Line[INTERRUR])+0*M_Rental_Fee[Urban]*Free_Service__Minutes[IN
TERRUR]*Local_Time_Adequacy[INTERRUR] 
Telephone_Service__Income[LDURB] = 
Service_Time_per_Line[LDURB]*Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[LDURB]*Service_C
ustomers[LDURB]+0*M_Rental_Fee[Urban]*Free_Service__Minutes[LDURB]*Local
_Time_Adequacy[LDURB] 
Telephone_Service__Income[LDRUR] = 
Service_Time_per_Line[LDRUR]*Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[LDRUR]*Service_C
ustomers[LDRUR]+0*M_Rental_Fee[Rural]*Free_Service__Minutes[LDRUR]*Local
_Time_Adequacy[LDRUR] 
Telephone__Capital_Costs[Region] = 
Cost_of__Telephone_Line[Region]*Total_Telephone_Lines[Region] 
Total_Telephone_Lines[Region] = 
Connected__Subscribers[Region]+New_Telephone_Capacity[Region]+Telephone_Dep
loyment__in_Progress[Region]+Prepaid_Tel_Lines[Region] 
Total_Telephone_Serv_Income = 
Telephone_Service__Income[URLOCAL]+Telephone_Service__Income[RULOCAL]+
Telephone_Service__Income[INTERURB]+Telephone_Service__Income[INTERRUR]
+Telephone_Service__Income[LDURB]+Telephone_Service__Income[LDRUR] 
Total_VAS_Income = 
VAS__Income[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]+VAS__Income[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]+
VAS__Income[Payphone,Urban]+VAS__Income[Payphone,Rural]+VAS__Income[Pre
paid_Phone,Urban]+VAS__Income[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] 
Total_VAS__Investment = 
VAS_Investment_per_Month[Urban]+VAS_Investment_per_Month[Rural] 
Urban_Inv_Fr = 1-Rural_Investment_Fraction-VAS__Investment_Fraction 
VAS_Capital_Costs[Region] = 
Maibox_Infra[Region]*Cost_of_each_Mail_Box+Payphone_Infrastructure[Region]*Co
st_of_each_Payphone[Region]+CCard__Infra[Region]*Cost_Calling_Card_Number 
VAS_Investment_per_Month[Region] = 
New_Mailbox_Infrastructure[Region]*Cost_of_each_Mail_Box+New_CCard_Infrastru
cture[Region]*Cost_Calling_Card_Number+New_Payphone_Infrastructure[Region]*C
ost_of_each_Payphone[Region] 
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VAS__Income[VAS,Region] = VAS_Users[VAS,Region]*VAS_Price[VAS,Region] 
VAS__Investment_Fraction = VAS_Investment_Policy 
Investment__Adequacy = GRAPH(Telecom_Cash__Balance) 
(0.00, 0.00), (100, 0.00), (200, 0.01), (300, 0.04), (400, 0.07), (500, 0.11), (600, 0.165), 
(700, 0.25), (800, 0.385), (900, 0.595), (1000, 1.00) 
Local_Time_Adequacy[Service] = 
GRAPH(Service_Time_per_Line[Service]/Free_Service__Minutes[Service]) 
(0.99, 0.00), (0.991, 0.475), (0.992, 0.76), (0.993, 0.94), (0.994, 1.00), (0.995, 1.00), 
(0.996, 1.00), (0.997, 1.00), (0.998, 1.00), (0.999, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00) 
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TELEPHONE DEMAND EQUATIONS: 
 
 
 
 
Connected__Subscribers[Region](t) = Connected__Subscribers[Region](t - dt) + 
(Connecting_Rate[Region] - Connected__Subscribers__Attrition_Rate[Region]) * dt 
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INIT Connected__Subscribers[Region] = Con_Subscribers_Init[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Connecting_Rate[Region] = 
Connecting_Rate_Indicated[Region]*Waiting_List_Restriction[Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Connected__Subscribers__Attrition_Rate[Region] = 
Attrition_Rate_Indicated[Region]*Attrition_Rate_Adequacy[Region] 
Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_Demand[Region](t) = 
Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_Demand[Region](t - dt) + 
(Attractiveness__Growth[Region]) * dt 
INIT Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_Demand[Region] = 
Effect_Attract_on_Demand_Indicated[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Attractiveness__Growth[Region] = (Effect_Attract_on_Demand_Indicated[Region]-
Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_Demand[Region])/Time_to_Recognize_Attractiveness 
Population[Region](t) = Population[Region](t - dt) + (Population_Growth[Region]) * dt 
INIT Population[Region] = Init_Region_Population[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Population_Growth[Region] = 
Population[Region]*Population_Rate_of_Growth_Month[Region] 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region](t) = 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region](t - dt) + 
(Pop_Tel_Subsc_Growth[Region]) * dt 
INIT Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region] = Init_Pop_Tel_Subs[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Pop_Tel_Subsc_Growth[Region] = 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region]*Population_Rate_of_Growth_Month[R
egion] 
Potential__Customers[Urban](t) = Potential__Customers[Urban](t - dt) + 
(New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Urban] - Rate_of_New_Customers[Urban]) * dt 
INIT Potential__Customers[Urban] = 0 
 
Potential__Customers[Rural](t) = Potential__Customers[Rural](t - dt) + 
(New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Rural] - Rate_of_New_Customers[Rural]) * dt 
INIT Potential__Customers[Rural] = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Region] = 
New_Potential_Customers__Rate_Indicated[Region]*New_Pot_Cus_Rate_Adequacy[
Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Rate_of_New_Customers[Region] = 
Potential__Customers[Region]/Delay_to_Accept_Activation_Fee 
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Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Region](t) = 
Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Region](t - dt) + 
(PCWIOTS_Growth[Region] - New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Region] - 
Prep_Phone_Lines_Growth[Region]) * dt 
INIT Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Region] = 
Init_Pot_Cust__WIOTS[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
PCWIOTS_Growth[Region] = 
Pop_Tel_Subsc_Growth[Region]+Connected__Subscribers__Attrition_Rate[Region]+P
rep_Phone__Demand_Reduction[Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Region] = 
New_Potential_Customers__Rate_Indicated[Region]*New_Pot_Cus_Rate_Adequacy[
Region] 
Prep_Phone_Lines_Growth[Region] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Prepaid_Phone_Demand[Region](t) = Prepaid_Phone_Demand[Region](t - dt) + 
(Prep_Phone_Lines_Growth[Region] - Prep_Phone__Demand_Reduction[Region]) * dt 
INIT Prepaid_Phone_Demand[Region] = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Prep_Phone_Lines_Growth[Region] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
OUTFLOWS: 
Prep_Phone__Demand_Reduction[Region] = VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region] 
Waiting_List[Region](t) = Waiting_List[Region](t - dt) + 
(Rate_of_New_Customers[Region] - Connecting_Rate[Region]) * dt 
INIT Waiting_List[Region] = Waiting_List_Init_[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Rate_of_New_Customers[Region] = 
Potential__Customers[Region]/Delay_to_Accept_Activation_Fee 
OUTFLOWS: 
Connecting_Rate[Region] = 
Connecting_Rate_Indicated[Region]*Waiting_List_Restriction[Region] 
Actual_Demand[Region] = 
Connected__Subscribers[Region]+Potential__Customers[Region]+Waiting_List[Regio
n] 
Attrition_Rate_Indicated[Region] = 
Demand_Adjustment[Region]*Attrition_Adequacy[Region] 
Connecting_Rate_Indicated[Region] = 
New_Telephone_Capacity[Region]*Fraction_of_Tel_Capacity_Con_per_Month*Conv
entional_Prepaid_Fr[Region] 
Con_Subscribers_Init[Urban] = Total_Con_Subs_Initial*(1-Percent_Rural_Lines) 
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Con_Subscribers_Init[Rural] = Total_Con_Subs_Initial*Percent_Rural_Lines 
Delay_to_Accept_Activation_Fee = 3 
Demand_Adjustment[Region] = (Indicated__Demand[Region]-
Actual_Demand[Region])/Time_to_Adjust_Demand[Region] 
Demand_Fractrion[Region] = 
Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_Demand[Region]*Effect_of__Price_on_Demand[Region] 
Effect_Attract_on_Demand_Indicated[Region] = Network_Externality_Impact[Region] 
Effect_of__Price_on_Demand[Region] = Monthly__Rental_Fraction[Region] 
Fraction_of_Tel_Capacity_Con_per_Month = 0.25 
Fr_of_Exp_Telecom[Urban] = 0.015 
Fr_of_Exp_Telecom[Rural] = 0.015 
Income_per_Capita[Urban] = 1708 
Income_per_Capita[Rural] = 310 
Indicated__Demand[Region] = 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region]*Demand_Fractrion[Region] 
Initial_Total_Population = 23000000 
Init_Pop_Tel_Subs[Region] = 
Init_Region_Population[Region]*Number_of_Lines_per_People[Region] 
Init_Pot_Cust__WIOTS[Region] = Init_Pop_Tel_Subs[Region]-
Waiting_List_Init_[Region]-Con_Subscribers_Init[Region] 
Init_Region_Population[Urban] = Initial_Total_Population*(1-Perc_Rural_Pop) 
Init_Region_Population[Rural] = Initial_Total_Population*Perc_Rural_Pop 
ITU_Waitiing_List = 86022 
Lines_per_VAS_Users = 1 
Minimum_Subs_Discarded = 1 
Min_Con_Rate = 1 
Min_New_Pot_Cust_Rate = 1 
Mionthly_Income_per_Capita[Region] = 
Income_per_Capita[Region]*Year_Month_Relation 
Monthly_Income_per_Subscriber[Region] = 
Mionthly_Income_per_Capita[Region]/Number_of_Lines_per_People[Region] 
Monthly_Rental_Discrepancy[Region] = 
M_Rental_Fee[Region]/Normal_Monthly_Rental[Region] 
Monthly__Rental_Fraction[Region] = Monthly_Rental_Discrepancy[Region] 
Months_per_Year = 12 
Network_Externality_Impact[Region] = Region_Externality_Impact[Region] 
New_Potential_Customers__Rate_Indicated[Region] = 
Demand_Adjustment[Region]*New_Subscribers_Adequacy[Region] 
Number_of_Lines_per_People[Region] = 
Num_of_Lines_per_House[Region]/Num_of_People_per_House[Region] 
Num_of_Lines_per_House[Urban] = 1 
Num_of_Lines_per_House[Rural] = 1 
Num_of_People_per_House[Region] = 4 
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Percent_Rural_Lines = 0.1 
Perc_Rural_Pop = 0.4 
Population_Rate_of_Growth_Month[Region] = 
((1+Population_Rate_of_Growth_Year[Region])^(1/Months_per_Year))-1 
Population_Rate_of_Growth_Year[Urban] = 0.023 
Population_Rate_of_Growth_Year[Rural] = 0.002 
Prepaid_Tel_Lines[Region] = VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Region] = VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region]*New_Pot_Cus_Rate_Adequacy[Region] 
Ref_Tel_Exp_per_Line[Region] = 
Fr_of_Exp_Telecom[Region]*Monthly_Income_per_Subscriber[Region]*Telecom_Ex
penditure_Incr_Size_of_the_Network[Region] 
Regional_Fraction_W_List[Urban] = 0.9 
Regional_Fraction_W_List[Rural] = 0.1 
Region_Externality_Impact[Region] = 
Region_Telephone_Density[Urban]*Urban_Weight_on_Externality[Region]+Region_T
elephone_Density[Rural]*Rural_Weight_on_Externality[Region] 
Region_Telephone_Density[Region] = 
(Connected__Subscribers[Region]+VTelephony_Lines[Region]+Prepaid_Tel_Lines[Re
gion])/Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region] 
Rural_Weight_on_Externality[Urban] = 0.1 
Rural_Weight_on_Externality[Rural] = 0.5 
Susbcriber__Expenditure_on_Telecommunications_[Region] = 
Ref_Tel_Exp_per_Line[Region]*Telecom_Expenditure_Increase_from_Mobility[Regi
on] 
Telecom_Expenditure_Incr_Size_of_the_Network[Region] = 
Region_Externality_Impact[Region] 
Time_to_Adjust_Demand[Region] = 60 
Time_to_Recognize_Attractiveness = 6 
Total_Con_Subs_Initial = 598287 
Urban_Weight_on_Externality[Urban] = 0.9 
Urban_Weight_on_Externality[Rural] = 0.5 
VTelephony_Lines[Region] = VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony, 
Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Waiting_List_Initial = ITU_Waitiing_List*Waiting_List_Unreported_Factor 
Waiting_List_Init_[Urban] = Waiting_List_Initial*Regional_Fraction_W_List[Urban] 
Waiting_List_Init_[Rural] = Waiting_List_Initial*Regional_Fraction_W_List[Rural] 
Waiting_List_Unreported_Factor = 4 
Year_Month_Relation = 1/12 
Attrition_Adequacy[Region] = GRAPH(Demand_Adjustment[Region]) 
(-1.00, -1.00), (-0.9, -0.99), (-0.8, -0.97), (-0.7, -0.915), (-0.6, -0.775), (-0.5, -0.505), (-
0.4, -0.255), (-0.3, -0.115), (-0.2, -0.045), (-0.1, -0.01), (-1.39e-016, 0.00) 
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Attrition_Rate_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Connected__Subscribers[Region]/(Attrition_Rate_Indicated[Region]+Minimu
m_Subs_Discarded)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.5, 0.01), (1.00, 0.055), (1.50, 0.135), (2.00, 0.27), (2.50, 0.505), (3.00, 
0.745), (3.50, 0.895), (4.00, 0.985), (4.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00) 
Monthly__Rental_Fraction[Region] = Monthly_Rental_Discrepancy[Region] 
New_Pot_Cus_Rate_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Region]/(New_Potential_C
ustomers__Rate_Indicated[Region]+VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users+Min_New_Pot_Cust_Rate)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.4, 0.025), (0.8, 0.085), (1.20, 0.185), (1.60, 0.33), (2.00, 0.5), (2.40, 
0.715), (2.80, 0.84), (3.20, 0.92), (3.60, 0.98), (4.00, 1.00) 
New_Subscribers_Adequacy[Region] = GRAPH(Demand_Adjustment[Region]) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.31), (0.2, 0.515), (0.3, 0.66), (0.4, 0.765), (0.5, 0.85), (0.6, 0.915), 
(0.7, 0.96), (0.8, 0.985), (0.9, 0.99), (1, 1.00) 
Region_Externality_Impact[Region] = 
Region_Telephone_Density[Urban]*Urban_Weight_on_Externality[Region]+Region_T
elephone_Density[Rural]*Rural_Weight_on_Externality[Region] 
Telecom_Expenditure_Increase_from_Mobility[Region] = 
GRAPH(Fraction_of_Mobile_Subscribers[Region]) 
(0.00, 1.00), (0.1, 1.03), (0.2, 1.08), (0.3, 1.17), (0.4, 1.29), (0.5, 1.38), (0.6, 1.45), (0.7, 
1.48), (0.8, 1.50), (0.9, 1.50), (1, 1.50) 
Telecom_Expenditure_Incr_Size_of_the_Network[Region] = 
Region_Externality_Impact[Region] 
Waiting_List_Restriction[Region] = 
GRAPH(Waiting_List[Region]/(Connecting_Rate_Indicated[Region]+Min_Con_Rate)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.5, 0.035), (1.00, 0.07), (1.50, 0.105), (2.00, 0.145), (2.50, 0.215), (3.00, 
0.37), (3.50, 0.65), (4.00, 0.795), (4.50, 0.915), (5.00, 1.00) 
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TELEPHONE TRAFFIC EQUATIONS: 
 
 
 
Service_Time_per_Line[Service](t) = Service_Time_per_Line[Service](t - dt) + 
(Service_Time_Adjustment_Rate[Service]) * dt 
INIT Service_Time_per_Line[Service] = Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[Service] 
INFLOWS: 
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Service_Time_Adjustment_Rate[Service] = 
(Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[Service]-
Service_Time_per_Line[Service])/Service_Time_Adj_Period[Service] 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Region] = 
Normal_Expenditure_on_Traffic[Region]*Telecom_Expenditure_Incr_Size_of_the_Ne
twork[Region]*Telecom_Expenditure_Increase_from_Mobility[Region] 
Exp_on_Traffic_as_Fraction_of_Income[Urban] = 0.010 
Exp_on_Traffic_as_Fraction_of_Income[Rural] = 0.006 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[URLOCAL] = 0.3 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[RULOCAL] = 0 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[INTERURB] = 0.5 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[INTERRUR] = 0.2 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[LDURB] = 0.2 
Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[LDRUR] = 0.8 
Free_Local_Minutes_Used[Urban] = 100 
Free_Local_Minutes_Used[Rural] = 50 
Incoming_International_Traffic[Urban] = 
Service_Time_per_Line[INTERURB]*Incoming_Outgoing_International_Traffic_Rati
o 
Incoming_International_Traffic[Rural] = 
Service_Time_per_Line[INTERRUR]*Incoming_Outgoing_International_Traffic_Rati
o 
Incoming_Outgoing_International_Traffic_Ratio = 3 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[URLOCAL] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Urban]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[UR
LOCAL] 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[RULOCAL] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Rural]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[RU
LOCAL] 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[INTERURB] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Urban]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[IN
TERURB] 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[INTERRUR] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Rural]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[INT
ERRUR] 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[LDURB] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Urban]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[LD
URB] 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[LDRUR] = 
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Rural]*Fraction_of__Expenditure_per__Service[LD
RUR] 
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Normal_Expenditure_on_Traffic[Region] = 
Exp_on_Traffic_as_Fraction_of_Income[Region]*Monthly_Income_per_Subscriber[Re
gion] 
Normal_Monthly_Rental[Region] = (W_t_Pay_Telephone_Service[Region]-
Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Region])*Normal_Monthly_Rental_Adequacy[Regio
n] 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[URLOCAL] = 0.014 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[RULOCAL] = 0.002 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[INTERURB] = 1 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[INTERRUR] = 1 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[LDURB] = 0.042 
Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[LDRUR] = 0.006 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[URLOCAL] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[URLOCAL]+Free_Local_Minutes_Use
d[Urban] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[RULOCAL] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[RULOCAL]+Free_Local_Minutes_Use
d[Rural] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[INTERURB] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[INTERURB]+0*Free_Local_Minutes_
Used[Urban] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[INTERRUR] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[INTERRUR]+0*Free_Local_Minutes_
Used[Rural] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[LDURB] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[LDURB]+0*Free_Local_Minutes_Used
[Urban] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line[LDRUR] = 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[LDRUR]+0*Free_Local_Minutes_Used
[Rural] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[URLOCAL] = 
(Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[URLOCAL]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Servic
e[URLOCAL]) 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[RULOCAL] = 
(Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[RULOCAL]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Servic
e[RULOCAL]) 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[INTERURB] = 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[INTERURB]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Servic
e[INTERURB] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[INTERRUR] = 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[INTERRUR]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Servic
e[INTERRUR] 
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Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[LDURB] = 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[LDURB]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[L
DURB] 
Referential_Service_Time_per_Line_Indicated[LDRUR] = 
Indicated_Traffic_Expenditure_per_Service[LDRUR]/Price_of_Traffic_per_Service[L
DRUR] 
Service_Time_Adj_Period[Service] = 12 
W_t_Pay_Telephone_Service[Region] = 
Susbcriber__Expenditure_on_Telecommunications_[Region] 
Normal_Monthly_Rental_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(W_t_Pay_Telephone_Service[Region]/Expenditure_on_Traffic_per_line[Regi
on]) 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.295), (1.01, 0.555), (1.01, 0.765), (1.02, 0.87), (1.02, 0.94), (1.03, 
0.96), (1.03, 0.975), (1.04, 0.99), (1.04, 0.995), (1.05, 1.00) 
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VALUE ADDED SERVICE DEMAND EQUATIONS: 
 
 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban](t) = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban](t - dt) + 
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(Potential_VAS_Growth[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] - 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] - 
Potential_VAS__Reduction[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]) * dt 
INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
(Waiting_List[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Urban])*
VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural](t) = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural](t - dt) + 
(Potential_VAS_Growth[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] - 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] - 
Potential_VAS__Reduction[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]) * dt 
INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
(Waiting_List[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Rural])*V
AS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban](t) = Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban](t 
- dt) + (Potential_VAS_Growth[Payphone,Urban] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Payphone,Urban] - 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Urban] - Potential_VAS__Reduction[Payphone,Urban] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Urban]) * dt 
INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban] = 
Population[Urban]*payphone_users_per_people[Urban] 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural](t) = Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural](t - 
dt) + (Potential_VAS_Growth[Payphone,Rural] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Payphone,Rural] - 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Rural] - Potential_VAS__Reduction[Payphone,Rural] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Rural]) * dt 
INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural] = 
Population[Rural]*payphone_users_per_people[Rural] 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban](t) = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban](t - dt) + 
(Potential_VAS_Growth[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] - 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] - 
Potential_VAS__Reduction[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]) * dt 
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INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Pho
ne,Urban] 
 
Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural](t) = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural](t - dt) + 
(Potential_VAS_Growth[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] + 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] - 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] - 
Potential_VAS__Reduction[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] - 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]) * dt 
INIT Potential_VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Pot_Customers_without_Interest_on_Tel_Services[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phon
e,Rural] 
 
INFLOWS: 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]*Virtual_Telephony_Users_Growth[Urban]+0
*(Payphone_Users_Growth[Urban]+Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Urban]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]*Virtual_Telephony_Users_Growth[Rural]+0*
(Payphone_Users_Growth[Rural]+Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Rural]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Payphone,Urban] = 
(VAS_Offered[Payphone,Urban]*Payphone_Users_Growth[Urban])+0*(Virtual_Telep
hony_Users_Growth[Urban]+Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Urban]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Payphone,Rural] = 
VAS_Offered[Payphone,Rural]*Payphone_Users_Growth[Rural]+0*(Virtual_Telephon
y_Users_Growth[Rural]+Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Rural]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]+0*(Payphone_
Users_Growth[Urban]+Virtual_Telephony_Users_Growth[Urban]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]+0*(Virtual_Telep
hony_Users_Growth[Rural]+Payphone_Users_Growth[Rural]) 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Payphone,Urban] = 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Payphone,Urban] 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Payphone,Rural] = 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Payphone,Rural] 
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Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
0*VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] 
Potential_VAS_Growth_from_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
0*VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] 
OUTFLOWS: 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Virtual_Telephony,Ur
ban] 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Virtual_Telephony,Rur
al] 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Payphone,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Payphone,Urban] 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Payphone,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Payphone,Rural] 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]*0 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]*0 
Potential_VAS__Reduction[VAS,Region] = 
VAS_Users_Reduction[VAS,Region]*Pot_VAS_Red_Adq[VAS,Region]*VAS_Offere
d[VAS,Region] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Payphone,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Payphone,Rural] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] 
Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region](t) = Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region](t - dt) 
+ (Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[VAS,Region] - P_Phone_C_Rate[VAS,Region]) * 
dt 
INIT Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region] = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] 
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Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Payphone,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Payphone,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Payphone,Rural] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Urban]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] 
Prepaid_Phone_New_Customers[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prep_Phone_Demand_Growth[Rural]*VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] 
OUTFLOWS: 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban](t) = VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban](t - 
dt) + (VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] + 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 0 
 
VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural](t) = VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural](t - 
dt) + (VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] + 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 0 
 
VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban](t) = VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban](t - dt) + 
(VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Urban] + P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Urban] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Payphone,Urban]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban] = 0 
 
VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural](t) = VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural](t - dt) + 
(VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Rural] + P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Rural] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Payphone,Rural]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural] = 0 
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VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban](t) = VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban](t - dt) + 
(VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] + P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 0 
 
VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural](t) = VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural](t - dt) + 
(VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] + P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] - 
VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]) * dt 
INIT VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Virtual_Telephony,Ur
ban] 
VAS_Adoption[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Virtual_Telephony,Rur
al] 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Payphone,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Payphone,Urban] 
VAS_Adoption[Payphone,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Payphone,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Payphone,Rural] 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]*Increase__Adequacy[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]*0 
VAS_Adoption[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
VAS_Increase[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]*Increase__Adequacy[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]*0 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Urban] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Payphone,Rural] = 
0*Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
OUTFLOWS: 
VAS_Users_Attrition[VAS,Region] = 
VAS__Decrease[VAS,Region]*Decrease_Adequacy[VAS,Region] 
CCard_Infra__Availability[Region] = 1 
Conventional_Prepaid_Fr[Region] = 
Waiting_List[Region]/(Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region]+Waiting_List[Region]) 
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Delay_to__Adjust_VAS = 3 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 0.4 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 0.2 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Payphone,Urban] = 0.7 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Payphone,Rural] = 0.4 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 1 
Easy_to_Use_Fraction[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 1 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]+0*Effect_of_Attractiven
ess_on_Demand[Urban] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]+0*Effect_of_Attractiven
ess_on_Demand[Rural] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Payphone,Urban] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Payphone,Urban]*Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_De
mand[Urban] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Payphone,Rural] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Payphone,Rural]*Effect_of_Attractiveness_on_De
mand[Rural] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]*Effect_of_Attractiveness_o
n_Demand[Urban] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]*Effect_of_Attractiveness_on
_Demand[Rural] 
Fraction_of_VAS_Demand_Initial[VAS,Region] = 
Price_Fraction_VAS[VAS,Region]*Easy_to_Use_Fraction[VAS,Region]*VAS_Availa
bility_Fraction[VAS,Region]*VAS_Offered[VAS,Region] 
Mail_Boxes_Infra_Availability[Region] = 1 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]+VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urba
n]+0*Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
(Potential_VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]+VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rura
l])+0*Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[Payphone,Urban] = 
(Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban]+VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban])+0*Populatio
n_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[Payphone,Rural] = 
Potential_VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural]+VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural]+0*Population_o
f_Telephone_Subscribers[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
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Max_Demand_per_VAS[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Urban]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+0*(Potential_V
AS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]+VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]) 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Rural]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+0*(Potential_VA
S_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]+VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]) 
Min_Prepaid_Con_Rate = 1 
Min_VAS_Users_Reduction = 1 
Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Region] = 
Ref_Tel_Exp_per_Line[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Region] = 
Susbcriber__Expenditure_on_Telecommunications_[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Region] = 
Ref_Tel_Exp_per_Line[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Num_of_payphone_users_per_house[Region] = 2 
Payphone_Service_Availability[Region] = 
Payphone_Infra_Availability[Region]*CCard_Infra__Availability[Region] 
Payphone_Users_Growth[Region] = 
Population_Growth[Region]*payphone_users_per_people[Region] 
payphone_users_per_people[Region] = 
Num_of_payphone_users_per_house[Region]/Num_of_People_per_House[Region] 
Payphone_Users_Reduction[Region] = 
(Rate_of_New_Customers[Region]/Lines_per_VAS_Users)+Prepaid_Phone_New_Cus
tomers[Prepaid_Phone, Region] 
Potential_Prepaid_Conneting_Rate[Region] = 
New_Telephone_Capacity[Region]*Fraction_of_Tel_Capacity_Con_per_Month*(1-
Conventional_Prepaid_Fr[Region]) 
Pot_VAS_Red_Adq[VAS,Region] = 
Potential_VAS_Users[VAS,Region]/(VAS_Users_Reduction[VAS,Region]+Min_VAS
_Users_Reduction) 
Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Region] = CCard_Infra__Availability[Region] 
Prepaid_Phone_Growth[Region] = PCWIOTS_Growth[Region]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Prep_Phone_Connecting_Rate_Ind[Region] = 
Potential_Prepaid_Conneting_Rate[Region]*Prep_Phone__Waiting_List_Restriction[R
egion] 
Prep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Region] = 
New_Potential__Customer_Rate[Region]/Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Price_of_Calling_Card[Region] = Willingness_to_Pay_Fixed_Telephony[Region] 
Price_of_Prepaid_Phone[Region] = Willingness_to_Pay_Telephone_Services[Region] 
Price_of__Virtual_Telephony[Region] = 
Willingness_to_Pay_Fixed_Telephony[Region] 
Price__Discrepancy[VAS,Region] = 
VAS_Price[VAS,Region]/VAS_Price_Normal[VAS,Region] 
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VAS_Availability_Fraction[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Virtual_Telephony_Availability[Urban]+0*Payphone_Service_Availability[Urban]*Vo
ice_Mail_Service_Availability[Urban]*Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Urban] 
VAS_Availability_Fraction[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
Virtual_Telephony_Availability[Rural]+0*Payphone_Service_Availability[Rural]*Voic
e_Mail_Service_Availability[Rural]*Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Rural] 
VAS_Availability_Fraction[Payphone,Urban] = 
Payphone_Service_Availability[Urban]+0*Voice_Mail_Service_Availability[Urban]*V
irtual_Telephony_Availability[Urban]*Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Urban] 
VAS_Availability_Fraction[Payphone,Rural] = 
Payphone_Service_Availability[Rural]+0*Voice_Mail_Service_Availability[Rural]*Vi
rtual_Telephony_Availability[Rural]*Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Rural] 
VAS_Availability_Fraction[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Urban]+0*Payphone_Service_Availability[Urban]*Voice_
Mail_Service_Availability[Urban]*Virtual_Telephony_Availability[Urban] 
VAS_Availability_Fraction[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prepaid_Phone_Availability[Rural]+0*Payphone_Service_Availability[Rural]*Voice_
Mail_Service_Availability[Rural]*Virtual_Telephony_Availability[Rural] 
VAS_Increase[VAS,Region] = 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[VAS,Region]*VAS_Increase_Adjustment_Adequacy[VAS,R
egion] 
VAS_Price[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Price_of__Virtual_Telephony[Urban]+0*Price_of_Calling_Card[Urban]*Price_of_Prep
aid_Phone[Urban] 
VAS_Price[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
Price_of__Virtual_Telephony[Rural]+0*Price_of_Calling_Card[Rural]*Price_of_Prepa
id_Phone[Rural] 
VAS_Price[Payphone,Urban] = 
Price_of_Calling_Card[Urban]+0*Price_of__Virtual_Telephony[Urban]*Price_of_Prep
aid_Phone[Urban] 
VAS_Price[Payphone,Rural] = 
Price_of_Calling_Card[Rural]+0*Price_of__Virtual_Telephony[Rural]*Price_of_Prepa
id_Phone[Rural] 
VAS_Price[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Price_of_Prepaid_Phone[Urban]+0*Price_of_Calling_Card[Urban]*Price_of__Virtual_
Telephony[Urban] 
VAS_Price[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Price_of_Prepaid_Phone[Rural]+0*Price_of_Calling_Card[Rural]*Price_of__Virtual_T
elephony[Rural] 
VAS_Price_Normal[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Urban]+0*(Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Urb
an]+Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Urban]) 
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VAS_Price_Normal[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Rural]+0*(Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Rur
al]+Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Rural]) 
VAS_Price_Normal[Payphone,Urban] = 
Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Urban]+0*(Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Urb
an]+Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Urban]) 
VAS_Price_Normal[Payphone,Rural] = 
Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Rural]+0*(Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Rur
al]+Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Rural]) 
VAS_Price_Normal[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Urban]+0*(Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Urban
]+Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Urban]) 
VAS_Price_Normal[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Normal_Price_Prepaid_Phone[Rural]+0*(Normal_Price_of_Virtual_Telephony[Rural]
+Normal_Price__of_Calling_Card[Rural]) 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
((VAS_Users_Indicated[Virtual_Telephony,Urban]-
VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Urban])/Delay_to__Adjust_VAS)+0*Prepaid_Phone_
Waiting_List[Urban] 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
(VAS_Users_Indicated[Virtual_Telephony,Rural]-
VAS_Users[Virtual_Telephony,Rural])/(Delay_to__Adjust_VAS)+0*Prepaid_Phone_
Waiting_List[Rural] 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Payphone,Urban] = 
((VAS_Users_Indicated[Payphone,Urban]-
VAS_Users[Payphone,Urban])/Delay_to__Adjust_VAS)+0*Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_L
ist[Urban] 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Payphone,Rural] = ((VAS_Users_Indicated[Payphone,Rural]-
VAS_Users[Payphone,Rural])/Delay_to__Adjust_VAS)+0*Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_Li
st[Rural] 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
(VAS_Users_Indicated[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]-VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Urban]-
Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Urban])/Delay_to__Adjust_VAS 
VAS_Users_Adjustment[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
(VAS_Users_Indicated[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]-VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Rural]-
Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Rural])/Delay_to__Adjust_VAS 
VAS_Users_Indicated[VAS,Region] = 
Max_Demand_per_VAS[VAS,Region]*Fraction_of_VAS_Demand[VAS,Region] 
VAS_Users_Reduction[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 
Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Urban]+0*(Payphone_Users_Reduction[Urban]+
Prep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Urban]) 
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VAS_Users_Reduction[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 
Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Rural]+0*(Payphone_Users_Reduction[Rural]+P
rep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Rural]) 
VAS_Users_Reduction[Payphone,Urban] = 
Payphone_Users_Reduction[Urban]+0*(Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Urban]+
Prep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Urban]) 
VAS_Users_Reduction[Payphone,Rural] = 
Payphone_Users_Reduction[Rural]+0*(Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Rural]+P
rep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Rural]) 
VAS_Users_Reduction[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 
Prep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Urban]+0*(Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Urban
]+Payphone_Users_Reduction[Urban]) 
VAS_Users_Reduction[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 
Prep_Phone_Users_Reduction[Rural]+0*(Payphone_Users_Reduction[Rural]+Virtual_
Telephony_Users_Reduction[Rural]) 
VAS__Decrease[VAS,Region] = 
VAS_Decrease_Adjustment_Adequacy[VAS,Region]*VAS_Users_Adjustment[VAS,R
egion] 
Virtual_Telephony_Availability[Region] = 
Payphone_Infra_Availability[Region]*CCard_Infra__Availability[Region]*Mail_Boxe
s_Infra_Availability[Region] 
Virtual_Telephony_Users_Growth[Region] = 
Rate_of_New_Customers[Region]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+Prepaid_Phone_New_Custo
mers[Prepaid_Phone, Region] 
Virtual_Telephony_Users_Reduction[Region] = 
Connecting_Rate[Region]/Lines_per_VAS_Users+P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region] 
Voice_Mail_Service_Availability[Region] = Mail_Boxes_Infra_Availability[Region] 
Willingness_to_Pay_Fixed_Telephony[Region] = 
Ref_Tel_Exp_per_Line[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Willingness_to_Pay_Telephone_Services[Region] = 
Susbcriber__Expenditure_on_Telecommunications_[Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users 
Decrease_Adequacy[VAS,Region] = 
GRAPH(VAS_Users[VAS,Region]/(VAS__Decrease[VAS,Region]+1)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.4, 0.205), (0.8, 0.43), (1.20, 0.61), (1.60, 0.77), (2.00, 0.875), (2.40, 
0.95), (2.80, 0.985), (3.20, 0.99), (3.60, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00) 
Increase__Adequacy[VAS,Region] = 
GRAPH(Potential_VAS_Users[VAS,Region]/(VAS_Increase[VAS,Region]+1)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.4, 0.01), (0.8, 0.04), (1.20, 0.105), (1.60, 0.22), (2.00, 0.5), (2.40, 0.8), 
(2.80, 0.935), (3.20, 0.985), (3.60, 0.995), (4.00, 1.00) 
Pot_VAS_Red_Adq[VAS,Region] = 
Potential_VAS_Users[VAS,Region]/(VAS_Users_Reduction[VAS,Region]+Min_VAS
_Users_Reduction) 
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Prep_Phone__Waiting_List_Restriction[Region] = 
GRAPH(Prepaid_Phone_Waiting_List[Region]/(Potential_Prepaid_Conneting_Rate[Re
gion]+Min_Prepaid_Con_Rate)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.33), (2.00, 0.565), (3.00, 0.715), (4.00, 0.835), (5.00, 0.9), (6.00, 
0.96), (7.00, 0.985), (8.00, 1.00), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00) 
Price_Fraction_VAS[VAS,Region] = GRAPH(Price__Discrepancy[VAS,Region]) 
(1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 0.97), (1.40, 0.945), (1.60, 0.895), (1.80, 0.825), (2.00, 0.755), (2.20, 
0.665), (2.40, 0.57), (2.60, 0.44), (2.80, 0.245), (3.00, 0.00) 
VAS_Decrease_Adjustment_Adequacy[VAS,Region] = 
GRAPH(VAS_Users_Adjustment[VAS,Region]) 
(-1.00, -1.00), (-0.9, -0.975), (-0.8, -0.935), (-0.7, -0.875), (-0.6, -0.745), (-0.5, -0.505), 
(-0.4, -0.285), (-0.3, -0.165), (-0.2, -0.09), (-0.1, -0.035), (-1.39e-016, 0.00) 
VAS_Increase_Adjustment_Adequacy[VAS,Region] = 
GRAPH(VAS_Users_Adjustment[VAS,Region]) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.215), (0.2, 0.415), (0.3, 0.565), (0.4, 0.695), (0.5, 0.785), (0.6, 
0.85), (0.7, 0.905), (0.8, 0.95), (0.9, 0.99), (1, 1.00) 
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VALUE ADDED SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE EQUATIONS: 
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Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region](t) = 
Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region](t - dt) + 
(New_Orders__of_Payphone_Deployment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] - 
Payphone__Deployment_Rate[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]) * dt 
INIT Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 0 
INFLOWS: 
New_Orders__of_Payphone_Deployment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Infra_Adjustment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]*Payphone_Ordering_Adequ
acy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Payphone__Deployment_Rate[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]/Payphone_Deploym
ent_Delay[Region] 
Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Urban](t) = Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Urban](t 
- dt) + (Payphone__Deployment_Rate[Payphones,Urban] - 
Payphone_Discard_Rate[Payphones,Urban]) * dt 
INIT Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Urban] = 0 
 
Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Rural](t) = Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Rural](t - 
dt) + (Payphone__Deployment_Rate[Payphones,Rural] - 
Payphone_Discard_Rate[Payphones,Rural]) * dt 
INIT Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Rural] = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
Payphone__Deployment_Rate[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]/Payphone_Deploym
ent_Delay[Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
Payphone_Discard_Rate[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Discard__Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]*Payphone_Infra__Discard
ed[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] 
Cost_Calling_Card_Number = 5 
Cost_of_each_Mail_Box = 10 
Cost_of_each_Payphone[Region] = 
Cost_of__Payphone_Devices+Cost_of__Telephone_Line[Region]*T_Lines_per_Payph
one 
Cost_of__Payphone_Devices = 500 
Delay_to__Adjust_Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 3 
Desired__Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Supplied__Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]-
Supplied_Payphone_Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]*(Supplied__Payphone_Inf
ra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]-
Maximum_Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]) 
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Maximum_Payphone_Infra[Payphones,Urban] = IF(VAS_Offered[Payphone,Urban] = 
1 OR VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 1) THEN 
(Ref_Payphone_Users[Urban]*Payphone_Infrastructure_per_Users*Payphone_Availab
ility_Referential) ELSE (0) 
Maximum_Payphone_Infra[Payphones,Rural] = IF(VAS_Offered[Payphone,Rural] =1 
OR VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 1) 
THEN(Ref_Payphone_Users[Rural]*Payphone_Infrastructure_per_Users*Payphone_A
vailability_Referential) ELSE(0) 
Min_VAS__Infra = 1 
Payphone_Availability_Referential = 3/1000 
Payphone_Deployment_Delay[Region] = 
Telephone_Lines__Deployment_Delay[Region]+Payphone_Devices_Implement_Delay 
Payphone_Devices_Implement_Delay = 1 
Payphone_Infrastructure_per_Users = 1 
Payphone_Infra_Adjustment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
0+(Desired__Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]-
Payphone__Installed[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]-
Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region])/Delay_to__Adjust_
Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] 
Payphone_Infra_Availability[Region] = Payphone__Density[Payphones, 
Region]/Payphone_Availability_Referential 
Payphone_Infra__Discarded[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Infra_Adjustment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]*Payphone_Adjustment_Disc
ard_Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] 
Payphone_Investment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
Payphone_Total_Investment*Regional_Payphone_Infra_Investment_Fr[Region] 
Payphone__Density[Payphones,Urban] = 
(Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Urban]/(Ref_Payphone_Users[Urban]*Payphone_Infr
astructure_per_Users)) 
Payphone__Density[Payphones,Rural] = 
(Payphone__Installed[Payphones,Rural]/(Ref_Payphone_Users[Rural]*Payphone_Infra
structure_per_Users)) 
Ref_Payphone_Users[Region] = Population[Region]*Ref_Payphone_Users_per_People 
Ref_Payphone_Users_per_People = 1 
Regional_Payphone_Infra_Investment_Fr[Urban] = Urban_Inv_VAS_Fr 
Regional_Payphone_Infra_Investment_Fr[Rural] = 1-Urban_Inv_VAS_Fr 
Supplied__Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
(Payphone_Investment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]/Cost_of_each_Payphone[Region])
+Payphone_Deployment__in_Progress[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]+Payphone__Instal
led[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] 
T_Lines_per_Payphone = 1 
Urban_Inv_VAS_Fr = 0.965 
VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Urban] = 0 
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VAS_Offered[Virtual_Telephony,Rural] = 0 
VAS_Offered[Payphone,Urban] = 0 
VAS_Offered[Payphone,Rural] = 0 
VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Urban] = 0 
VAS_Offered[Prepaid_Phone,Rural] = 0 
Payphone_Adjustment_Discard_Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
GRAPH(Payphone_Infra_Adjustment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]) 
(-1.00, -1.00), (-0.9, -0.7), (-0.8, -0.475), (-0.7, -0.295), (-0.6, -0.175), (-0.5, -0.1), (-0.4, 
-0.045), (-0.3, -0.025), (-0.2, -0.01), (-0.1, -0.005), (-1.39e-016, 0.00) 
Payphone_Discard__Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
GRAPH(Payphone__Installed[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]/(Payphone_Infra__Discard
ed[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]+1)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.4, 0.335), (0.8, 0.535), (1.20, 0.705), (1.60, 0.81), (2.00, 0.88), (2.40, 
0.94), (2.80, 0.97), (3.20, 0.99), (3.60, 0.995), (4.00, 1.00) 
Payphone_Ordering_Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
GRAPH(Payphone_Infra_Adjustment[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.275), (0.2, 0.5), (0.3, 0.66), (0.4, 0.78), (0.5, 0.865), (0.6, 0.92), 
(0.7, 0.955), (0.8, 0.975), (0.9, 0.99), (1, 1.00) 
Supplied_Payphone_Adequacy[VAS_Infrastructure,Region] = 
GRAPH((Supplied__Payphone_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]/(Maximum_Paypho
ne_Infra[VAS_Infrastructure,Region]+Min_VAS__Infra))) 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.255), (1.02, 0.47), (1.03, 0.62), (1.04, 0.745), (1.05, 0.835), (1.06, 
0.91), (1.07, 0.96), (1.08, 0.99), (1.09, 1.00), (1.10, 1.00) 
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WIRED ACCESS NETWORK EQUATIONS: 
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Cost_of_External_Plant_per_Line[Region] = 
Referential_Cost_of_External_Plant+(Distance_C_Office__Line_Km[Region]*Meter_
Km_Converter*Referential_Cost_per_Meter_of_Cable) 
Cost_of_the_Core_Network__per_Line = 40 
Cost_of_Wired__Network_per_Line[Region] = 
Cost_of_External_Plant_per_Line[Region]+Cost_of_the_Core_Network__per_Line 
Coverage_of_Central_Office[Region] = 
Number_of_Lines__per_Central_Office/New_Lines__per_Area[Region] 
Distance_C_Office__Line_Km[Region] = 
SQRT(Coverage_of_Central_Office[Region]/(2*3.1416)) 
Dist_C_Office_Line_Ratio[Region] = 
Distance_C_Office__Line_Km[Region]/Ref_Distance__C_Office_Line_Km[Region] 
External_Plant__Deployment_Time[Region] = 
Ref_Ext_Plant_Deployment_Time[Region]*Dist_C_Office_Line_Ratio[Region] 
Meter_Km_Converter = 1000 
Network_Telephone_Density[Region] = 
((Connected__Subscribers[Region]+Prepaid_Tel_Lines[Region])*(1-
Wireless_Flag[Region])/Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Region])+(Wireless__S
ubscribers[Region]*Wireless_Flag[Region]/Population_of_Telephone_Subscribers[Reg
ion]) 
New_Lines__per_Area[Region] = 
Normal_Number_of_Lines_per_Area[Region]*Region_Lines_Density_Adequacy[Regi
on] 
Normal_Number_of_Lines_per_Area[Region] = 
Population__Density[Region]/Number_of__people_per_line_[Region] 
Number_of_Lines__per_Central_Office = 5000 
Number_of__people_per_line_[Region] = 
Num_of_People_per_House[Region]/Num_of_Lines_per_House[Region] 
Population__Density[Urban] = 284 
Population__Density[Rural] = 19 
Referential_Cost_of_External_Plant = 150 
Referential_Cost_per_Meter_of_Cable = 0.10 
Ref_Cov_of_Central_Office[Region] = 
Number_of_Lines__per_Central_Office/Ref_Lines_per_Area[Region] 
Ref_Distance__C_Office_Line_Km[Region] = 
SQRT(Ref_Cov_of_Central_Office[Region]/(2*3.1416)) 
Ref_Ext_Plant_Deployment_Time[Region] = 12 
Ref_Lines_per_Area[Region] = 
Ref_Pop_Density[Region]/Number_of__people_per_line_[Region] 
Ref_Pop_Density[Urban] = 284 
Ref_Pop_Density[Rural] = 284 
Time_to_Couple_External_Plant_with_Switching_Equipment = 1 
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Time_to_Deploy_Telephone_Line[Region] = 
IF(External_Plant__Deployment_Time[Region]>=Time_to_Install_Switching_Equipm
ent[Region])THEN(External_Plant__Deployment_Time[Region]+Time_to_Couple_Ext
ernal_Plant_with_Switching_Equipment)ELSE(Time_to_Install_Switching_Equipment
[Region]+Time_to_Couple_External_Plant_with_Switching_Equipment) 
Time_to_Install_Switching_Equipment[Urban] = 8 
Time_to_Install_Switching_Equipment[Rural] = 18 
Region_Lines_Density_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Network_Telephone_Density[Region]) 
(0.00, 5.00), (0.1, 4.75), (0.2, 4.28), (0.3, 3.52), (0.4, 2.46), (0.5, 1.92), (0.6, 1.64), (0.7, 
1.42), (0.8, 1.26), (0.9, 1.12), (1, 1.00) 
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WIRELESS ACCESS NETWORK EQUATIONS:  
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Avg_Mobile_Users_per_Base_Station[Region](t) = 
Avg_Mobile_Users_per_Base_Station[Region](t - dt) + (A_M_U__Growth[Region]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Mobile_Users_per_Base_Station[Region] = 
Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region]*Mobility_Offered[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
A_M_U__Growth[Region] = (Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region]-
Avg_Mobile_Users_per_Base_Station[Region])/Avg_MUBS_Time 
Avg_Wireless_Lines_per_Base_Station[Region](t) = 
Avg_Wireless_Lines_per_Base_Station[Region](t - dt) + (AWLBS_Growth[Region]) * 
dt 
INIT Avg_Wireless_Lines_per_Base_Station[Region] = 
Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
AWLBS_Growth[Region] = (Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region]-
Avg_Wireless_Lines_per_Base_Station[Region])/Avg_WLBS_Time 
Wireless__Subscribers[Region](t) = Wireless__Subscribers[Region](t - dt) + 
(MS_Growth[Region] - MS_Reduction[Region]) * dt 
INIT Wireless__Subscribers[Region] = 0 
INFLOWS: 
MS_Growth[Region] = (Connecting_Rate[Region]+P_Phone_C_Rate[Prepaid_Phone, 
Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users)*Wireless_Flag[Region] 
OUTFLOWS: 
MS_Reduction[Region] = 
(Connected__Subscribers__Attrition_Rate[Region]+VAS_Users_Attrition[Prepaid_Pho
ne, Region]*Lines_per_VAS_Users)*Wireless_Flag[Region] 
Access_to_Electricity[Urban] = 0.98 
Access_to_Electricity[Rural] = 0.5 
Actual_Area_of_Cell[Region] = 
(Max_Area_of_Cell+Area__Adequacy[Region]*(Indicated_Area_of__Cell[Region]-
Max_Area_of_Cell)) 
Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region] = 
Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS_Indicated[Region]+Area__Adequacy[Region]*(Max_Wl
ess_Lines_per_Base_Station-Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS_Indicated[Region]) 
Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS_Indicated[Region] = 
Actual_Area_of_Cell[Region]*New_Lines__per_Area[Region] 
Avg_MUBS_Time = 100 
Avg_WLBS_Time = Avg_MUBS_Time 
Costs_of_Subscriber_Units_per_Line[Region] = 
Cost_of_Subscriber_Units[Region]/Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region] 
Cost_of_a_Base_Station = 150000 
Cost_of_B_Station_per_Wless_Line[Region] = 
Cost_of_a_Base_Station/(Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region]) 
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Cost_of_Core_Network_and_B_Station_per_Wless_Line[Region] = 
Cost_of_B_Station_per_Wless_Line[Region]+Cost_of_the_Core_Network__per_Line 
Cost_of_Normal_Subscriber_Unit = 50 
Cost_of_Power_Supply[Region] = 
(Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell_without_electricity[Region]+Wless_Lines_outside_
Normal_Cell_without_electricity[Region])*Cost_of__Solar_Panel 
Cost_of_Special_Subscriber_Unit = 400 
Cost_of_Subscriber_Units[Region] = 
Total_Cost_of_Special_Subscriber_Units[Region]+Total_Cost_of__Normal_Subscriber
_Units[Region]+Cost_of_Power_Supply[Region] 
Cost_of_Wireless__Telephone_Line[Region] = 
Cost_of_Core_Network_and_B_Station_per_Wless_Line[Region]+Costs_of_Subscribe
r_Units_per_Line[Region] 
Cost_of__Solar_Panel = 500 
Fraction_of_Mobile_Subscribers[Region] = 
Wireless__Subscribers[Region]*Share_of__Mobile_Users_per_B_Station[Region]/Tot
al_Phone_Lines[Region] 
Fraction_of_Mobility_offered[Region] = 
Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region]*Mobility_Offered[Region]/Actual_Wless_
Lines_per_BS[Region] 
Indicated_Area_of__Cell[Region] = 
Max_Wless_Lines_per_Base_Station/New_Lines__per_Area[Region] 
Max_Area_of_Cell = (Max_Radio__of_Cell^2)*3.1416 
Max_Radio__of_Cell = 30 
Max_Wless_Lines_per_Base_Station = 5000 
Mobility_Offered[Region] = IF(Cost_of_Normal_Subscriber_Unit < 100) THEN 
(Wireless_Flag[Region]*1) ELSE (0) 
Normal_Area__of_Cell = (Normal_Radio__of_Cell^2)*3.1416 
Normal_Radio__of_Cell = 5 
Share_of__Mobile_Users_per_B_Station[Region] = 
Avg_Mobile_Users_per_Base_Station[Region]*Mobility_Offered[Region]/Avg_Wirele
ss_Lines_per_Base_Station[Region] 
Total_Cost_of_Special_Subscriber_Units[Region] = 
Cost_of_Special_Subscriber_Unit*Wless_Lines_outside_Normal_Cell[Region] 
Total_Cost_of__Normal_Subscriber_Units[Region] = 
Cost_of_Normal_Subscriber_Unit*Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region] 
Total_Phone_Lines[Region] = 
Connected__Subscribers[Region]+VAS_Users[Prepaid_Phone,Region]+VAS_Users[Vi
rtual_Telephony,Region] 
Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region] = Actual_Wless_Lines_per_BS[Region]-
Wless_Lines_outside_Normal_Cell[Region] 
Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell_without_electricity[Region] = 
Wless_Lines_inside_Normal_Cell[Region]*(1-Access_to_Electricity[Region]) 
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Wless_Lines_outside_Normal_Cell[Region] = 
New_Lines__per_Area[Region]*((Actual_Area_of_Cell[Region]-
Normal_Area__of_Cell)*Outside_Cell_Wless_Lines_Adequacy[Region]) 
Wless_Lines_outside_Normal_Cell_without_electricity[Region] = (1-
Access_to_Electricity[Region])*Wless_Lines_outside_Normal_Cell[Region] 
Area__Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Max_Area_of_Cell/Indicated_Area_of__Cell[Region]) 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.215), (1.00, 0.425), (1.00, 0.615), (1.00, 0.74), (1.00, 0.84), (1.01, 
0.91), (1.01, 0.96), (1.01, 0.985), (1.01, 1.00), (1.01, 1.00) 
Outside_Cell_Wless_Lines_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Actual_Area_of_Cell[Region]/Normal_Area__of_Cell) 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.285), (1.01, 0.485), (1.01, 0.625), (1.02, 0.735), (1.02, 0.825), 
(1.03, 0.885), (1.03, 0.935), (1.04, 0.975), (1.04, 0.995), (1.05, 1.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
TELECOM POLICIES EQUATIONS: 
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Market_Price[Region](t) = Market_Price[Region](t - dt) + (Price_Adjustment[Region]) 
* dt 
INIT Market_Price[Region] = Referential_Market_Price[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
Price_Adjustment[Region] = (Indicated_Price[Region]-
Market_Price[Region])/Time_to__Adjust_Price[Region] 
M_Rental_Fee[Region](t) = M_Rental_Fee[Region](t - dt) + (MRF_Growth[Region]) * 
dt 
INIT M_Rental_Fee[Region] = M_Rental_Fee_Indicated_[Region] 
INFLOWS: 
MRF_Growth[Region] = (M_Rental_Fee_Indicated_[Region]-
M_Rental_Fee[Region])/MRF_Adj_Time 
Universal_Service__Obligation(t) = Universal_Service__Obligation(t - dt) + 
(USO_Growth) * dt 
INIT Universal_Service__Obligation = USO_Referential 
 
INFLOWS: 
USO_Growth = (Universal_Service_Obligation_Indicated-
Universal_Service__Obligation)/USO_Adj_Time 
USO_Policy(t) = USO_Policy(t - dt) + (USO_Policy_Adjustment) * dt 
INIT USO_Policy = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
USO_Policy_Adjustment = (Policy_Start_Indicated-
USO_Policy)/Time_to__Implement_Policy 
VAS_Investment_Policy(t) = VAS_Investment_Policy(t - dt) + (VAS_Inv_Growth) * 
dt 
INIT VAS_Investment_Policy = VAS_Investment_Policy_Indicated 
 
INFLOWS: 
VAS_Inv_Growth = (VAS_Investment_Policy_Indicated-
VAS_Investment_Policy)/VAS_Inv_A_T 
Indicated_Price[Region] = 
Market_Clearing_Adequacy[Region]*Referential_Market_Price[Region] 
Market_Price_Flag = 0 
MRF_Adj_Time = 3 
M_Rental_Fee_Indicated_[Urban] = Referential_Monthly__Rental[Urban] 
M_Rental_Fee_Indicated_[Rural] = Referential_Monthly__Rental[Rural] 
Policy_Start_Indicated = 
IF(Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Urban]>=Demanded_Telephone__Lines[Urban] AND 
Region_Telephone_Density[Urban]>=0.01)THEN(1)ELSE(0) 
Referential_Market_Price[Region] = Referential_Price[Region] 
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Referential_Monthly__Rental[Urban] = Referential_Price[Urban]*(1-
Market_Price_Flag)+Market_Price[Urban]*Market_Price_Flag 
Referential_Monthly__Rental[Rural] = 
Referential_Price[Rural]+0*Market_Price[Rural]*Market_Price_Flag 
Referential_Price[Urban] = 1 
Referential_Price[Rural] = 1 
Referential_Time_to_Adjust_Market_Price = 60 
Time_to__Adjust_Price[Region] = 
Referential_Time_to_Adjust_Market_Price*(1+Market_Clearing_Adequacy[Region]) 
Time_to__Implement_Policy = 12 
Universal_Service_Obligation_Indicated = IF(USO_Policy > 0.9 AND 
USO_Improved_Flag = 1)THEN(USO_Improved)ELSE(USO_Indicated) 
USO_Adj_Time = 3 
USO_Improved = 0.45 
USO_Improved_Flag = 0 
USO_Indicated = IF(TIME < 48) THEN (USO_Referential+0.215*0) ELSE 
(USO_Referential) 
USO_Referential = 0.035 
VAS_Investment_Policy_Indicated = VAS_Investment_Referential 
VAS_Investment_Referential = 0 
VAS_Inv_A_T = 30 
Market_Clearing_Adequacy[Region] = 
GRAPH(Supplied__Telephone_Lines[Region]/Demanded_Telephone__Lines[Region]) 
(0.00, 10.0), (0.2, 7.35), (0.4, 5.20), (0.6, 3.55), (0.8, 2.25), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 0.45), 
(1.40, 0.1), (1.60, 0.1), (1.80, 0.05), (2.00, 0.005) 
 
 
 
